A new Mercosur summit was held in Montevideo in the first week of December. The main item on the agenda was the signing of a free trade agreement with the European Union (EU). This issue still has to be approved by the EU bodies, where there is a division among the member countries, which has been holding up the agreement for many years. Another issue was the proposal by Argentine President Javier Milei to amend Mercosur’s basic agreement to allow member countries to sign bilateral free trade agreements with countries outside the bloc. What is Mercosur and how will this summit affect its dynamics?
By Alejandro Iturbe
Mercosur was created in 1991 and became fully operational in 1994. It currently has Argentina, Bolivia (which will join in 2025), Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay as full members. Venezuela had joined in 2012, but its participation was “suspended” in 2017[1]. Other South American countries have the status of ‘associates’ (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru): they can attend meetings without voting rights and without being obliged to abide by its decisions.
Mercosur is essentially a regional free trade agreement that allows “the free movement of goods, services and factors of production between countries through the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods…”[2]. It also facilitated investment by companies from one member country in another member country of the bloc.
At the same time, Mercosur was supposed to establish “a common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade policy with third countries or groups of countries…” (as it is now trying to do with the EU). This is the constitutive clause that Milei wants to remove or modify.
Subsequently, the bloc adopted agreements allowing for the free movement of persons within its territory, with the simple presentation of a national document, as well as temporary and permanent residence in another country (and the right to work), with simple procedures for obtaining them. The first and subsequent Mercosur agreements are binding on the member countries (which must give them the status of national legislation).
Mercosur had set itself more ambitious goals: “the coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies among member countries: foreign trade, agricultural, industrial, fiscal, monetary, exchange and capital policies…”. There was also talk of creating supranational institutions such as the EU, with the creation of a single currency and a single central bank (along the lines of the eurozone). No progress was ever made on this path and it remained ‘frozen’ at the level we have analysed.
Some facts
According to the World Bank, the five Mercosur countries had a total nominal GDP of $2.916 trillion (of which Brazil accounts for 73%, Argentina for 21.3%, Uruguay for 2.6%, Bolivia for 1.6% and Paraguay for 1.5%). Mercosur’s total GDP would rank eighth on the World Bank’s list, very close to that of France and well above that of major countries such as Italy and Canada.
At the same time, Mercosur is the world’s largest producer of food; it has large reserves of fuel (oil and gas) and is a major producer of electricity; it has abundant mineral reserves (e.g. lithium) and huge freshwater resources (in addition to the many rivers that cross it, its territory contains the gigantic Guarani aquifer). It is also home to the largest area of the Amazon rainforest, the largest tropical forest in the world. Because of its size as a ‘market’ and its immense natural wealth, Mercosur is a ‘very appetising morsel’ for the world’s major economic powers”.
In addition to trade between member countries, in 2021 Mercosur had a trade exchange (sum of exports and imports) with the “rest of the world” of almost 600 billion dollars, according to its official website[3]. Exports accounted for 57% of this figure and imports for 43%: a favourable trade balance (of around 84 billion dollars).
The main exports were metalliferous minerals, oilseeds and oleaginous fruits, fuels and vegetable and mineral oils. The main imports were reactors, boilers, machinery, mechanical appliances and equipment, and electrical machinery, equipment and materials. In other words, it exported food, fuel and raw materials and imported manufactured goods.
Semi-colonial integration
The creation of Mercosur was part of a policy of imperialist capitalism in the 1990s called ‘globalisation’. Free trade agreements reduced or eliminated tariffs and liberalised the movement and establishment of capital.
The signatory governments presented Mercosur as an integration that would strengthen the autonomy of their countries and of the bloc as a whole in the face of imperialism, on the way to “national liberation”. It was a big lie: this integration was at the service of the interests of the big international and national companies (including the landowners), which could thus reduce their costs and plan their investments on a larger market scale, i.e. it was a functional integration of subordination to the imperialist powers (especially the USA).
In the global division of labour established in the 1990s, Mercosur’s role, as we have seen, is that of supplier and exporter of food, fuel and raw materials (especially minerals). At the same time, the favourable trade balances have been used to pay the interest on the foreign debt contracted by these countries in previous decades.
