The Rise and Fall of Chavismo

Editorial Board, IWL-FI, September 2014

The Cuban and Venezuelan governments have the support of most left-wing organizations around the world. However, that support peaked in the last decade and is now in decline, with those governments experiencing a heightened situation of crisis.

The international weight of this support—which we will call Castro-Chavism—is very important. But because the parties and movements that support the Cuban and Venezuelan governments are very heterogeneous, we cannot classify Castro-Chavism as an international organization (as the international Stalinist apparatus was in its day) or as a current. These are parties, organizations, movements, and governments of diverse origins and characteristics, very different from each other. One part assumes the bourgeois nationalist model of Chavism, the Bonapartism of Castroism, and the class collaboration between the two. Another part only supports these governments.

The Cuban and Venezuelan governments are not working class (nor are they petty-bourgeois reformist).

They have different origins, but today they are bourgeois governments that run capitalist states.

Castroism comes from a petty-bourgeois current that fulfilled a revolutionary task by taking power and expropriating the bourgeoisie. Later, it led the restoration of capitalism in Cuba and became bourgeois. The Castro dictatorship relies on a post-restoration bourgeois state.

Chavism was a petty-bourgeois current that came to power in Venezuela and created a new bourgeoisie. Maduro leads a Bonapartist government in the Venezuelan bourgeois state. It is more of a version of bourgeois nationalism, like Argentine Peronism, Peruvian Aprism, and Egyptian Nasserism.

Cuba is not the “last bastion of socialism” of the 20th century. Capitalism was never expropriated in Venezuela. “21st-century socialism” is merely propaganda with no connection to reality. Stalinism already did a lot of harm to the revolutionary movement by identifying Stalinist dictatorships with socialism.

These are bourgeois leaderships, based on the workers’, popular, and student movements. But support for these governments, which experienced a boom at the beginning of the 21st century, is now in clear decline.

1- Cuba: from revolution to capitalist restoration

The Cuban revolution had a profound impact on Latin American history. A small island, a few hundred kilometers from the North American coast, expropriated multinational companies and put an end to the capitalist economy. This had never happened before and has not been repeated since.

The Cuban example made it possible to realize what an alternative to the capitalist economy means. This went beyond the previous level of debate with the defenders of capital in the realm of ideas and programs, becoming an experience that could be compared. What already existed globally with the USSR became a reality in Latin America through Cuba.

Cuba was one of the poorest and most miserable countries on the continent. Part of the tourism to the island was made up of rich Americans who went to its brothels. That ended with the revolution and the expropriation of capitalism.

It was a striking example. The island saw an end to social problems that even the imperialist countries had not solved. They ended unemployment and homelessness. Everyone could eat and have access to education and health care. Cubans had access to free, quality education, including university. They could count on qualified medical care at all levels. The change in the population’s quality of life was reflected in sports: a small island began to compete with the United States for leadership in medals at the Pan American Games.

This was hugely important for the consciousness of the Latin American masses and their vanguard. What the Russian Revolution had already demonstrated on a global level was now present in Latin America. Socialism is not a dream, but a real program that can change the world and people’s lives. Generations and generations of activists in Latin America received their first lessons in socialism from the Cuban example.

The 26th of July Movement, which took power, was a guerrilla group with a petty-bourgeois leadership. That movement accomplished a revolutionary task, not only by defeating the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, but also by building a workers’ state.

The Castro leadership’s project was not to go that far. But after overthrowing Batista’s dictatorship, it wanted to recover the economy, which was in complete crisis. And it had to confront the Cuban bourgeoisie and, in particular, the American companies present there. After the agreement to import oil from the USSR at very low prices, US refineries refused to refine it. Fidel reacted by expropriating those companies, which initiated a confrontation with imperialism and led to a break with capitalism and the construction of a new state.

But it was a petty-bourgeois leadership, supported essentially by the student movement, the urban middle classes, and the poor peasantry. From the outset, this movement had a fundamental difference with the Russian Revolution: the exercise of power in Cuba was never backed by the workers’ democracy of the soviets as in 1917, but was under the dictatorial control of the guerrilla leaders. From the outset, it was a bureaucratized workers’ state.

At first, Castro even adopted a more left-wing stance than the Soviet bureaucracy. While the USSR leadership pursued a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with imperialism, the Cuban leadership encouraged Latin American guerrilla warfare. Che Guevara died promoting this policy in Bolivia in 1967. Although the guerrilla strategy was completely wrong, it demonstrated a policy different from that of Russia. But later, the Cuban leadership adopted the same policy as the USSR, which was fundamental in preventing the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 from evolving towards the expropriation of capitalism.

The restoration of capitalism in the USSR was accompanied by the same process in Cuba. Beginning in 1977, changes were initiated to open up the island to capitalism. At first, this meant opening up the countryside to cooperatives and free peasant markets, as well as to self-employment in the cities. In the 1990s, qualitative steps were taken towards restoration with the 1995 Foreign Investment Law, the privatization of key sectors of the Cuban economy (tourism, sugar cane and tobacco production), and the end of state economic planning and the foreign trade monopoly.

