A Home Grown Revolution in the Framework Of The Arab Revolutions
In the last five months, the Syrian working class led by its youth section, has been carrying out mobilizations that have been growing in numbers, in geographical reach and in radicalization.
In July, for the first time, the marches gathered hundreds of thousands. Hama replaced Daraa as the leading city of the mobilizations that are happening nationwide. The main demands went from reforms and democratic rights to «Down with Bashar El Assad,» the hated dictator. Local Coordinating Committees in every city provide an example of grassroots organizing and alternative leadership.
This true revolution became a watershed among left wingers and anti-imperialist activists. Hezbollah, the main political organization in Lebanon and certainly the most prestigious party among Arab masses for their struggle against Israel, is supporting Bashar openly. Although Hezbollah supported the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain before, in Syria, now, they claim that Bashar has popular support and is committed to reforms and that the opposition is sponsored by imperialist forces. Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez are also supporting Bashar, repeating the support they have already given to Khadaffi in Libya.
The broad majority of the Stalinist organizations, new and old alike, are siding with Bashar on the grounds of his supposed opposition to imperialism, claiming that the mobilizations are led by western, Israeli or rightwing Lebanese agents. They say that the content of the mobilization in Syria is different from the Egyptian revolution.
Let’s address each of these arguments.
The Myth of Assad’s Opposition to Imperialism
Since in power, the Assads, first Hafez and then his son Bashar, carried out a slow move from an independent bourgeois state inspired by Arab nationalism towards a regional power dependent on imperialist countries of the West. For the past forty years, the Assad regimes have been geared towards transforming Syria into a regional capitalist power to be the main bridge between the Arabs and the international world order.
In November 1970 Hafez al-Assad, a former lieutenant of the Syrian Air force and then the minister of defense, led the ouster of Salah Jadid, the strongman of the Baath regime in Syria. Disagreements between the two became irreconcilable after the so called «Black September» in Jordan. The Syrian government was committed to intervening militarily to help the Palestinians topple King Hussein of Jordan. The PLO did its part by taking control of large areas in Jordan including part of its capital, Amman. When the royal backlash started, Jadid moved some troops into northern Jordan but Assad refused to let the Air Force join the war efforts for fear of an eventual Israeli intervention. Without the Air Force, the Syrian troops were easy prey for Jordanian warplanes. The Assad takeover was the thermidor of the radicalization of the Baath regime leading to a loosening of tensions with imperialist powers and liberalization of the economy.
In 1973, a joint effort by the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces to take back territory occupied by the Israeli forces (the Sinai and Gaza, and the Golan heights respectively), was strongly defeated by the far superior Israeli military. Accusations of betrayal by both the Egyptians and the Syrians weakened the alliance between the two countries. While maintaining strong anti-Zionist rhetoric and claims to Golan Heights, Hafez El Assad accepted the border as stipulated in the ceasefire agreement and strictly enforced it. Since then the border with Syria has been one of the Zionist state’s most stable.
In 1976, Syrian troops invaded Lebanon. Formally called by the Maronite president, but in reality, backed by the US and Israel, the Syrian troops prevented the insurrection led by the PLO and its allies (the Druze, the Sunni and the Shiite organizations) to destroy the rightwing Lebanese Forces and seize power, completely changing the situation of the Palestinians, the effects of which were felt across the Middle East. Assad had his own reasons for this: he was fully opposed to strengthening the PLO because they could jeopardize his plans to secure regional hegemony and influence the huge Palestinian constituency inside Syria itself. On top of that, the Syrian regime has never recognized the Lebanese state, arguing that Lebanon was a product of colonialism to divide Syria and the Arabs in general. Syria’s shared the concern of the West and Israel that a PLO-led administration in Lebanon could destabilize the entire region and threaten the existence of the state of Israeli itself.
In 1978, the Syrian armed forces in Lebanon carried out a tacit agreement to allow the Israeli troops to invade and occupy southern Lebanon. In 1982, Assad joined Israeli and right-wing Lebanese efforts to expel Arafat and the PLO from Lebanon, at the cost of thousands of Syrian soldiers and military weapons. While the Israelis invaded Beirut in search of the Palestinian fedains, the Syrians did the same, surrounding Tripoli in the north. After expelling the PLO leaders and fighters to Tunisia, the Syrian sponsored Palestinian groups: the Saika, Fatah Uprising led by Abu Musa and the PFLP-General Command led by Ahmed Jibril worked to oust Arafat and weaken the PLO, favoring Assad’s plot to eliminate the Palestinian threat to his regional hegemony among all Arabs.
In 1980, Assad sided with the Iranians against Saddam Hussein, then backed by the US and Arab gulf countries in their efforts to prevent the Iranian revolution from turning the whole region upside down. Assad was interested in weakening his old foe and regional rival, Saddam Hussein.
The End of the USSR And The Turn To The West
The collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria’s main ally, under the impact of a revolutionary wave across Eastern Europe in 1989-1991, led Assad to court the US and European countries.
