Chavista collectives: are they ‘guardians of the revolution’ or paramilitary groups?

The following article was originally published on the IWL website in 2017:

The German news agency DW, citing the Venezuelan Observatory on Social Conflict (OVCS), claims that ‘the colectivos’ are parapolice and paramilitary groups operating in close coordination with other state security forces. DW concludes that: ‘Unarmed civilians in Venezuela are the ones most likely to suffer at the hands of these militias, which have been compared more than once to the Tonton Macoute of Haitian dictator François Duvalier (1957–1971).’

While this comparison may seem exaggerated, in opposition demonstrations and workers’ struggles in recent years, some of these armed civilian groups have been seen acting alongside the National Guard or the police. They have fired their weapons in order to disperse and intimidate protesters. In several cases, they have been responsible for deaths and injuries.

Some of these collectives have existed since the Caracazo (1989), predating Chávez and Chavismo. They were a form of organisation for left-wing activists in the working-class neighbourhoods of Caracas. They carried out political, community and cultural activities.

Many played a prominent role during the pro-US coup of 2002, confronting it at a time when Chávez was imprisoned and the Chavista apparatus had already surrendered. They also attacked the headquarters of FEDECAMARAS, where the most reactionary Venezuelan business leaders are based, including Pedro Carmona, the short-lived president who succeeded Chávez. They also rebelled against the Chavista policy of ‘forgiving’ the coup plotters. At that time, they were known as ‘Bolivarian Circles’ and had spread throughout numerous neighbourhoods, where they were the most respected authority. Chávez referred to them as ‘the armed wing of the revolution’.

One of the oldest collectives is La Piedrita, which emerged in the mid-1980s. Other groups included Alexis Vive (named in honour of Alexis González Rivette, an activist killed during the 2002 coup), Tupamaros (named after the well-known Uruguayan guerrilla group), the Revolutionary Liberation Movement and the Simón Bolívar Coordinating Committee, among others.

Institutionalisation

At the same time, Chávez and Chavismo realised that these ‘circles’ represented dual power and that they could not lose control of them. They therefore had to ‘tame’ them.

Part of this policy involved transforming them into mere ‘electoral committees’, controlled by trusted cadres, particularly after the 2004 ‘recall referendum’. Conversely, they gradually became committees that implemented the Missions for education, medical care, food distribution, and so on. In other words, most of them became instruments of the Chavista apparatus.

Chávez’s death and the ‘fragmentation of power’

Since Chávez’s death, power in Venezuela has been fragmenting. This has also occurred in the case of the colectivos. According to journalist Sebastiana Barraez, ‘not all of them answer to Maduro’. Some are close to Diosdado Cabello and a faction within the FANB. Others are aligned with Freddy Bernal, who is in charge of distributing CLAPs (Local Supply and Production Committees). Bernal also acts as a ‘protector’ (a sort of parallel governor) of Táchira state, which is one of the most conflict-ridden in the country due to its location on the main border with Colombia.

While all are funded by the government, some human rights organisations believe that ‘while not all, a significant proportion are financed through illegal activities’ [1].

As the country has experienced economic and social decline, the colectivos have evolved and slipped out of the direct control of Chavismo. Several have even been accused by the former Minister of the Interior, López Torres, of being mere ‘criminals’. In 2014, the young deputy José Serra, who was closely linked to the ‘collectives’, was murdered in a confusing incident involving an ‘attempted robbery’ at his home.

José Odreman, a former police officer and one of the leaders of the Coordinadora 5 de Marzo (comprising some 100 collectives), declared to the media: “Enough of killing comrades! If anything happens to me, I hold Minister López Torres responsible.’ A few days later, Odreman was killed in ‘a confrontation with criminals’, along with other members of the Coordinadora [2].

The importance and strength of these groups was demonstrated when the collectives took to the streets of Caracas in protest, demanding the resignation of López Torres and a thorough investigation into the murders. The minister resigned a few days later.

From ‘guardians of the revolution’ to paramilitary groups

Not all collectives have used weapons to intimidate. However, workers and other popular groups that have mobilised report the presence of these groups, who have beaten them to disperse them or fired at them.

Roberto Briceño of the OVCS defines them as ‘true paramilitary groups in Venezuela’. They also operate in factories and other workplaces, pressuring and intimidating activists. This shift in their role as ‘paramilitary’ repressors became abundantly clear in 2017, when they attacked the massive demonstrations that year alongside the National Guard, resulting in more than 100 deaths.

According to the human rights NGO PROVEA, the Maduro government has reportedly used these groups to suppress the latest opposition demonstrations. The so-called ‘colectivos’ operated in: Acarigua, Barcelona, Barinas, Barquisimeto, Boconó, Cabimas, Cagua, Calabozo, Caracas, Carora, Carrizal, Carúpano, Ciudad Bolívar, Coro, Cumaná, Ejido, El Tigre, El Vigía, Guanare, Guarenas–Guatire, La Guaira, La Victoria, Los Teques, Maracaibo, Maracay, Maturín, Mérida, Naguanagua, Ocumare del Tuy, Pampanito, Porlamar, Puerto Ayacucho, Puerto Cabello, Puerto La Cruz, Puerto Ordaz, Punto Fijo, San Antonio de los Altos, San Antonio del Táchira, San Carlos, San Felipe, San Fernando de Apure, San Joaquín, San Juan de los Morros, Santa Elena de Uairén, Tinaquillo, Tucupita, Upata and Ureña., Valencia and Valera [3].

Decline and decay of the ‘colectivos’

As mentioned above, there are signs of disintegration in several of these groups. The economic crisis and budget cuts have led them to rely on illegal funding methods (kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking, etc.). Some have degenerated into common gangs that sell their services to the highest bidder, sometimes firing on opposition demonstrations and other times supporting them. For this reason, they no longer offer any guarantees, which is problematic for the dictatorship.

According to several journalists, some ‘colectivos’ are reportedly in crisis and have differences with Maduro. These journalists have even reported ‘hundreds of defections’ by their members and their flight to Colombia and Brazil. We have not been able to verify this information. However, this may explain why Iris Varela, the Venezuelan minister in charge of prisons, appeared at the Colombian border accompanied by armed civilians (who were reportedly “prisoners”) to carry out repressive actions.

Today, they are firing on opponents of the Chavista regime. However, given the regime’s accelerating disintegration, it would not be surprising if a faction of these ‘collectives’, which have devolved into paramilitary groups involved in legal and illegal enterprises with no political agenda, were to switch allegiance to the other bourgeois, pro-imperialist opposition, which is so corrupt that it offers ‘amnesty’ to military and civilian leaders. Some of these groups may benefit from this ‘amnesty’ by turning their guns on their former comrades-in-arms.

[1] See http://www.defiendoddhh.org/rafael-uzcategui/

[2] http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/sucesos/quien-era-jose-odreman-lider-del-colectivo-marzo_118415  

[3] https://www.derechos.org.ve/ y http://talcualdigital.com/

[4] http://epmundo.com/2019/iris-varela-suelta-presos-en-la-frontera-videos-evidencia/