The economic blockade of Cuba, imposed by the US government in 1962, is one of the main “demonstrations” by the Castro-Chavistas that the island remains a “bastion of socialism.” However, the blockade is not imposed by imperialism as a whole, but only by the Americans. The European bourgeoisie took advantage of this situation to take the lead in the economic occupation of the island during the restoration. It is no coincidence that a large part of the hotel and tourism infrastructure is controlled by Spanish chains such as Meliá. Even the US bourgeoisie is divided, with a growing sector opposing the blockade because of the loss of “opportunity.” In reality, the position of the exiled Cuban bourgeoisie, based mainly in Miami, still weighs decisively in favor of maintaining the blockade. This bourgeoisie wants restoration, but with the return of “its” properties, and therefore maintains a bellicose stance against the Castro dictatorship. Even so, the United States is one of the largest exporters to Cuba (ranging between fourth and fifth place).

The Castro bureaucracy’s plan is to transform Cuba into a China closer to the US coast. However, at least so far, imperialism has only appropriated the former Cuban state-owned companies without making any major investments in the island.

The result is a clear decline in the country. Industrial production was 55% lower in 2011 than in 1989. Sugar production fell from 8 to 1.3 million tons. Real wages fell by 72% in twenty years.

Now, with the restoration complete, Raúl Castro is implementing a new qualitative step: another Foreign Investment Law, a plan to lay off one million civil servants, and the opening of a huge free trade zone (similar to those in China) in the Port of Mariel. Under the new investment law, investors will not pay taxes on profits for the first eight years of operation and will then pay half the current rate. The Port of Mariel is state-of-the-art and can accommodate large (post-Panamax) ships. It cost $1 billion and is a bet that Cuba will become part of Asia’s trade with the US market.

These are new steps in the opening up of the country, now restored, to new foreign investment. These new initiatives may be linked to the prospect of an end to the blockade and investment by the American bourgeoisie.

The fable, widely spread by the Castro-Chavistas, is that Cuba is the “last bastion of socialism.” They deny the restoration of capitalism, supported by the figures of Fidel and Raúl Castro, who gave the same direction that commanded the revolution.

The Cuban reality belies Castro-Chavism. The island’s economy is no longer governed by state planning, but by the laws of the capitalist market. There is no workers’ state if it is not supported by state ownership of the means of production, economic planning, and a monopoly on foreign trade.

In the consciousness of the Latin American masses, Cuba today is no longer proof that a workers’ state can be an alternative to capitalism. On the contrary, there is a social tragedy on the island resulting from the restoration, which has led to a severe decline in the standard of living of Cubans. Workers earn wages of $18 per month; unemployment threatens to rise sharply due to the government’s plan for mass layoffs of public employees. The crisis is reaching Cuban education and health care.The oppression of women was not resolved by the Castro dictatorship, even when there was a workers’ state. But with capitalist restoration, the situation has worsened dramatically. Dozens of prostitutes surround all the tourist hotels in Cuba, returning to the sad reality of the Batista era.When questioned by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Violence against Women about prostitution on the island, the Cuban government responded with impressive cynicism: that “it constitutes a personal choice of women and men who seek in the practice of prostitution a way to access certain consumer goods that provide a higher standard of living than that of the rest of the working population.” Fidel Castro went even further in a speech, almost promoting prostitution: “Our prostitutes are the healthiest and most educated in the world” (quote from Alejandro Armengol). Meanwhile, sex tourism returned with a vengeance, including child prostitution. Rock singer Gary Glitter was arrested for pedophilia in England after consecutive trips to Cuba. A 78-year-old Canadian, James McTurk, was found guilty in his country’s courts of sex tourism with Cuban girls as young as three years old.

Oppression against homosexuals never ended, even in times when a bureaucratized workers’ state still existed. The documentary “Conducta impropia” (Improper Conduct) had a great impact by showing the repression against anonymous homosexuals, as well as against renowned writers such as Reinaldo Arenas.

Anyone who wants to see the majority of the population’s rejection of the Cuban dictatorship need only travel to the island and talk to people on the streets, outside the “official” circuit. There is passive rejection by the vast majority of the population, particularly the younger generation. They speak ill of the government all the time, making jokes in the expansive manner typical of Cubans. The dictatorship still retains the support of the older sector of the population, who lived through the Batista dictatorship. But the vast majority oppose the Castro dictatorship.

Attendance at demonstrations called by the government is compulsory and controlled by the political police, as in the Eastern European dictatorships. Shortly before the collapse of the Stalinist dictatorship in Romania, there was a huge official demonstration. The Cuban Committees for the Defense of the Revolution are like political police stations in each neighborhood, monitoring anyone who expresses a political position contrary to the government, which can lead to loss of employment or imprisonment.

