By Esat Erdoğan
Since 2016, Turkiye has been ruled by a new Bonapartist regime in which all powers are concentrated in the executive palace, with rule by appointed trustees without separation of powers. Erdoğan is the undisputed Bonaparte of this regime as a leader who has even “liquidated” his own party. A capitalist oligarchy dominated by the energy, arms and construction sectors is clustered around the palace. This weak and distorted regime is sustained by the pressure of the judiciary and security bureaucracy on all sections of the struggle.
Under the impact of numerous political, economic and regional crises, Erdoğan Bonaparte has long lost his popularity and credibility among the people. As a result of this loss of power, he lost the 2024 mayoral elections against the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). The municipalities of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Antalya, Bursa and other cities where money and social amenities are concentrated passed to the opposition.
Enraged by the shocking electoral defeat, Erdoğan’s palace regime began to develop tactics to forcibly take back the municipalities won by the opposition and to set up an election that it could not lose. The first of these tactics was to forcibly intimidate the opposition and the municipalities they govern with the cudgel of the judiciary loyal to the Palace, rendering them impotent. The second was to split the third largest party in the country, the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), and the Kurds who vote for it, away from the opposition bloc. The regime has long used repression against the Kurds, and now it is continuing the process by calling it peace. Thirdly, the regime has started to attack the capitalists and religious sects that have distanced themselves from Erdoğan.
The Palace Attacks the Opposition with the Judiciary and Security Bureaucracy
The palace has been appointing trustees to DEM Party-run municipalities for many years and has held the prominent Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtaş in prison for 9 years as a political hostage for no legal reason. The regime also unlawfully imprisoned prominent figures of the Gezi uprising (2014). Lawyer Can Atalay, deputy of the Workers’ Party of Turkiye (TİP), businessman Osman Kavala, film producer Cigdem Mater, architect Tayfun Kahraman and others have been unjustly imprisoned for years without any legal basis. Ümit Ozdag, the leader of the right-wing Victory Party, which has an anti-Erdoğan political line, is also a prisoner of the regime. Ozdag has been declared an enemy by the regime, especially because of their ability to rally nationalist votes. It should be added that the heads of TUSIAD, Turkiye’s largest business organization, have also been harshly detained for their criticism of the course of events in the country.
This wave of arrests, trusteeships and security state operations reached a new phase with the arrest of the mayors of large municipalities run by the CHP and the appointment of trustees to their municipalities. The grounds for arrest were sometimes alliances with the legal Kurdish party and sometimes corruption. The cases were weak, the documents insufficient, but the arrests continued. Shortly afterwards, the Palace negotiated a “peace” with the Kurds of Turkiye and a disarmament of the PKK.
On March 19, the Palace upped the ante by having Erdoğan’s main rival, Istanbul mayor Imamoğlu, arrested. However, something he did not expect happened: the university youth crossed the barricades and did not listen to the Palace’s warnings. Lit by the spark of the university students, mass mobilizations began. For the first time, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) joined the street protests of the masses.
The 2nd Month of the Coup Left Behind
The mass mobilizations that started with the political coup of March 19 have emerged from their 2nd month. The wave of resistance led by university students continues, albeit at a slower pace. However, despite all the dynamism of the mass movement led by the student youth, socialists and the CHP, which is the primary victim of the issue, the palace regime of Erdoğan Bonaparte has not yet been dissolved. Although the regime could not appoint a trustee in Istanbul, it paralyzed the municipality with 5 waves of arrests. Detentions, arrests and forced confessions continue. Images of torture and harassment have become commonplace during protests. Early morning raids against socialists and revolutionary youth leading the protests have become continuous. The May Day raids were undoubtedly one of the most widespread. Journalists and the independent press are hamstrung by fines and physical threats. Thousands of people were detained and hundreds were arrested. Imamoğlu’s lawyers were detained and not only that, lawsuits were filed against the lawyers’ lawyers. The legal dissolution of the CHP is still on the Palace’s agenda. Freedom of protest, which is a constitutional right, is prevented by arbitrary bans. Young people are suspended from school.
The palace is trying to buy time until the summer by creating debates to change the agenda in parallel with its attacks. The Minister of Health started a debate over the definition of “family”. The Minister of National Education reopened the headscarf debate and tried to pit the religious against the secular. The debate regarding the use of C-sections in childbirth was brought to the agenda. On the one hand, there is the peace process with the Kurds. On the other hand, there are crackdowns on sects that do not support Erdoğan. There are discussions that put the principle of secularism into question.
