Recently an article signed by the CST, the MRT, and by comrades Plínio de Arruda Sampaio and Silvio Sinedino was published, which polemicizes with the opinion of the PSTU on the conclusion of the experience of the Socialist and Revolutionary Pole. The comrades make a positive balance of the experience, and criticize us for having defended -in the face of the differences established on the strategy for the Pole – its termination.
By: Eduardo Almeida and Zé Maria
They claim that precisely at a time when the majority of the left, including the PSOL, supports the broad front headed by Lula, more than ever a socialist and class-independent alternative for the working class is needed. And that the political differences already existed before and, therefore, do not justify the end of the Pole experience now.
In the first place, let us appreciate what we agree with our comrades on: a positive balance of the experience of the Pole. The degree of agreement and joint action that we built among various organizations and leaders, despite the presence of various differences including in the electoral campaign, is important. We especially value a healthy methodology for dealing with differences marked by frankness in debates and respect for the opinions of others.
We want to preserve this methodology, and that is why we felt it necessary to resume the dialogue with the comrades, to seek more clarity on the nature of the debates that took place among us and on the reasons that led us to the conclusion that it was better to end the experience. Let us turn then to the arguments put forward by the comrades.
It is true that the differences that were established when we moved on to the debate on strategy were to a certain extent already foreshadowed previously. On the other hand, the need for a socialist and revolutionary alternative for the Brazilian working class is really urgent. Indeed, it was already so when we began to build the Pole. The support of the majority of the left (including the PSOL leadership) for Lula’s candidacy, at that time, was the main reason for the call we made. It is enough to read the Pole Manifesto to confirm this.
Therein lies the problem that comrades don’t seem to appreciate. The reality evolved after that. On the one hand, we sought to advance, within the Pole, a debate on the program of that socialist and revolutionary alternative that we need to build. On the other hand, the political reality of the country deepened the process of capitulation of the PSOL to the alternative of class conciliation headed by Lula.
What lessons and conclusions do we draw from this process that the PSOL is undergoing?
It seems clear to us that the worst predictions we made when the idea of the Pole was launched, about the evolution (or the retreat) of the sectors of the Brazilian left that turned to support Lula’s candidacy at that time, were confirmed. The PSOL decided to support the Lula/Alckmin candidacy from the first round, but it did not stop there. Now it has decided to support and is preparing to participate in the broad front government headed by the PT candidate.
The PSOL, thus, is rapidly following the same path of degeneration experienced by the PT, but in worse conditions, since this party never had the mass base in the organized working class that the PT had in its origin. And it is necessary to draw lessons from this whole process, to learn from it, especially from the mistakes.
We do not want to repeat here what we argued in the previous article we published on this subject, so we will only draw attention to a central aspect.
This retreat experienced by the PSOL has as its foundation the establishment of an electoral -and not a revolutionary- strategy as the political horizon of the party. This necessarily leads to a programmatic adaptation of the organization to the limits of the capitalist system. The organizational form adopted by this party is only the result of these political and programmatic positions, an electoral strategy. A party that functions as a broad front where different strategies coexist is only useful in that it brings together one and all in order to elect candidates every two years.
The strategy debate that we initiated in the coordination of the Pole in the final stretch of the electoral campaign dealt precisely with this aspect. The socialist and revolutionary program we defend for the country is not only incompatible with an electoral strategy. This program also presupposes, as a constitutive part of that same program, an organization adequate to the type of task we propose (a socialist revolution carried out by the mobilized masses, and not simply an electoral victory).
Nevertheless, after this process – on the one hand, the road traveled by the PSOL and, on the other hand, the debates and the experience we developed in common in the Pole – we do not see that the comrades have drawn the necessary conclusions or lessons, especially with respect to this central issue.
They continue to defend a political organization in the mold of a broad party, such as the PSOL, or a permanent political coalition of various parties and groupings (with the exception of Sinedino) as a strategy. We do not rule out the use of tactics, and even of electoral fronts in certain circumstances. But we do rule out the “permanent” tactic of building political fronts or broad parties, because what happens here is that this “tactic” becomes, in fact, the “strategy.”
And the experience of the PSOL, to give just one example, did not lead to the strengthening of the revolutionary sectors acting in that party. On the contrary, some even abandoned the revolutionary perspective and became reformists. Repeating this recipe will lead to the same place arrived at by the PT.
The debate between us is about strategy
The CST and Plinio de Arruda Sampaio supported, in the debates we held within the Pole, a political alternative based on a Left Front which, in addition to the components of the Pole, would also include the PCB and the UP. That was the content of the electoral coalition that they proposed for last year’s elections, and on that there was no agreement.