The Cuban leadership commanded the restoration and went on to run a bourgeois state. Despite all the secrecy with which the Castro dictatorship surrounds these events, there are reports that senior officers in the Cuban armed forces are partners in multinational companies operating in Cuba.

Secrecy also surrounds the private lives of senior Cuban leaders. However, a book has just been published by Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, who was Fidel’s bodyguard for 17 years. Fidel’s former loyal servant claims that Fidel owns the island of Cayo Piedra, located southeast of Cuba, a “paradise for millionaires,” to which he always travels on his own yacht, the “Aquarama II.” Fidel only invites a select few to this island, such as CNN owner Ted Turner, French businessman Gerard Bourgoin, and former Colombian president Alfonso López Michelsen.

What exists in Cuba today is similar to the situation in China: a Communist Party dictatorship that commands a bourgeois state in a capitalist economy.

The revolutionary program needed for the island is no longer that of a political revolution, as in the days of the bureaucratized workers’ state, but that of a social revolution against a bourgeois state and a capitalist dictatorship.

When most of the world’s left defends Castroism, it supports a bourgeois dictatorship that exploits and oppresses its people. It is inevitable that, at some point, what happened in Eastern Europe will happen in Cuba. And that left will then have to support the repression of the Cuban government or renounce everything it has defended until now.

2- Chavismo: from petty-bourgeois nationalism to bourgeois nationalism

The emergence of Chavismo has its political origins in the crisis experienced by Venezuela with the Caracazo, the insurrection that shook the country in 1989. President Carlos Andrés Pérez imposed a violent economic package, with the devaluation of the currency (a 100% increase in relation to the dollar) and an 80% increase in the price of fuel. The poor population of the hills surrounding Caracas came down from the hills, clashed violently with the police, and looted shops. The harsh repression killed more than a thousand people, thus containing the situation. But the armed forces were divided and the crisis took hold in the regime.

Then-Colonel Chávez attempted a military coup in 1992, expressing widespread dissatisfaction within the armed forces. Despite being imprisoned and convicted, he gained enormous prestige among the poorest sectors of society. In 1998, he won the presidential elections, ushering in a long period of Chavismo in power that continues to this day.

Chávez’s rhetoric against US imperialism earned him great prestige throughout Latin America. Chávez’s speeches against the Bush administration were clearly different from those of Lula and other governments on the continent. But neither Chávez nor Lula ever broke with imperialism.

Even in terms of rhetoric, everything changed when Obama became president of the United States. Chávez said of the US elections: “If I were an American, I would vote for Obama. And I believe that if Obama were from Barlovento or a neighborhood in Caracas, he would vote for Chávez.”

The Venezuelan government continued to pay its foreign debt religiously and maintained oil supplies to the United States, even when imperialism invaded Iraq.

Even his most famous measures, such as the “nationalization of oil,” meant nothing more than maintaining the partnership with multinationals in the exploitation and refining of oil, slightly increasing the percentage received by the state. In the main item of the Venezuelan economy—oil—multinationals can own up to 49% of the companies and reserves. In the case of gas, they can own up to 100%. Thus, we are not talking about small companies but about “socialism” with Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, and Repsol. The huge buildings of these companies are located in the country’s oil cities.

At first, imperialism harshly repudiated Chávez and promoted a coup d’état in April 2002. The masses reacted violently, initiating a new insurrection that was only contained with Chávez’s return three days later.

In December, imperialism still attempted a lockout and was defeated by the masses once again. Afterwards, the US government and the Venezuelan right wing learned from their defeats and began to focus on wearing down the government and using the electoral route to defeat Chavismo.

Chávez’s “21st-century socialism” is just a farce, an ideology to win over the vanguard and the masses for his bourgeois project. Capitalism remained untouchable throughout the Chavista period, with characteristics similar to those of the rest of the continent, such as the predominance of multinationals (in this case, oil companies) and private banks. The Venezuelan bourgeois state remained intact, with its armed forces controlled by Chavismo. There was never anything resembling organs of mass power.

This phenomenon was already defined by Trotsky as sui generis Bonapartism, a type of bourgeois government that relies on the mass movement and presents partial frictions with imperialism.

The definition of Bonapartism is related to the anti-democratic and authoritarian character of Chavismo. This is something that Chavistas try, but fail, to hide. The unions are controlled by a Chavista bureaucracy and activists are persecuted. Chávez repressed strikes that escaped the control of the Chavista bureaucracy—and Maduro is doing the same now—as happened with the occupation of Mitsubishi in 2009 (two dead) and Sidor in 2014 (three wounded). The PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, founded by Chávez) is a bourgeois party that uses the state apparatus, as did the Mexican PRI or the Colorado Party in Paraguay, to co-opt and control the movement into a single party.