Internal inequalities
Brazil has been the country that has benefited most from the existence of Mercosur. On the one hand, it is a major exporter of food and minerals outside the bloc. On the other hand, its greater industrial development allowed it to become the “regional headquarters” of large industrial companies and their “export platform” to the bloc and South America (especially in the automobile sector). In this framework, while remaining subordinate to imperialism, it established relations of subjugation and exploitation towards the weaker countries. In Paraguay, it appropriated the energy produced by Itaipu[4] and promoted an “invasion” of Brazilian settlers who bought up more and more land and settled in the soya-producing region (the so-called “brasilguayos”)[5]. In Bolivia, Petrobras acquired great power in the exploitation and processing of Bolivian oil and gas, which it then imported into Brazil at “gift prices”[6].
Relations with Argentina (Mercosur’s second largest economy) are much more contradictory. Large industrial companies, especially in the metal-mechanical sector, considered Argentina as a ‘regional’ area integrated into the Brazilian market. Many companies in this sector have established their regional headquarters in Brazil. Argentina retained part of the automotive industry (increasingly specialised in pick-up trucks). In this sector, however, the balance of trade between the two countries has always favoured Brazil. At the same time, Brazilian companies began to buy Argentine companies: this was the case with Petrobras, the Camargo Correa construction group[7] and the JBS meat processing group[8]. At the same time, Argentina has higher productivity than Brazil in the grain, by-products and other food sectors. With these exports, it has achieved a better balance in the trade balance between the two countries, as it was at one point very deficient in the industrial sector.
Brazil is Argentina’s most important trading partner. Integration and trade flows are set to increase. Petrobras signed an agreement with YPF to invest in the Vaca Muerta mega-field in Patagonia[9]. At the same time, at the recent G20 summit, Argentina’s Economy Minister Luis Caputo signed an agreement with Brazil’s Mines and Energy Minister Alexandre Silveira to export gas from the field to Brazil[10]. For the time being, exports will be made through the gas pipeline that crosses Bolivia. However, there is a project to build a gas pipeline directly between the two countries[11]. This is a new factor that would tend to further balance the trade between the two countries.
Paraguay and Uruguay are looking for their “place in the sun”
In Mercosur, the two smaller countries have been sandwiched between Brazil and Argentina and their more developed economies. In this context, their bourgeoisies had to find some space for their businesses.
Paraguay began with an agrarian economy, with very little industrial development, which traditionally revolved around Argentina, to which many Paraguayans had emigrated. In the agricultural sector, with a large number of small farmers, a process of concentration of large landowners began, both in the production of soya and in the exploitation of tropical plants (such as palm hearts). In both cases, the presence of foreign landowners increased.
The construction of the Itaipú dam allowed some businesses to develop, but once it was operational, its high energy production was subordinated to Brazil. On the other hand, with the creation of Mercosur and the free movement of people across the border, some industries (cigarettes, clothing and the assembly of electronic products) greatly increased their production, which was then smuggled to neighbouring countries, especially Brazil, which is trying to combat this, so far without success.
The economy of Ciudad del Este (the second largest in the country) and its region depends on this circuit[12].
At the same time, many Brazilian companies have begun to set up in Paraguay (especially in Ciudad del Este) “because of the lower taxes they pay and the cheaper labour and energy”[13]. Currently, 12,000 Paraguayan workers (a very high number for the country) are employed in a system of maquilas whose production is “exported” to Brazil. This fact increases Paraguay’s dependence on Brazil, which we have already mentioned. Finally, the Paraguayan government has proposed to YPF and Tecpetrol that the pipeline that would bring gas from Vaca Muerta to Brazil should pass through Paraguay[14]. In this context, the Paraguayan government strongly defends the existence of Mercosur on its current basis.
The case of Uruguay is different. During the first half of the twentieth century, this country achieved stable economic development (with a certain amount of industry) around the export of wool, in which it had specialised. This prosperity came to an end in the 1950s when synthetic fibres replaced wool and the country entered a long economic, social and political crisis. In this context, the Uruguayan bourgeoisie sought an alternative in the tourism of the middle classes and bourgeois sectors in Argentina, and in the boost to trade and construction that this brought to various cities in the country.
Later, another factor was added: faced with the crisis and bankruptcy of the Argentine banking system and its chronic financial instability, a sector of Argentines turned to Uruguayan banking as a “safe financial haven”[15]. Some even moved there permanently and/or permanently to avoid paying taxes in Argentina.
