By Fabio Bosco
On July 31, the State of Israel assassinated top Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, where he was about to attend the inauguration of the new Iranian president.
The day before, Hezbollah leader Fouad Shukr was killed by an Israeli missile in Dahye, a Shiite-majority neighborhood in Beirut, where many Hezbollah members live.
The two assassinations are aimed at expanding the Israeli aggression towards Lebanon and Iran and, at the same time, maintaining the genocidal aggression in Gaza and the West Bank, in order to defuse the internal Israeli crisis and save the Netanyahu government.
The internal Israeli crisis takes a leap after October 7
The State of Israel was already going through a major economic and political crisis before October 7. On the one hand, the economy has been in crisis since the beginning of 2023, among other reasons due to capital flight from the technological sector. On the other hand, the judicial reform imposed by the Netanyahu government was opposed by broad liberal Zionist sectors, including capitalists and sectors of the armed forces, the Mossad, the Shin Bet, and the state bureaucracy.
From the action of the Palestinian resistance, led by Hamas on October 7 until the present, new crises have been added to the previous ones (1).
The first crisis is related to the loss of credibility of the State of Israel and the Netanyahu government in the eyes of the Israeli Jewish population, which has understood that the “security” discourse is a fraud, and is mobilizing to demand elections to overthrow the government.
The second crisis is related to the war effort. The prolongation of the genocide in Gaza has had a strong impact on the economy, both in terms of costs and the mobilization of reservists. Under pressure from the armed forces and the population, the government began asking members of the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox Jews) community to perform military service. The Haredim are mobilizing against the draft and are facing heavy police repression. It is important to keep in mind that the two parties representing the Haredim are part of the Netanyahu government and their departure could lead to the fall of the government. (2)
Another factor affecting the mobilization of soldiers is the Palestinian resistance in Gaza. Despite the ongoing genocide, in which more than 40,000 Palestinians have been killed (a figure that could in reality be as high as 186,000 according to the journal Lancet), and 70% of all buildings in Gaza (residences, schools, hospitals, businesses) have been destroyed, Palestinian resistance forces have been carrying out guerrilla actions against Israeli forces and have been holding more than 100 Israeli prisoners in hiding for 300 days. (3)
The issue of the Israeli prisoners brings us to the third crisis: the families of the Israeli prisoners supported the genocide, believing that the prisoners would be released. Today, however, the families are mobilizing against the Netanyahu government, demanding an immediate ceasefire to free the prisoners. Their mobilizations are growing every week and have become popular despite police repression.
Finally, there is a crisis with the Zionist fascist far right. Recently, a mob led by members of the government and members of parliament invaded the Sde Teman military camp to free nine Israeli soldiers imprisoned for the barbaric torture and rape of Palestinian prisoners from Gaza. This led to a conflict between the military chief and the fascist-Zionist ministers. There is an ongoing campaign to demand independent investigations into these cases of torture and rape.(4)
To escape from this multifaceted crisis, Netanyahu has launched murderous attacks on the capitals of Lebanon and Iran to provoke a generalized war, drag imperialism into his military defense, in addition to preventing any ceasefire in Gaza and gaining the possibility for his own political survival.(5)
Imperialisms are about to be involuntarily dragged into a regional war
The imperialisms (American, European, Japanese, Chinese and Russian) do not want the expansion of Israeli military aggression, for reasons of economic and social stability.
Israeli aggression will hit the world economy by increasing oil prices and disrupting commercial traffic in the Red Sea, one of the most important shipping routes in the world. Moreover, it could pave the way for a wave of mass anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and mass democratic radicalization that threatens the entire regional order.
However, the weakening of dominant (U.S.) imperialism, particularly at a time of polarized national elections, makes it possible for Netanyahu to set the Middle East on fire and attempt to drag the U.S., and possibly European imperialism, into the military defense of Israel, just as the U.S. and UK are doing against the Yemeni Houthis.
Iranian regime and Hezbollah do not want war
The Iranian regime and Hezbollah have already demonstrated by words and actions their opposition to a generalized military conflict with Israel. However, the assassinations of Ismail Haniyeh and Fouad Shukr force them to give some response. Any response, however restrained it has been so far, could serve as a motive for Israel to launch a generalized aggression.(6)
Hamas wants a permanent cease-fire and the PNA wants Gaza
Hamas wants a permanent cease-fire as a precondition for a prisoner exchange. In the long term, contrary to what the imperialist media reports, Hamas does not propose the destruction of the State of Israel, but rather a 20 or 30 year hudna (Arabic word for truce) between the State of Israel and a Palestinian mini-state, without formal mutual recognition. This would allow the reconstruction of Gaza and the strengthening of Hamas.(7)
The Palestinian National Authority, controlled by the Palestinian Fatah party, wants to take over control in Gaza from Hamas and form a Palestinian mini-state in security cooperation with the State of Israel. Its main competitor is Palestinian millionaire (and criminal) Mohammad Dahlan, who has the support of the United Arab Emirates to rule Gaza at the head of foreign troops.
The main organizations of the Palestinian left (PFLP, PFLP and People’s Party) have capitulated to the Arab regimes and to the so-called “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran and Hezbollah and, in Palestine, are divided between support for the PNA (under the allegation of defense of secularism), for Hamas, or a self-proclaimed position of opposition to both. (8)
Advancing solidarity towards a free Palestine, from the river to the sea.
It is unclear whether Israel will succeed in dragging Iran and Hezbollah into a war against the wishes of their leaders. It is possible that Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah will swallow all Israeli provocations without a proportionate reaction, as they have done so far. In any case, we oppose any Israeli aggression, whether inside or outside Palestine.
At the same time, we advocate active solidarity, including military solidarity, with the Palestinians. Unfortunately, the only Arab force building effective solidarity is the Yemeni Houthis.
In the event of war between Israel and Iran or Hezbollah, we will be in the Lebanese and Iranian military camp to defeat Israel. However, we cannot put all our hopes on these bourgeois organizations and regimes. It is necessary to push for the independent organization of the Palestinian and Arab working class to fight for the end of the State of Israel, for the liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea, and for the overthrow of the Arab autocratic regimes, towards a Socialist Federation of Arab Countries.
(1) https://litci.org/es/palestina-el-ataque-del-7-de-octubre-y-su-lugar-en-la-historia/
(2) https://litci.org/es/el-movimiento-israeli-contra-la-guerra-crece-a-pesar-de-su-falta-de-vision/
(4) https://www.addameer.org/news/5382
(5) https://litci.org/es/estan-israel-y-hezbollah-al-borde-de-una-guerra-generalizada/
(6) https://litci.org/es/el-contraataque-irani-crea-mas-incertidumbre-en-medio-oriente/
(7) https://litci.org/es/corte-de-la-haya-abre-investigacion-por-genocidio-pero-rechaza-alto-el-fuego/
(8) https://mondoweiss.net/2024/05/la-cuestión-de-hamas-y-la-izquierda/