Other partial frictions with imperialism exist because Chavismo is an expression of Latin American bourgeois nationalism, just like Peronism or Aprism. However, it maintains the limitations that bourgeois nationalism has in times of 21st-century economic globalization. It has no room for more significant anti-imperialist measures, such as the nationalization of oil carried out by Cárdenas in Mexico in 1938, or the nationalizations carried out by Peronism of both oil and electricity and the railways. Nor can it allow for important concessions to the mass movement, such as those of Peronism.

Multinationals are as strongly present in Venezuela as they are throughout Latin America. And, as in the rest of the continent, they are involved in big business with the government. One of the latest scandals in Venezuela was the disclosure, by none other than the president of the Central Bank (Edmée Betancourt, who lasted barely three months in office), that in 2012 between $15 billion and $20 billion were handed over by the state to a group of “briefcase companies” that overcharge for imports. Among those companies were General Motors, Toyota, Ford, Cargill, Chrysler, American Airlines, Nestlé Venezuela, and Procter & Gamble. Between 2004 and 2012, the “briefcase companies” received $180 billion from the state in a gigantic scam. In Venezuela, there has been a fierce inter-bourgeois dispute between Chavismo and the traditional bourgeoisie (called “escuálida”) since the rise of Chavismo. This explains the 2002 coup, the lockout, the current marches, and the violent electoral disputes. But the Chavista left confuses this inter-bourgeois dispute with a dispute between a supposed revolutionary sector and the bourgeoisie as a whole. Or even as if it were Cuba and the United States in the 1960s.Venezuelan workers live in the same appalling wage and working conditions as their Latin American brothers and sisters. The minimum wage is “worth” around $100 (according to the real exchange rate on the parallel market), which is lower than most of the continent. In the country that is the continent’s largest oil exporter, almost 40% of the population lives in poverty. There are 1.2 million unemployed, and half of those employed are in the informal sector. Cooperatives, promoted by the government, contribute enormously to the flexibilization of labor rights, with no stability for their workers and no recognition of minimum rights, such as unionization, strikes, social security, etc. In Venezuela, the oppression of women, Black people, and homosexuals is the same as in the rest of Latin America. In some areas, it is even greater than in other Latin American countries. For example, there is no right to abortion as in Mexico City and Uruguay (in the first 12 weeks). The “social” face of Chavismo is the same as that of other Latin American governments on the “left” and right: compensatory and welfare social programs. The Venezuelan “Missions” are similar in nature to Brazil’s “Bolsa Família,” Bolivia’s “Juanito Pinto” and “Renta Dignidad,” Nicaragua’s “Hambre Cero,” Colombia’s “Familias en Acción,” Mexico’s “Oportunidades,” and Peru’s “Juntos.” This policy follows the recommendations of the World Bank and the IMF to implement these programs alongside neoliberal plans. They come hand in hand with cuts to health, education, and retirement budgets to guarantee the payment of debts to bankers. According to these institutions of imperialism, they are “efficient programs” at a “low cost” that help implement neoliberal plans and maintain political stability.

In Venezuela, the “Missions” have enormous weight, reaching more than 40% of the population. This is the quantitative difference compared to other countries. Financed by oil revenues, the “Missions” can cover a larger number of people, ensuring electoral and political support for Chavismo.

The enormous economic potential of oil exports was not exploited to transform the country’s economy through industrialization. Oil went from accounting for 70% of exports in 1998 to 96% in 2012. Meanwhile, the industrial sector fell from 17.3% of GDP in 1998 to 14% in 2012.

Chavismo continued the parasitic rentier model of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie. It did not even advance along the path of bourgeois nationalism of the past, such as that of Perón, Vargas, and Cárdenas, who developed industrial sectors by replacing imports in key sectors such as steel, automotive, food, etc. It could have made progress in this direction with oil revenues, but it remained exactly in the same traditional parasitic position as the Venezuelan bourgeoisie.

Chávez did not break with capitalism and, therefore, did not change the lives of workers. Thus, Venezuela cannot present to the world a social change similar to that experienced by Cuba after the expropriation of capitalism.

Instead of advancing along a socialist path, as its defenders claim, Chavismo promoted, from within the state, the construction of a new bourgeoisie, known as the “boliburguesía” (Bolivarian bourgeoisie). This new bourgeoisie has enormous influence in the government and in the PSUV. Its most important representative is Diosdado Cabello, a former Armed Forces officer and current president of the Legislative Assembly, who even disputed Chávez’s succession with Maduro.

Diosdado’s economic group has three banks, several industries, and service companies. It is already one of the main economic groups in the country. Two other economic groups of the boliburguesía revolve around Jesse Chacón and Blanco La Cruz, also retired officers of the armed forces.

ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas), promoted by Venezuela, has proven to be just another free trade association, controlled by the multinationals established in these countries.