The crisis that began in the 1950s reduced Uruguayan industry to the production of food, beverages and tobacco (and construction linked to tourism and trade). In this context, a section of the Uruguayan bourgeoisie sought to establish new industries in the country. This was achieved through an agreement with the Finnish company Botnia and others from Europe, and the installation of a pulp processing plant in 2007 in the town of Fray Bentos, on the Uruguay River that separates it from Gualeguaychú (Argentina). It also promoted a reforestation plan in the nearby region. This led to a major political and diplomatic conflict with Argentina over the pollution of the river that the plantations would cause and the failure to respect previous agreements on the use of the river between the two countries. The strongest expression of this conflict was with the people of Gualeguaychú, who went so far as to block the international bridge linking the two banks. There were also internal conflicts in Uruguay, both with the bourgeois sectors that lived off Argentine tourism and even with the trade union center.
The construction of the second ‘pulp mill’ on the Uruguay River was suspended and is being built in Montes de Plata (Colonia Department) with Swedish-Finnish and Chilean capital. Finally, the third and largest ‘pastera’ in the country has just been inaugurated in Pueblo Centenario – Paso de los Toros (Durazno) with Finnish capital. It was the largest investment in the country’s history (3.47 billion dollars) and will have its own railway line to transport its production to the port of Montevideo. Once this plant is in full production and joins the two previous ones, cellulose exports will become the country’s main foreign sales item, surpassing the traditional exports of meat and soy[16]. Ironically, the exchange rate differences (and the lower prices of food, fuel and hotels in Argentina) have reversed the flow of tourists: it was very cheap for Uruguayans to go to Argentina to eat and spend a few days there, in very large numbers in 2023 (an average of 60,000 people per week). The rise in Argentine prices in dollars has considerably reduced this flow in 2024, as many Uruguayans now opt to go to Brazil[17].
The truth is that a section of the Uruguayan bourgeoisie has always criticised the obstacles imposed by Mercosur’s constitutive clauses on bilateral free trade agreements between its members and other countries. At the summit in Asunción last June, Lacalle Pou said: ‘We have to move forward [with these agreements]. If the partners are not willing to move forward as quickly as possible, we should move forward at different speeds'[18]. At the same time, he criticised Argentine President Javier Milei (who holds a similar position on this issue) for not attending the Asunción summit.
The failure of the FTAA and the signing of free trade agreements
Before Mercosur, other South American countries had signed similar agreements, such as the Andean Pact between Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru in 1969. This was later transformed into the Pacific Alliance in 2011-2012 (Bolivia left and Mexico joined). There have also been trade agreements between Central American and Caribbean countries. Or more general agreements such as LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Agreement), initiated in the 1970s and 1980s.
The North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ), which was signed by Canada, the USA and Mexico in 1992, deserves special mention. Here, U.S. imperialism was directly involved. The big loser of this agreement was Mexico, whose domestic industry was drastically reduced and turned into maquilas for U.S. companies (especially in the north of the country). Traditional maize-based agriculture was also reduced, bombarded by subsidised production in the USA.
At the same time, at the 1994 Summit of the Americas, U.S. imperialism launched the proposal to create the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas) ‘from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego’. This agreement never materialised. Hugo Chávez, then president of Venezuela, was strongly opposed to it and was supported by Argentina’s Néstor Kirchner. At the 2005 Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, Argentina, both called for a mobilisation and rally under the slogan ‘No to the FTAA’. The presidents of Brazil and Uruguay, although they did not call for a mobilisation, questioned the agreement at that summit. At the same time, agricultural producers in the U.S. also opposed the agreement because it could mean the end of the large subsidies they receive from the U.S. government.
Faced with the difficulties of making the FTAA a reality, U.S. imperialism took a different turn: it concluded regional or bilateral agreements with its direct participation. The most important of these was the DR-CAFTA (Free Trade Agreement between the U.S., Central American countries and the Dominican Republic), signed in 2003/2004, which had to be ratified by the national parliaments.
In Costa Rica, there was a very strong mobilisation against the FTA[19]. This forced the government of Óscar Arias to postpone ratification. In this situation, he called a referendum on 7 October 2007, in which he obtained a slight majority (51.62% in favour and 48.38% against). Finally, in 2009, Costa Rica ratified its participation in DR-CAFTA.