First, Syria reestablished diplomatic ties with Egypt. The relationship between the two countries had been severed after Egyptian president, Annuar Sadat, recognized the state of Israel in 1979. Afterwards, Egypt became, together with Saudi Arabia, the main Arab allies of the US.
The efforts to appease the West were furthered by Syria’s support for the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991. Despite deploying a modest 5,000 soldiers to Saudi Arabia, the political effect of an Arab nationalist regime supporting US war efforts was enormous. In exchange, Syria got US$ 2 billion from the Gulf states and was able to establish itself as a reliable partner of the US and Europe.
After the war, Syria engaged in talks with Israel, following the Egypt’s example. Nevertheless, Syria’s efforts failed to convince Israel to return every inch of the Golan heights taken from Syrian in 1967. Israeli leaders argued that it was unacceptable for Israeli security to have an Arab country on Lake Tiberias, Israel’s main supply of water.
Meanwhile, the Syrian regime worked on building its relationship with Iraq, Jordan and the PLO, the losers of the Gulf war, in order to become a bridge between them and the West and its Arab allies. Assad, after meeting the Iranians, declared that Syria opposed splitting Iraq, and made agreements with Saddam Hussein to curb Kurdish rebels from operating from Syria. He also signed economic agreements that permitted the flow of Iraqi oil through pipelines that crossed Syrian territory to the Mediterranean. In addition, Assad met with Arafat, pledging to stop delegitimizing him and the PLO as Assad had been doing since 1983.
In 1998 Syria also pushed ahead new economic and security agreements with Turkey, another Western ally. Turkey was particularly interested in preventing the PKK, the main Kurdish organization in Turkish-occupied Kurdistan, from operating within Syria with Assad’s support, as had happened before. Assad curbed all Kurdish operations in Syria. He arrested 125 PKK leaders and deported them to Turkey. On top of that, Syria abandoned its claims to the Hatay province, an extensive area delivered to the Turks by a French mandate many decades before. In exchange, Turkey increased investments and economic partnership with Syria and also made agreements on water resources as much of the water Syria needs comes from rivers that flow from Turkish lands.
The next round of pro-imperialist moves was pushed ahead after Hafez Al Assad’s death in 2000, by his successor, Bashar El Assad.
Once in power, Bashar signed economic neoliberal reforms in order to push ahead privatization and open the economy to foreign capital to appease the Western powers. At first, these reforms diluted state’s monopoly of the banking system, allowed private universities and incentivized the private real estate market. Among the main beneficiaries are Bashar’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, who became a billionaire. His personal wealth was estimated in 2008 to be about $6 billion dollars. He is the main owner of Syriatel which is one of the two licensed mobile phone company’s in Syria. Besides owning Syriatel, he is involved in oil, tobacco, real estate, banking, free trade zones along the border with Lebanon, duty-free shops, and luxury department stores. According to the Financial Times, he is thought to control as much as 60% of the Syrian economy through his web of business interests.
Bashar also concluded the Taif Agreements that finished the Lebanese civil war. These agreements, supported by the US, Saudi Arabia and the main groups in Lebanon, acknowledged Syrian power over Lebanon against the wishes and political and military efforts of General Michel Aoun, who had to flee to France. At the same time, Syria recognized the Lebanese state.
At the same time, Bashar maintained political and military support for Hezbollah in Lebanon in order to put pressure on Israel and the US to return the Golan heights and preserve Syria’s regional role as a leading Arab country. For the same reasons, Bashar accepted a large number of Iraqi refugees during the second Gulf War and allowed the operation of the Iraqi resistance through its borders. Currently, the UNRWA (United Nations agency responsible for refugees) acknowledges the existence of one million Iraqi refugees in Syrian territory.
Despite of these politicies, the US under Bush jr decided not to attack Syria for the fact that it is better to have a known evil than an unknown one. Bashar did not represent a hindrance for the imperialist order but someone who imperialism would need to bargain.
Now in 2011, the US, the EU and Israel altogether refuse to take military action or any further strong reprisals against Bashar’s regime for killing and violently repressing the largely peaceful revolution waged by massive mobilizations across the country. The politics of the US are clear: The media reported that US proposals were widely circulated in the unprecedented meeting of the Syrian «opposition» held in the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus last June 27th. The carefully phrased 3,000-word document demanded a clear and frank apology and accountability from organizations and individuals who failed to permit legitimate protests, and compensation for the families of the victims. It also called for a new law on political parties and a 100-member transitional national assembly for which the Baath party would appoint 30 members and Bashar would appoint 70 others in consultation with opposition nominees. In a phrase, what the US is demanding is that Assad oversee a secure and peaceful transition to civil democracy.
The US wants reforms to be led by the Syrian regime towards a national unity government in order to prevent any destabilization of Syria and consequently of the whole Middle East, particularly in Israel by Hezbollah and the Palestinians, in Turkey by the Kurds, in Iraq by the resistance and even in Saudi Arabia by the Shiite oppositionists who could start protests in oil production areas near the border with Kuwait, where the Shiites are the majority.