The Venezuelan government uses oil businesses in Latin American countries as part of its political objectives. It sells at lower prices to allied governments and uses its marketing in other countries as a bridge to negotiate with movements and parties.

By failing to advance along an anti-capitalist path, Chavismo exposed Venezuela to the global economic crisis and the maneuvers of the local bourgeoisie. Venezuela is currently experiencing one of the continent’s worst economic crises, with a probable recession this year (-0.5%), hyperinflation (over 50%), and shortages of basic foodstuffs (over 30% of products). If the country were truly socialist, this crisis could not be justified by the global economic situation. One need only compare the progress of the Soviet Union, which grew at rates above 10% in the midst of the global depression of 1929. Since, contrary to what Chavismo claims, no progress was made in breaking with capitalism, the country is now experiencing a gigantic crisis.

Chávez’s death clearly exposed the crisis of Chavismo, with countless internal disputes that are worsening as it loses popular support. Maduro’s government is increasingly fragile and increasingly repudiated.

The bourgeoisie relied on this discontent to promote large street demonstrations in early 2014, relying on the middle classes and students. Due to their size and their association with general discontent with the government, these demonstrations show the concrete threat that the right wing poses to Chavismo. The agreement between Maduro’s government and the right-wing opposition to curb the demonstrations meant more attacks on workers and more popular discontent.

The general policy of imperialism and the right-wing opposition is to wear down the government and bet on its electoral defeat in the 2015 legislative elections and, later, in the presidential elections. Disenchantment with inflation, shortages, and corruption under Chavismo is growing and can be capitalized on by the right-wing opposition. The right wing’s primary strategy is for Venezuela to evolve in the same direction as Nicaragua (which included an electoral defeat of Sandinismo by the right).

The government continues to control the armed forces and has the support of a significant sector of the population, which makes a military coup unfeasible. However, a change in the course of events cannot be ruled out if Maduro’s government weakens further and the right wing gains support in the armed forces.

The labor movement has staged countless strikes during all these years of Chavista government. The response has generally been harsh, with direct repression and the assassination of strike leaders. Now, enormous discontent is spreading among the popular sectors and a break with Chavismo is beginning to take place. Recently, there have been struggles by health workers, teachers, the automotive industry, and Sidor. Sidor is a state-owned company, the country’s main steel manufacturer, and since 2012 it has been fighting to defend a collective bargaining agreement. Diosdado Cabello called the Sidor workers “mafiosos.” Maduro accused them of “playing into the hands of the right wing.” On August 11, a march by Sidor workers was violently repressed by the Bolivarian National Guard, leaving three wounded and many detained.

It is essential that the Venezuelan labor movement build an alternative that is independent of both the government and the right-wing opposition.

3- The genesis of the Castro-Chávez retreat

The characterizations of the majority leaderships of the mass movement are very important for our understanding of reality and, therefore, of the program. For many years, the fundamental controversy in the labor movement revolved around reformists and revolutionaries.

But there is a social and political process that has affected the majority leaderships of the mass movement over the last thirty years, concomitant with the globalization of the economy and the development of neoliberal plans. In essence, there was a reactionary movement transformation of bureaucracies into new bourgeoisies, which moved politically from reformists to neoliberals.

At the end of the postwar boom (late 1960s and early 1970s), imperialism converted its Keynesian plans to neoliberalism. To recover the rate of profit, it was necessary to change the economy, imposing a rollback of the postwar gains of the proletariat (the so-called welfare state), in addition to privatizing state-owned enterprises and advancing strongly in the control of financial capital over the entire economy.

Neoliberalism, which had been a marginal intellectual current since its founding in 1947, was taken up by the thinkers and rulers of capitalism. First, as an experiment during the Pinochet dictatorship in 1973 (never before had a neoliberal plan been implemented). Then, it was adopted by the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the early 1980s. Finally, it became widespread among imperialist countries and throughout the world.

It is necessary to investigate the parallelism between economic globalization and the restoration of capitalism in Eastern Europe. There are elements that point to a relationship between the two processes, although the restoration in the East cannot be explained solely by an economic process.

But it is a fact that the ruling bureaucracies in the former workers’ states did not have the political conditions to carry out an attack on workers similar to that of neoliberal plans without the risk of rebellion. On the other hand, they also did not have the technological conditions to accompany the incorporation of information technology, telematics, and robotics into production. This greatly reinforced the pressure of the world market on these bureaucracies.

The result of this relationship—and, undoubtedly, of other associated processes—is that these bureaucracies preferred to associate themselves directly with big capital in the process of restoring capitalism. From there, they appropriated state-owned companies and transformed themselves into new bourgeoisies. This occurred across the board in all countries where restoration took place. A typical example is Abramovich, who took over Russian oil companies and became one of the richest men in the world.