Mercosur, the BRICS and the Silk Roads
Since the restoration of capitalism and the gigantic imperialist investments that have poured in (especially since 1990), China has undergone a spectacular industrial development. It became the “factory of the world” and the second largest capitalist economic power in terms of GDP, which the IWL describes as imperialist. It became a ‘key player’ in world trade.
This was strongly reflected in Latin America and Mercosur. By 2021, China had become Latin America’s second largest trading partner and was on its way to becoming the first[20]. In that year, imports and exports were in balance. Bourgeois economists call this ‘complementary economies’: Latin Amerocam exports food and raw materials (mainly minerals) and China exports finished industrial products, or parts of them.
China began to seek greater autonomy in its international trade, since world trade still functions around a banking system dominated by the dollar-euro pole. To this end, China pushed for the formation of the BRICS group (an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) between 2006 and 2009. In 2024 it was expanded to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates. Other countries, including Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey, are ‘associated’ and interested in becoming full members in the future. In this sense, the group is made up of countries with three of the ten largest GDPs in the world (in 2022, the group’s members will account for 25.7% of the world’s total)[21].
The group has created its own financial institutions, such as the New Development Bank, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the BRICS salary system. However, it has never been able to move towards much deeper integration (along the lines of the European Union) or to create a common currency such as the euro. There are many reasons and contradictions hindering this progress towards the ‘de-dollarisation’ of world trade[22].
At this point, it is necessary to mention the modern Silk Road: an international trade agreement that facilitates the transport of goods to and from China. In 2020, in Latin America, this agreement included Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. In other words, several Mercosur countries[23].
On the basis of this agreement, China has built a “physical chain” of ports and infrastructure, financed by its government and managed by Chinese companies with special privileges. In Latin America, the Chinese project has for several years sought to construct several ports of this type. But so far it has only succeeded in Chancay, Peru (70 km from Lima), which has become the most important port in the South American Pacific. It is operated by Cosco Shipping Port, the leading Chinese shipping company. The project to build a similar mega-port in Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) has been ruled out for the time being due to the strong pressure of U.S. imperialism and the IMF on the Argentinean governments[24].
Chinese investment in Mercosur
In addition to the great weight of the Mercosur countries in foreign trade outside the bloc, China has also begun to make increasing investments in some of them.
In the case of Argentina, these are aimed at securing supplies of agricultural and livestock products and their derivatives. Secondly, it began to make minority investments in the oil and mining sectors (especially lithium). It also began to operate in the downstream processing of lithium for use in the manufacture of batteries for electric cars. It has partnered with a new branch of YPF (the large state-owned oil company) called YPF Litio SA or Y-TEC (which was already involved in one of the lithium extraction projects)[25].
In order for Y-TEC to be involved in the entire lithium value chain (extraction, enrichment and battery production), an agreement was made for Chinese instructors to train engineers and workers to build and start up these factories[26], some of which are already operational and supplying batteries for use in vehicles[27]. This was complemented by the project of a Chinese company (Gotion High Tech) to build terminal plants in Argentina to manufacture electric buses and lithium batteries, in partnership with Y-TEC and a private Argentine company, for export to Mercosur and Latin America[28]. We will see later what happened to this project under the government of Javier Milei.
In Brazil, the Chinese company BYD bought the large factory in Camaçari-Bahia (closed by Ford at the beginning of 2021) to produce electric cars[29]. It also opened the first Brazilian battery factory for electric cars[30]. At the same time, Chinese companies have been investing in the energy production and distribution sector in Brazil, taking advantage of the process of dismantling and privatising the state-owned Eletrobras[31]. Recently, the Chinese state-owned Nonferrous Trade Co. Ltd. bought the Pitinga mine in the Amazon for 340 million dollars, becoming the owner of the largest tin reserves in Brazil[32].
All this explains why, after the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, Lula and Xi held an official meeting in Brasilia to “promote the development strategies of both countries, as well as regional and international issues of common interest” and to sign numerous trade agreements between the two countries. Xi Jinping again proposed to Lula that Brazil join the Silk Road trade agreement, which Brazil has not yet done[33].
The agreement with the EU and its contradictions
As we have said, the main point discussed at the summit was the signing of the bases of a free trade agreement between Mercosur and the European Union (EU), which still has to be approved by the EU bodies before it can enter into force. This agreement has been under discussion for more than 20 years. In fact, between 2016 and 2019 it seemed that it would become a reality, but it was blocked by the division between EU member countries into two blocs: one led by Germany (in favour) and the other by France (against)[34].