Now, after the elections, they continue to support a Left Front (of the forces that were part of the Pole plus the PCB and the UP) as a strategy for the Pole, that is to say, for the socialist and revolutionary alternative that we need to build for our country.
What degree of strategic unity for a socialist revolution in Brazil could be achieved with two Stalinist organizations, whose programmatic basis is based, as we all know, on class conciliation? The fact that these parties have launched their own candidacies in the first round of the last elections does not make them defenders of the principle of class independence. From what we understood in the discussions that took place in the Pole, the MRT did not agree with this strategy either.
But that is not all. The CST, after this whole process, is still part of the PSOL, a party that supports the bourgeois government of Lula-Alckmin and will participate in it. Honestly, to stay in the PSOL during the electoral campaign already seemed to us out of place. To continue, with this party supporting/participating in the government, seems to us a grave error on the part of the comrades. What class independent alternative can be built under these conditions? Again, it did not seem to us that there was agreement with this option on the part of the MRT nor of Plinio de Arruda Sampaio (who broke with the PSOL during the electoral campaign), nor of Sinedino.
The MRT, on the other hand, defends the construction of a permanent front between parties (for the struggles and for the elections, say the comrades) along the lines of the FIT-U (Workers’ Left Front-Unity) which exists in Argentina. Here is the first problem: besides the PSTU, with which party could such a front be formed in Brazil, preserving class independence? With the PSOL? With the PCB or the UP? Not even the MRT itself is in favor of this.
And, as we said before, permanent fronts of this nature end up effectively adopting elections as a strategy, and pushing their components to prioritize electoral disputes, which is already happening with the Argentine experience in question. It does not serve as a strategy if what is wanted is to prepare the ground for a socialist revolution.
Then, we do not believe that it is possible to advance on the basis of the paths proposed by the comrades, towards the construction of the conditions for a socialist revolution through which our class would take control of the political power of the country and advance in the construction of socialism. The only strategy that could be pursued in the conditions proposed by the comrades would be an electoral strategy, as happens with all organizations of this nature.
That was the difference in strategy (which is also programmatic) that arose and was consolidated from the debates we had in the coordination of the Pole. We proposed to the comrades that we carry out, through social networks, a public debate on this issue, which is of fundamental importance, so that all the activists gathered around the Pole could participate. But the comrades did not agree on that either.
All the above reasons led us to the conclusion that there was no way to continue with the Pole project. Moreover, this conclusion was common to all of us at the time of the debate. We maintain this opinion because as we have said before, it is very important to preserve a relationship based on openness between us and respect for different opinions.
This does not mean at all that we consider the PSTU as the ready-made alternative we need for the country; we are far from that. Nor do we think that building the revolutionary party that we need in Brazil is based on pure and simple adhesion to the PSTU. That is why we made this effort with the initiative of the Pole and we will continue to take initiatives that allow us to join the forces of the revolutionary militancy existing in our country and in the world. But it is useless to gather heterogeneous groups without taking care that this sum is carried out in the right context, guided by a program and a strategy adequate to the revolution we want to carry out. To neglect this care would be to open the way for regression, not for progress.
Therefore, the debate we are having among ourselves – and which is worthwhile – is not about the way in which the Pole project ended, nor about whose proposal it was to end it. It is this problem of content which, once again, we highlight here. If our strategy is the struggle for a socialist revolution in our country, building an organization adequate to this strategy -a Leninist, combative and democratically centralized party- is part of the program we need to embrace.
It is not just a statement based on theory, supported by the experience of a long past in the struggle of our class. It is also based on recent and current experiences. It is the lessons drawn from the experience of the PT, of the PSOL, and of several other similar organizations emerging in several countries across the world.
How long are we going to repeat the mistakes made there? What message do we send to the thousands and thousands of honest socialist fighters who are in the base of the PSOL (and even of the PT), anguished with the directions they see their parties taking? We cannot simply propose that they repeat the mistake, but that we advance in the construction of a different, socialist, and revolutionary alternative. We understand that this must be our position.
We will continue to work together with the comrades who were with us in the Pole. Whether in the struggles of our class against the bosses and against the governments (whatever they may be) always defending the independence of our class, or in the struggle against the Bolsonarist ultra-right. And we will do it through the spaces that exist in the movement for it, like CSP-Conlutas or others that may be created.
But the construction of a revolutionary and socialist alternative, far from being limited to these tasks, goes much further and demands not only a socialist program but an organization that corresponds to the necessity of the struggle needed to carry out this program.
Originally published at www.pstu.org.br, 12/26/2022.
Translation by: John Joseph