In semi-colonial countries, a similar process took place: the transformation of petty-bourgeois reformist parties and movements into bourgeois ones upon coming to power. This was the case with the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua. After destroying the bourgeois armed forces—Somoza’s National Guard—in 1979, the Sandinistas refused to expropriate capitalism. On the contrary, the Sandinista leaders privately seized many of Somoza’s properties. Several of them became multimillionaires and part of the bourgeoisie, such as Daniel Ortega, the current president of the country.

The same phenomenon was observed in Mozambique and Angola. The armed forces that sustained bourgeois and colonial power were the Portuguese troops. The Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1975 favored the victory of the national liberation movements that were already very strong in that country. Both the MPLA [Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola] in Angola and Frelimo [Frente de Libertação de Moçambique] in Mozambique maintained capitalism, and their leaderships became part of the new bourgeoisie.

The family of Eduardo dos Santos, the current president of Angola, is a shareholder in the 21 largest companies in the country. His daughter, Isabel dos Santos, is a partner of one of the most powerful bourgeois in Portugal, Américo Amorim, in Banco BIC of Angola. In Mozambique, the privatization of the state-owned banks BCM (Banco Comercial de Mozambique) and BPD (Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento) in 1996-97 mainly benefited several Frelimo leaders, who disappeared with more than $400 million. Armando Guebuza, the current president, is a major shareholder in Intelec Holding and a partner in the multinational Vodacom. His son, Mussubuluko Ghebuza, is also a partner of Américo Amorim in the creation of Banco Único in Mozambique.

In South Africa, the leaders of the ANC [African National Congress] in government paved the way for the formation of a new black bourgeoisie, a junior partner to the white bourgeoisie. Cyril Ramaphosa, leader of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] in the struggle against apartheid, is now a partner-owner and board member of the multinational company Lonmin. It was during the 2013 crackdown on the Marikana miners’ strike at that company that police, sent by the ANC government, killed 34 miners.

In the Brazilian PT, which has been in power for twelve years, a process of bourgeoisification of its leadership is underway. Lula’s son, the family’s front man, was employed at a zoo in São Paulo and earned about $300 a month when his father took office. Today, he is a partner in a multinational telephone company. Zé Dirceu, lawyer and partner in multinationals. We are not claiming that the PT has already been completely transformed into a bourgeois party, but rather that a process is underway.

There is a totality that unites globalization and the restoration of capitalism, the conversion of bureaucracies into new bourgeoisies in the former workers’ states, in the imperialist countries, and in the dependent and semi-colonial countries.

The Castro-Chávez leadership is, therefore, an expression of this ultra-reactionary movement of transformation of bureaucracies and petty-bourgeois movements into new bourgeoisies, both in Cuba and Venezuela. The origins of these two governments are different, as we have seen. But today they are united and are a political reference point for much of the global left. A terrible reference point, as we shall see.

4. What remains of the global apparatus of Stalinism

Stalinist parties around the world support the Cuban and Venezuelan governments. When people talk about the “remnants of Stalinism,” they may conclude that these parties have no power. That is a serious mistake.

Obviously, the current situation has nothing to do with the times when they had behind them bureaucratized workers’ states that ruled over a third of humanity. But they continue to have a very important influence in some countries.

These parties organize annual meetings with organizations from more than fifty countries. They bring together parties of different natures, although—by tradition—they all share the same name of “Communist Party.”

This includes major parties that, despite the crisis, still have great national influence (such as the Portuguese Communist Party) and others with less influence, a product of the crisis of Stalinism, such as the Brazilian Communist Party.

But it also includes parties that have ceased to be reformist workers’ parties and have become bourgeois parties in the management of capitalist states, such as the Cuban Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party.

5. The rise of Castro-Chavism and its consequences in Latin America

Castro-Chavism had its heyday at the beginning of the 21st century, associated with the moment when popular front and bourgeois nationalist parties occupied the majority of Latin American governments.

Evidently, the impact of the Cuban revolution in 1959 provoked a wave of sympathy in Latin America since then. But that was weakened due to the repercussions in Eastern Europe.

We are talking about a later phenomenon. At the beginning of the 21st century, an anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal wave swept across the Latin American continent. There was a growing struggle against neoliberal plans, against the Bush administration and its FTAA plan.

Most of the governments that implemented neoliberal plans were defeated, either through direct mobilizations (as in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador) or through elections (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and others).

Never before in history had so many popular front and bourgeois nationalist governments been in power at the same time in Latin America. This was the heyday of Castro-Chavism, supported by Lula, Evo Morales, Chávez, Correa, Bachelet, Lugo, and several other governments.

As part of this process of struggle, the imperialist FTAA plan was defeated. This opened up the conditions for an unprecedented process in Latin America. It was possible to fight against the non-payment of foreign debts with a front of debtor countries. It was possible to move towards a break with imperialism in a significant part of the continent, which would pave the way for a powerful anti-capitalist revolutionary process.

Whenever a policy of breaking with capitalism is discussed, with parties and movements that defend class collaboration with the bourgeoisie, the response is inevitably the same: “The balance of forces does not allow it.” At that time, this response was completely absurd.