In this agreement, the most developed EU countries obtain major advantages for selling their industrial products in Mercosur and for investing in subsidiaries in these countries. As a result, Germany leads the bloc in its approval. In France, the main opposition to the agreement comes from agricultural producers, especially those involved in cattle and poultry farming.
Now they are firmly opposed to the EU-Mercosur agreement, fearing that it will lead to an “invasion” of beef and chicken at much lower prices and that this will be the “coup de grâce”[35]. They received the solidarity of the large supermarket chain Carrefour, which announced that it would no longer buy meat from Mercosur countries to supply its supermarkets in France. In Brazil, this led to a conflict with the country’s major meat producers (JBS and Marfrig), which suspended the sale of meat and its derivatives to the company’s entire extensive chain of stores in the country[36]. Argentine meat producers threatened to do the same in their country. In the end, Carrefour backed down and sent a letter to the Brazilian government asking for an “apology” for the “confusion caused”[37]. In this context, it remains to be seen how the crisis between the two main EU countries will be resolved in the vote on the ratification of the agreement in their bodies.
In Mercosur, the main beneficiaries of the agreement would be, first and foremost, beef producers and exporters. Currently, the “cream” of meat exports from the countries of the bloc to the EU is the so-called “Hilton Quota”, a total of 100,000 tons of imports of high quality and high price meat, which the EU allows to different countries, with tariffs of 20%. In Mercosur: Argentina has 30,000 tons of this quota; Brazil, 10,000; Uruguay, 6,300; and Paraguay, 1,000. The new agreement would eliminate tariffs, increase the quota and include the import of a similar quota of “meat on the bone” from the EU. At the same time, as we have already seen, it would allow a large import of poultry meat (which would benefit Brazil in particular).
Nevertheless, Argentinean and Uruguayan beef exporters say that the agreement has “little taste”. Although it could mean an increase in income of $600 million for Mercosur countries, the main beneficiary would end up being Brazil (due to the inclusion of lower quality cuts and poultry). At the same time, the agreement on meat imports will not be fully implemented for another five years[38].
The oscillation of the Argentine government
At the Montevideo Summit, Argentine President Javier Milei argued that it was necessary to modify the basic Mercosur agreement to allow member countries to sign bilateral free trade agreements with other countries outside the bloc without having to apply the “common external tariff”. He stated that under the current conditions, Mercosur is “a prison” for its members. He added that because of this obstacle, in the last two decades its members, with the exception of Brazil, have been harmed and their economies have gone backwards, unlike Chile and Peru, which have grown a lot[39]. A few days later, he announced that his government would promote the signing of a free trade agreement between Argentina and the United States[40].
It is interesting to note the oscillations of the Argentine government towards Mercosur in recent years. Sergio Massa, the main figure of the previous Peronist government, had promoted ever greater Argentine integration with Mercosur and especially with Brazil. In January 2023, in the face of the great weakening of the Argentine currency (the peso), he announced a project to create a common currency between the two countries[41].
After defeating Massa in the 2023 presidential elections and taking office in December of that year, Milei initiated a policy of the opposite, weakening political relations with Brazil to the extreme: after Lula’s party supported Sergio Massa in the last Argentine elections. Milei said that Lula was “a corrupt communist”[42]. Let us recall that Milei did not participate in the last Mercosur summit in Asuncion last June (he sent his foreign minister).
This is where reality came into play: Brazil is Argentina’s most important trading partner. In addition to the traditional export of Argentine agricultural products, there is now the export of gas from the Vaca Muerta mega-field, in which Petrobras plans to invest heavily[43]. Other Brazilian companies are also investing in Argentina: in a northern province, the construction of the Formosa Biosiderúrgica plant for the production of so-called “green pig iron”[44] is nearing completion. The plant was built and is owned by Modulax Siderurgia, a recently created industrial group based in Minas Gerais[45]. This is why Milei, on behalf of the large economic groups that support his government, went to the recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro to rebuild relations with Lula and sign trade agreements with his government (what the Argentine media called a “pragmatic turn”)[46]. And now he has attended the Mercosur summit.