The palace does not hide that it wants to ensure the absolute power of the right. It would not be wrong to say that it has somehow managed to unite its masses. In a process leading to elections, it is certain that they will attempt to ensure that the order remains unchanged, by force and fraud if necessary. However, they can neither hide the destruction of the economic crisis nor the lawlessness of the political coup. Further, Erdoğan has been given the power to dismiss any officer he wants from the army with a simple decree. Meanwhile, despite all their shows of strength, they are becoming more economically and politically dependent on imperialism. They are regressing from being the playmaker in Syria to the subcontractor of U.S. imperialism and the Gulf oligarchies.
Although Erdoğan’s partner, the MHP, objects from time to time, the coalition has not yet cracked. U.S. imperialism constantly reiterates its support for Erdoğan. There are no clear signs of a rupture in the forces within the regime either. The most obvious crack appears within the capitalist bloc. However, the detentions, arrests and threats against the bosses who support Imamoğlu intimidate the other wing of the bourgeoisie.
It is possible to liken this situation to the dynamic experienced by Belarus. Similarly, the protests against electoral fraud, demands for freedom and youth protests slowed down at first because the labor movement did not actively participate in the struggle, the state bureaucracy did not crack and the support of Russian imperialism remained strong. Then the regime took the initiative and suppressed the opposition with a wave of arrests and violence.
It would not be wrong to say that Turkiye is experiencing a similar situation. The difference is that Turkiye has a democracy, albeit a distorted one, and a well-established and resilient opposition culture. Left forces are actively on the streets. Although the prisons are full, there is no widespread fear in the mass movement. It would not be wrong to describe the situation as a stalemate.
In summary, although the mass movement maintains its morale, the regime continues its stubborn repression in order to increase despair. The wall of fear has been breached, but there is still a pause. Erdoğan’s political coup has been slowed down a bit, but it has not stopped yet. The mass movement is angry, brave but retreating. Exams have started at universities. Schools will close. Summer vacation is coming.
Possibilities in the Struggle
University and high school youth are on the streets after many years. After the 1980 military coup, it would not be wrong to say that these are the most massive student protests. Their creative actions often bring them face to face with the security forces. However, the harsh wave of arrests, disproportionate violence and expulsions by the state are slowing down the movement. There is no centralized political leadership, even though they coordinate among themselves. Young people want to live freely without fear of the future. They hate Erdoğan and the Palace; they advocate for the release of Imamoğlu. And of course, they want to live freely without interference in their way of life. We need more coordination to unite the student movement and a program of action that directly targets the regime.
The Kurds, another dynamic force in the country, have retreated organizationally with the newly started peace process. Although they officially express their opposition to the arrests and trustees, in practice they are cautious both because of the right-wing extremists participating in the protests and because they are afraid of disrupting the peace process.
The labor movement is silent in the face of the political coup. There are struggles against unemployment, the rising cost of living and deteriorating working conditions. But they are not yet widespread. The regime is preventing the labor movement from taking to the streets, sometimes by compromise, sometimes by force. There are workplaces where the regime forces the bosses to reach an agreement with the workers. Bought union bureaucrats also serve the regime. Unions with an orientation towards struggle are under threat of arrest.
The regime is on edge despite its strength from the security bureaucracy. The economy has gotten worse after Imamoğlu’s arrest. With its room for maneuver shrinking, it is relieved to have the support of the U.S., EU and Russian imperialisms, but it is unclear whether it will be able to secure its spoils in the fight for division in Ukraine and Syria. At the very least he hopes to win construction contracts.
As a result, the regime has entered an irreversible path and is ready to commit all sorts of evil to keep its power. The majority of the people, especially the youth, hate it. This makes the Palace even more aggressive. But this is not enough to bring it down. A wave of strikes to accompany the youth actions is what would break up all the coalitions in the Palace. This is the direction things are going in, the fire is heating up in the industrial zones. Even if the summer vacation is Erdoğan’s hope, if the expected worker raises do not come in July, a wave of struggle that will shake the palace may come from the grassroots.
The Erdoğan regime is shaking but it will not fall easily. The mass movement needs a patient, persistent struggle. It needs a united class-based political leadership and an action program independent of the CHP. It is necessary to focus discussions and struggles on building this alternative.