More than at any other time in history, the beginning of the 21st century brought about a sudden change in the balance of forces on the continent. There has never been a more favorable moment for a break with imperialism and capitalism. Not even in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution was there anything similar, with so many countries experiencing the defeat of right-wing neoliberal governments. Most governments were occupied by parties and movements that identified as “leftist.”

The main political reference point on the continent was Castro-Chavism, particularly the Venezuelan government. Large demonstrations of repudiation greeted Bush every time he set foot in a country on the continent. Chávez was greeted by just as many important demonstrations of support. If there had been a real break with imperialism in Venezuela, a wildfire would have set Latin America ablaze.

But none of that happened. The governments of Venezuela and Cuba maneuvered to manage friction with imperialism within acceptable limits. Chávez and Castro did not implement any break with imperialism in their countries. Nor did they advocate measures in that direction in the rest of the continent.

These were bourgeois governments, whether of the popular front type or bourgeois nationalist. And the Latin American bourgeoisies are not willing to break with imperialism. These “left-wing” governments were the fundamental basis for containing the mass movement. They relied on a temporary economic upswing and, with their popular support, managed to restore the political situation. From 2005 to 2012, there were virtually no general strikes or popular rebellions on the continent. The FTAA was defeated, but these governments implemented in their countries the neoliberal plans that had been defeated along with the right-wing governments.

The real role of the Cuban and Venezuelan leaderships, as well as the Latin American governments that support them, can be demonstrated at that moment. They could have triggered a historic process of breaking with imperialism. They did not do so. On the contrary, they diverted and froze the rise that accompanied their boom. But in doing so, they also opened the door to their own weakening.

They managed to curb the large mobilizations that marked the beginning of the 21st century until 2005. From that year until 2012, there were virtually no general strikes or popular rebellions on the continent. But as they wore down, they began to pay the same price as right-wing governments by implementing neoliberal plans.

6. The decline of Castro-Chavism

Since 2013, a different process has been taking place on the continent. A new cycle is beginning in Latin America, which includes economic and political crises, as well as the confrontation of the mass movement against those same governments that previously had enormous popular support.

The decline of the continent’s economies returned, accompanying the end of the commodity boom that had been an important part of previous economic growth. The mass movement regrouped with several general strikes that shook Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia, in addition to the popular mobilizations of June 2013 in Brazil.

There is no homogeneous Latin American process, nor is there a permanent and generalized rise. These are different situations of class struggle on the continent, with countless ebbs and flows, comings and goings. Even more so because it is combined with a very strong crisis of revolutionary leadership, that is, the absence of revolutionary organizations with mass weight.

The decline and crisis of Castro-Chavismo are part of this new moment. The economies of Venezuela and Cuba are being challenged by the economic crisis. The Maduro government has to face large mobilizations, capitalized on by the right-wing opposition. In addition, many governments that support Castro-Chavismo are now facing significant mobilizations, such as Cristina Kirchner in Argentina and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil.

These governments did not move toward a break with imperialism. Now they have to face the mass movement.

Neither in Cuba nor in Venezuela can the situation of workers serve as a reference for other countries. On the contrary, the lines to buy basic necessities, inflation in Venezuela, and very low wages in Cuba are elements of counter-propaganda.

Unlike classical reformism, the Chavista and Castroist leaderships are also uncommitted to democracy. Cuba is a dictatorship and Chavismo is a Bonapartist regime. Furthermore, by defending dictatorships such as those of Gaddafi and Assad, Castro-Chavismo clashes with the democratic sentiment of the post-restoration masses.

The repudiation that existed against Stalinism, due to its authoritarian characteristics, was mitigated by the existence of workers’ states and their social gains. Today, Castro-Chavismo has to face the skepticism of the masses after the restoration of capitalism following the dictatorships, without knowing how to offer a higher standard of living for workers. Cuba’s influence on the consciousness of the Latin American masses was already greatly reduced due to events in Eastern Europe. Now it is also being questioned by the social regression on the island.

For these reasons, the decline of Castro-Chavismo means that the vanguard emerging from the struggles no longer has these currents as its immediate reference point. The organizations that make up the Castro-Chavist current have weight in reality, but Castro-Chavismo is no longer a “natural” reference point for the vanguard, as it was at the time of its rise.

7. What if the governments of Cuba and Venezuela fell?

After the restoration of capitalism in Eastern Europe, there was a serious crisis throughout the world left. There was a combination of two major factors that led to a profound setback in the consciousness of the masses and the vanguard.

First, the disappearance of the bureaucratized workers’ states which, despite Stalinism, demonstrated the possibility of a non-capitalist economy. Second, a gigantic capitalist propaganda campaign claiming that “socialism is dead,” that “socialism equals dictatorship,” and that “socialism equals economic and social backwardness.”