In this context, although he “clarified that it is not Argentina’s will to leave or dissolve Mercosur”, he wants “permission to get out of jail” and to be able to sign a bilateral FTA with the United States.
Milei’s Reasons
U.S. imperialism has been hegemonic in the semi-colonial subordination of Argentina since the late 1950s. Currently, its main tool in this sense is the payment of the foreign debt and the economic plans imposed and supervised by the IMF. In terms of direct investment, it has since invested heavily in key sectors of the Argentine economy such as automobiles (Ford), oil (Exxon) and others (meat processing plants and laboratories).
At present, there is no “wave” of U.S. investments in Argentina. Those that are coming are concentrated in Vaca Muerta (directly through Chevron, or associated with the Techint-Rocca group, which controls YPF, and Pan American Energy of the Bridas-Bulgheroni group). Also in other related projects (such as the liquefied natural gas plant to be built in Punta Colorada-Río Negro, camouflaged within the Petronas group of Malaysia).
In the Argentine Parliament, the Milei government has already managed to push through the RIGI (Large Investment Incentive Regime), which grants large tax and customs advantages to all imperialist investments[47]. Why then is it pushing for a specific FTA with the USA? We believe that it has to do, first of all, with a legal aspect: the RIGI is only a law and therefore could be repealed by another law, while an FTA, once ratified, acquires constitutional rank and therefore is much more difficult to reverse.
At the same time, an FTA between Argentina and the United States seems destined in the immediate future to benefit Elon Musk, who has established a strong personal relationship with Milei. After his clash with the Brazilian government and justice[48], Musk seems to have chosen Argentina as a platform to expand his business in South America. First, in the field of telematics: Milei wants to sell him the state-owned company ARSAT (satellites and communications)[49].
Secondly, Musk has announced that he will install the first Tesla factory (electric vehicles) in South America in the city of Zarate[50]. From there it would compete with the Chinese company BYD (installed in Brazil). In this context, it could take over Y-TEC and its projects for the production of electric batteries: Horacio Marín (member of the Techint-Rocca group and current president of YPF) has already announced that he intends to sell it[51]. In other words, with this FTA, there would be a bingo for Elon Musk’s business: huge profits in Argentina and, at the same time, free access for his products to the Mercosur countries (including Brazil). It is possible that Milei’s expectation is that, after Musk, several other investments of Yankee imperialism will arrive.
Uruguay’s Lacalle Pou had also expressed his willingness to make agreements outside Mercosur. However, unlike Milei, his goal was not a free trade agreement with the U.S., but with China. Our hypothesis is that Lacalle Pou’s proposal was aimed at having China build a mega-port in Montevideo as part of the “physical chain” of the Silk Road, and that this would be the gateway for trade with Mercosur.
What kind of integration do our countries need?
We have seen that Mercosur has been an integration that, far from strengthening the autonomy and independence of its members, has been at the service of the interests of large international and national corporations (including landowners). The main beneficiaries have been U.S. imperialism and its European allies, Canada, Japan and Australia. More recently, China, as a strong emerging capitalist power, has been included as another “major external actor”.
The nature of the agreement with the EU confirms this content of Mercosur. Its current crisis with Argentina is due to the fact that the Milei government wants this subordination and surrender to be done directly with U.S. imperialism, without the mediation or supervision of other countries (Brazil).
The countries that are part of Mercosur gained their independence from Spain or Portugal (Brazil) in the first decades of the 19th century. Subsequently, in the 21st century, they became semi-colonies of imperialism: they maintain their formal independence, but in substance they are subordinated to the imperialist powers (especially the USA). This is a subordination that increases more and more through various political, economic and financial (foreign debt and IMF supervision) and also military (U.S. bases in the countries and joint military exercises led by the U.S. 4th Fleet).
That is why we have said that for these countries, as for Latin America as a whole, the task is to achieve a second independence from imperialism. This is a task that implies a series of measures to advance in breaking the subordination in each of the fields in which it is expressed: political, economic-financial and military[52]. This is a great struggle that, for profound reasons, must be waged in a unified manner at the level of the entire continent.
But unlike the first Latin American independence, it will not be led by the national bourgeoisies (which have become agents of subordination to imperialism). The Second Independence can only be led by the working class as the “caudillo” of all the popular and oppressed masses. The struggle for the Second Independence becomes part of a larger process that encompasses it: the workers’ and socialist revolution on a continental scale and its own tasks. Far from being a step forward on this road, Mercosur, despite its rhetoric, takes us in the opposite direction.
