By Érika Andreassy (PSTU – Brazil)
It is common to hear the government and even activist sectors claim that Lula is a well-intentioned president who wants to create a government for the poor but whose hands are tied by Congress and the “Centrão,” (1) and who is therefore being “held hostage” by the balance of power.
While this view may make sense to some workers clinging to the hope that things will improve, especially after defeats like the recent one when the Chamber of Deputies revoked the presidential decree adjusting IOF tax rates, it must be firmly rejected.
It is not true that Lula’s government is a neutral actor seeking profound reforms but is being hampered by institutions. The government is part of the regime. Currently, it is the primary political manager of the Brazilian bourgeois state, implementing a program of class conciliation that guarantees the interests of big capitalists while managing popular discontent.
A conscious manager of the bourgeois order
The Brazilian political system is one of the main instruments of bourgeois class rule. Any government that agrees to act within institutional frameworks without mobilizing the working class and breaking with the pillars of capitalism is doomed to manage crises to maintain order.
So-called “governability” is just a fancy name for this system of bourgeois control over any government that aims to manage their interests. The Workers’ Party (PT) knows this game well and consciously accepts it. The “Centrão,” on the other hand, is not an “external force” or an enemy seeking to block the government’s popular project. It is an integral part of the regime’s support base and of Lula’s government.
The governability sought by the PT is based on the Centrão
The government has consciously formed alliances with the agribusiness sector, banks, and the army. This has been the case since the 2022 campaign when the government formed an alliance with Alckmin. Today, ministries are occupied by its direct representatives.
The IOF’s defeat shows that, amid the current capitalist decline, even the most modest reforms cannot be enacted without confrontation. However, the government does not want confrontation. It seeks stability in order to maintain the fiscal framework, guarantee the profits of banks and large corporations, and continue presenting itself as progressive through concrete actions. It is not a hostage but an accomplice.
The specter of the far right is political blackmail
Since 2018, the far right has occupied a prominent place in the Brazilian political landscape. Even with Bolsonaro’s disqualification, Bolsonarism remains alive and is in the process of reorganization. The movement is divided between those seeking a more institutional image, such as Tarcísio de Freitas, and those who are more radical and ideological, such as Nikolas Ferreira and Pablo Marçal. Its social base remains active and is fueled by reactionary moralism, churches, social media, and social resentment among the middle and working classes.
What is the government doing about this? It is engaging in constant blackmail. “We cannot criticize the government too much; otherwise, the far right will return.” This rhetoric is repeated by PT and PSOL parliamentarians, union leaders, and even leftist intellectuals. Any criticism of conciliation, economic policy, or repression in the outskirts is considered “friendly fire,” as if Lula were the last defense against “fascism.”
However, this blackmail does nothing to defeat Bolsonarism. It serves to protect the government. Even worse, this strategy paralyzes the working class and prevents the development of a genuine, autonomous, revolutionary alternative. As a result, the far right is advancing not only despite Lula’s government but also thanks to it.
The government’s role is to contain the struggle and protect the regime
Sectors of the ruling party repeatedly claim that “this is not the time to criticize, or the far right will return.” This includes the Workers’ Party (PT), the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), most of the PSOL (Socialist Party), and the UP (Workers’ Party), as well as some union, grassroots, and student leaders. These groups play a central role by acting as intermediaries between the government and social movements, channeling discontent within the confines of the system. They justify every government setback as “what is possible within the balance of power,” urging patience and talking about tactical advances. However, they continue to feed the illusion that it is possible to govern for the poor hand in hand with the rich.
Their main function is to prevent the formation of an independent, socialist alternative.
“Critical support” also helps shield the government
Faced with the erosion of the traditional ruling base, sectors are emerging that seek to present themselves as an alternative within it. They claim to offer crucial support and to be with the people, yet they continue to contribute to the government’s survival.
This is the case with some PSOL sectors, such as the MES, as well as part of the progressive intelligentsia. They denounce some government policies and sometimes vote against specific measures, yet they refuse to abandon the strategy of class collaboration. They remain trapped in institutional logic, believing that they can push for change from within.
In 2022, these sectors called for a vote for Lula without making any political demands. Now, they claim to be outside the government, yet they play a role similar to that of the ruling coalition in practice. They participate in broad fronts with the Workers’ Party (PT), sign joint manifestos, and offer mild and specific criticisms that do not alter the course of general policy.
This stance is dangerous because it confuses activists and hinders the development of a left-wing opposition to the government and an independent, class-based solution for workers—that is, a real alternative.
What would it mean to truly govern for the people?
To govern for workers, one must break with the interests of big capital. This would entail repealing the fiscal framework and allocating state resources to popular needs, renationalizing strategic companies under worker control, imposing high taxes on large fortunes, suspending public debt payments, and guaranteeing free, quality public housing, education, healthcare, and transportation. It would also mean confronting police who murder Black youth in favelas and guaranteeing the democratic rights of the masses, including legalizing abortion for women.
These measures are not utopian; they are concrete demands that could improve the lives of the working class and pave the way for a socialist transition. However, they are impossible to implement with a government complicit with the bourgeoisie.
Given that popular mobilization, not agreements with the market, is the only way to implement these measures, and Lula has no intention of doing so, the narrative that the government is supposedly hostage to Congress and the “Centrão” is completely false. The defeat of the IOF decree is just another reminder that there is no institutional solution within a regime built to guarantee capital profits.
A workers’ government supported by the masses
The solution to the Brazilian crisis will not come from the Workers’ Party (PT), the Socialist Party (PSOL), or any other reformist or conciliatory class variant. Rather, it will come from a workers’ government without bosses, bankers, or generals. It will be a government based on the direct mobilization of the masses, on grassroots councils, and on struggle committees. It will confront the rich, break with imperialism, and reorganize society on the basis of socialism. This requires participating in real struggles and investing in the self-organization of workers, precarious sectors, youth, women, indigenous peoples, Black people, and LGBTQI+ communities. It means not betting on alliances with those who hold power.
The central task of activism is not only to defeat the far right at the ballot box but also to end the capitalist system that sustains its political existence. This requires breaking with conciliation, unmasking the role of the government, challenging the consciousness of the new vanguard emerging in the struggles, and preparing the conditions for a real alternative to those currently in power.
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(1) At term used in Brazil to refer to a group of opportunistic bourgeois political parties that negotiate their votes in parliament in exchange for perks or positions.