The consequences of this setback are still evident today because the mass reference point that makes it possible to overcome capital has disappeared. There is great skepticism about everything that implies socialist revolution (revolutionary party, centralism, etc.).

The collapse of the Stalinist dictatorships had another consequence, of the opposite sign: the disappearance of the global Stalinist apparatus weakened the counterrevolutionary mechanism that brought together powerful parties and states around the world. This allowed for a very important liberation of forces within the mass movement. However, this very positive element is still greatly mediated by the regression in consciousness, which delays the construction of significant revolutionary alternatives.

What will happen if the Castro dictatorship is overthrown by a mass mobilization, as happened in the East? What if this is combined with an electoral defeat for Chavismo? Will the same process be repeated, at least in Latin America?

First of all, it is necessary to differentiate between the processes in Cuba and Venezuela. The fall of the Castro dictatorship through a mass mobilization would be a progressive process, in the same way that we analyze what happened in Eastern Europe. It would be the collapse of a bourgeois state after the restoration of capitalism, of a capitalist dictatorship. The defeat in Cuba came earlier, with the restoration of capitalism, as also happened in the East.

An electoral victory for the bourgeois opposition in Venezuela would be a defeat for the mass movement, even knowing that it is a bourgeois government. It would be the victory of a pro-imperialist opposition over a bourgeois nationalist government.

The responsibility for all the negative elements that arose in the consciousness of the masses, in the case of the overthrow of the Cuban and Venezuelan governments, lies directly with those governments and all the left-wing organizations that support them. To this day, there is no left-wing alternative with mass support in either Cuba or Venezuela. The alternatives for leadership, with influence in those countries, are bourgeois and pro-imperialist.

The non-existence of a left-wing opposition in Venezuela is a tragedy, for which the entire left that capitulates to the Chavista government is directly responsible. Mass mobilizations against the government are capitalized on and directly led by the right-wing opposition. This is the consequence of capitulation to Chavismo: the defeat of the Venezuelan government could be a victory for the bourgeoisie.

In Cuba, the situation is even worse. There is a violent dictatorship that prevents any political opposition from expressing itself. There are no alternatives in place. But it is not difficult to imagine how easily bourgeois leaderships backed by “democratic” imperialism could be built.

But let us return to the question of the consequences of a possible defeat of the Castro and Chavez governments on the consciousness of the masses and the vanguard in Latin America. Would what happened in the post-Eastern Bloc era be repeated—or intensified? Will this be understood as a “defeat of socialism”?

In our view, the immediate impact is inevitable, but its magnitude depends on several factors. There are elements that play in favor and others that play against it.

The elements working in favor of a new disaster in the consciousness of the masses and the vanguard are concentrated in the weight of the Castro-Chavista left.

Leftist organizations that support the governments of Cuba and Venezuela, in the face of their fall, will once again spread the ideology that “socialism” has been defeated again. It is likely that these parties and movements, particularly those in Latin America, will experience significant crises in that case.

Why, then, do we say that it “depends” and that the extent of these results is not defined? Because some elements of the current reality differ from those of the 1990s and may lead to a different situation.

The first difference is that, at the time of the fall of the Stalinist dictatorships in the 1990s, neoliberalism was at its peak. Neoliberal plans were being implemented and raising expectations in many countries. Capitalism appeared victorious, in contrast to defeated “socialism.” But the international economic crisis put an end to that in 2009, leading to a general decline, albeit with ebbs and flows. The economic crisis that has affected Latin America since 2013 also plays into this.

As we have seen in this text, there is also a decline in the consciousness of the Latin American masses regarding the Cuban and Venezuelan governments. This is due both to general post-Eastern Bloc disenchantment and to the economic and social decline of those countries. The support of the Cuban and Venezuelan governments for the dictatorships in North Africa and the Middle East also weighs heavily on the vanguard.

The current erosion of the popular front governments and bourgeois nationalists who support Castro-Chavismo has lessened the likely trauma following their possible defeat.

The decline of Castro-Chavismo may be a factor that reduces the negative impact of the defeat of the Cuban and Venezuelan governments. There may be a liberation of forces due to the crisis of the Castro-Chavista organizations, which would be very positive. And the negative consequences of the retreat of consciousness may be mitigated.

In essence, the outcome is not predetermined. That has profound political significance today. The more activists understand the populist-bourgeois meaning of Castro-Chavismo, the less negative the impact of the defeats of the Cuban and Venezuelan governments will be. If the collapse of the workers’ states had strongly negative immediate consequences, that may be different today.

To advance in this direction, we want to call on the entire global left to debate the Cuban and Venezuelan governments. It is important that a broad discussion take place throughout the world and, especially, in Latin America. In particular, we call on the most combative sectors of the vanguard who still believe in these governments to enter into this debate, to verify whether we are right, and to break with them.

It is essential to build a revolutionary alternative to Castro-Chavismo starting now.