Sources
[1] https://www.mercosur.int/suspension-de-venezuela-en-el-mercosur/
[2] https://www.mercocsur.int/quienes-somos/objetivos-del-mercosur/
[3] https://www.mercosur.int/durante-2021-aumento-el-intercambio-comercial-del-mercosur-con-el-mundo-y-con-los-paises-del-bloque-entre-si/#:~:text=El%20intercambio%20comercial%20del%20MERCOSUR%20con%20el%20mundo%5B1%5D%20en,el%2043%25%20del%20intercambio%20comercial.
[4] https://litci.org/es/paraguay-lula-y-bolsonaro-una-misma-politica-para-itaipu/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=browser
[5]https://www.bbc.com/mundo/economia/2010/09/100917_brasil_elecciones_paraguay_agricultores_soja_jrg
[6] https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/bolivia-el-gobierno-no-logra-aun-un-acuerdo-con-petrobras-nid853519/
[7] En 2005, este grupo adquirió Loma Negra (la más importante productora argentina de cemento) y el ramal ferroviario que esta empresa poseía. Ahora, para resolver su crisis financiera se la venderá a otro grupo brasileño. Ver https://www.ambito.com/negocios/loma-negra-esta-venta-y-la-comprara-otro-grupo-brasileno-n5991999
[8] Debido al escándalo de corrupción conocido como Lava Jato, la JBS debió vender sus plantas en Argentina, Paraguay y Uruguay al grupo brasileño Minerva. https://www.lavoz.com.ar/negocios/el-frigorifico-brasileno-jbs-vendio-sus-operaciones-en-argentina/
[9] https://www.iprofesional.com/economia/414326-ypf-petrobras-preparan-mega-inversion-vaca-muerta
[10] https://www.infobae.com/movant/2024/11/20/argentina-firmo-un-acuerdo-con-brasil-para-exportar-gas-de-vaca-muerta/
[11] https://www.infobae.com/economia/2020/01/22/proponen-construir-un-gasoducto-para-que-la-produccion-de-gas-de-vaca-muerta-pueda-llegar-a-brasil/
[12] https://insightcrime.org/es/noticias/paraguay-depende-contrabando-brasil-combate/
[13] https://www.cronista.com/financial-times/Empresas-brasilenas-se-mudan-a-Paraguay-por-sus-bajos-costos-20170411-0026.html
[14] https://vacamuertanews.com/actualidad/paraguay-quiere-construir-un-gasoducto-que-lleve-el-gas-de-vaca-muerta-a-brasil.htm
[15] https://www.clarin.com/economia/economia/argentinos-depositados-uruguay-cerca-3-000-millones-dolares_0_ez0YUnxG.html?srsltid=AfmBOopc0Awp7gQyhSSBmTAySpDRcBtBqjOFMAJXRGaSK7CT2EPKBKpy
[16] https://eleconomista.com.ar/internacional/empieza-producir-tercera-mayor-planta-celulosa-uruguay-relegara-carne-soja-n61490
[17] https://america-retail.com/paises/uruguay/la-caida-del-turismo-hacia-argentina-impulsa-otros-destinos-para-uruguayos/#:~:text=Los%20datos%20recientes%20revelan%20que,fue%20de%202.931.676%20viajeros.
[18] https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/07/08/luis-lacalle-pou-hablo-en-la-cumbre-del-mercosur-si-es-tan-importante-deberiamos-estar-aca-todos-los-presidentes/
[19]https://litci.org/es/artigo426/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=browser
[20] Comercio entre China y América Latina fue récord en 2021 | BAE Negocios
[21] https://chequeado.com/el-explicador/que-son-los-brics-el-bloque-de-paises-a-los-que-ingresara-la-argentina-en-2024/
[22] https://www.dw.com/es/cu%C3%A1n-viable-es-que-los-brics-tengan-su-propia-moneda-com%C3%BAn/a-70950743
[23] https://egade.tec.mx/es/egade-ideas/investigacion/se-unira-america-latina-la-nueva-ruta-de-la-seda#:~:text=Grupo%20de%20pa%C3%ADses%20miembros%3A%20Emiratos,%2C%20Panam%C3%A1%2C%20Per%C3%BA%2C%20Venezuela.
[24] Puerto chino en Tierra del Fuego: negocios bajo la presión de la Casa Blanca – La Licuadora (lalicuadoratdf.com.ar)
[25] YPF incursiona en el negocio del litio con una nueva empresa (ambito.com)
[26] La UNLP capacita al personal y se prepara para poner en marcha la Planta de Baterías de Litio – Huella Minera
[27] Este lunes debuta en La Plata el primer micro con baterías de litio (datadiario.com)
[28] Empresa china fabricará buses eléctricos y baterías en Argentina | TN
[29] BYD vai produzir carros elétricos na Bahia na fábrica fechada pela Ford (estadao.com.br)
[30] BYD inaugura primeira fábrica de baterias de lítio no Brasil – CanalEnergia
[31] Privatização da Eletrobras: veja perguntas e respostas | Economia | G1 (globo.com)
[32] https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/una-estatal-china-compra-una-minera-brasile%C3%B1a-con-un-gigantesco-yacimiento-de-uranio/88373056
[33] https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/esp/zxxx/202411/t20241120_11529720.html
[34] https://www.dw.com/es/mercosur-y-la-ue-recorrido-y-alcance-de-un-acuerdo-hist%C3%B3rico/a-70985228
[35] https://bichosdecampo.com/argentina-preocupa-por-su-carne-de-vaca-pero-el-verdadero-cuco-es-brasil-explica-benoit-devault-periodista-de-la-france-agricole-sobre-los-temores-galos-frente-al-acuerdo-con-el-mercosur/
[36] https://www.lavoz.com.ar/noticias/agencias/carrefour-rechaza-carne-sudamericana-y-enfrenta-represalias-de-brasil/
[37] https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/el-ceo-de-carrefour-pide-disculpas-a-brasil-por-la-%22confusi%C3%B3n%22-tras-el-boicot-a-la-carne/88337035
[38] https://bichosdecampo.com/mientras-los-ganaderos-franceses-lucen-aterrados-por-una-invasion-sudamericana-aqui-los-exportadores-de-carne-se-quedaron-con-gusto-a-poco/
[39] https://www.lapoliticaonline.com/politica/milei-dijo-que-el-mercosur-es-una-prision-y-defendio-un-acuerdo-con-estados-unidos/
[40] https://www.iprofesional.com/politica/418793-javier-milei-anuncio-que-impulsara-un-tratado-de-libre-comercio-con-estados-unidos-en-2025
[41] https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/massa-confirmo-que-argentina-y-brasil-trabajan-en-un-proyecto-para-crear-una-moneda-comun
[42] https://elpais.com/argentina/2024-06-28/milei-redobla-sus-ataques-contra-lula.html
[43] https://www.infobae.com/movant/2024/11/20/argentina-firmo-un-acuerdo-con-brasil-para-exportar-gas-de-vaca-muerta/
[44] https://www.eldestapeweb.com/informacion-general/desarrollo-sustentable/formosa-dio-un-importante-avance-en-el-proyecto-que-revolucionara-la-industria-2024121415012
[45] http://modulax.com.br/es/unidades-de-negocio/siderurgia/
[46] https://litci.org/es/g20-muchos-problemas-pocas-soluciones/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=browser
[47] https://litci.org/es/argentina-el-regimen-de-incentivo-a-las-grandes-inversiones-rigi-es-una-mesa-servida-para-el-imperialismo/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=browser
[48] https://accion.coop/las-ultimas/suspenden-a-la-red-x-en-brasil/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=Trafico&utm_term=Texto&utm_content=NonBrand&keyword=&gad_source=5&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI9K_hmYy0igMVB0VIAB3r5QB8EAAYAiAAEgId0_D_BwE
[49] https://www.pagina12.com.ar/777794-el-gobierno-le-pone-a-arsat-el-cartel-de-remate
[50] https://ar.motor1.com/news/716583/zarate-fabrica-tesla-argentina/
[51] https://periferia.com.ar/politica-cientifica/el-nuevo-presidente-de-ypf-planea-desprenderse-de-y-tec/#:~:text=Horacio%20Mar%C3%ADn%20no%20quiere%20a,YPF%20Luz%20e%20YPF%20Agro.
[52] https://litci.org/es/debate-lograr-la-segunda-independencia-latinoamericana/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=browser