The Syrian Revolution Is Part Of The Arab Revolutions
There are characteristics that the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and other Arab countries all share: hated old dictatorships with no perspective of change, all of them directly backed or in strategic dealings with Western powers, economic hardships deeply increased by the world economic crisis, working class youth in the vanguard of massive people’s mobilizations, and democratic demands centered in the most popular chant from Tunisia: «The people want to topple the regime».
The same is happening in Syria. Let’s see.
A Repressive and Authoritarian Regime
Syria has been under martial law for 40 years. It stipulates that any meeting of more than 5 people should have a permit by one of the 15 security services agencies two weeks in advance. To get the permit the name of the speaker(s) should be provided, together with a copy of each speech and a complete list of the attendees.
This law has allowed the Assads to arrest anyone in dissent. The Syrian jails are famous for hosting thousands of Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners, and at the same time, countless numbers of dissenters are missing. There are mobilizations in Lebanon demanding accountability from Syrian authorities in order to provide information as to the whereabouts of loved ones. Some survive. Salah Jadid, the former ruler before Hafez Al Assad, was put in jail and died there after 23 years.
On top of the martial law, repressive action was taken against the Sunni dissent. In 1982, more than 20,000 people were killed in Hama after protests led by the Muslim Brotherhood. In the aftermath all Sunni clerics were probed and only the ones sanctioned by the regime and linked to the Baath party were allowed to lead a mosque.
The same applies to the 2 million Kurds. There is a ban on their language in an effort to erase the Kurdish culture and turn them into Arabs. Around 300,000 Kurds do not have Syrian citizenship and marriages between any of these 300,000 and Syrian citizens is not recognized by the state. The majority of the Kurds are poor despite living on rich farmland (primarily cotton and wheat producing areas) and the abundance of oil resources in Syrian-occupied Kurdistan. In 2004, a mobilization was met with strong repression and deals with Turkey and Iraq were broken to severe connections among Kurds across the area.
In reality, no democratic changes were implemented under Bashar. When he was appointed president, there were large expectations for democratic reforms. Some even spoke of a Syrian spring. But Bashar only carried out economic reforms. The democratic efforts were suppressed then. In 2005, after imperialist pressure and strong local mobilization, Syrian troops finally left Lebanon. In Syria, for the first time, an opposition movement appeared openly demanding a change of regime under a document called the Damascus Declaration. It called for political and economic reforms. Foremost among them was the demand of a multiparty system, a democratic regime, free elections, a new constitution to ensure equality before the law, freedom of speech and organization, cancellation of the martial law and freedom for all political prisoners. This declaration was authentically Syrian, signed by known personalities like author Michel Kilo, former member of Parliament Rayad Sayf and former judge Haytham al Malih. They did not have US support or encouragement and faced repression including years of imprisonment.
In 2011, under the combined pressures of the Syrian Revolution and the West, Bashar announced some reforms: end of the martial law, the creation of a multiparty system, citizenship for the Kurds, freedom for some political prisoners, etc. At the same time, he resorted to widespread repression to end the protests. In August Hama, Deir el-Zour and Latakia have been particularly targeted. Two thousand people were killed, around three thousands disappeared, and over ten thousands were jailed. 12,000 refugees fled to Turkey and many more to Lebanon. Authoritarian actions prevailed under democratic rhetoric.
The Economic Roots Of The Revolution
The combination of the economic reforms carried out by Bashar from 2000 onwards and the world economic crisis generated an explosive situation. Like in all Arab states, unemployment, especially among young educated people, is high without any signs of decreasing. Wages are low and inflation is high. The two million public workers make US$200-300 per month making «baksheesh» a critical complement of their survival. On top of that, millions of farmers have been forced into migration into the cities due to a drought in rural areas.
While the working masses are suffering, Bashar handed over whole sections of the economy to his family members. Rami Makhlouf got the telecommunications company Syriatel and a myriad of other businesses. Rami is hated by the masses in struggle as the symbol of the corruption of the regime. By the way, he is not alone. Zou Al-Hima Shalish, his cousin, assumed control of a huge contracting firm in the building industry. He and other businessmen around them received the lion’s share of the public contracts for infrastructure.
Perspectives: A Regime On The Verge Of Breaking Down
The future of the Syrian revolution is being decided in the streets of Damascus, Hama, Daraa, Deir-el-Zour together with the struggle in the streets of all the other Arab countries.
The counter revolutionary forces are at work but contradictions are accumulating.
Last August 18th President Barack Obama explained the US approach: «We have consistently said that President Assad must lead a democratic transition or get out of the way». Furthermore he ordered Syrian government assets in the United States frozen, banned U.S. citizens from operating or investing in Syria and prohibited U.S. imports of Syrian oil products. The same day the European Union leaders also demanded Assad to step aside. Whether E.U. imports of Syrian oil will be halted is yet to be seen. The U.S. and the E.U. took five months to declare that Bashar must leave because their preferential way to defeat the Syrian revolution was to have reforms with Bashar in the lead. Both Bashar’s refusal to stop repression and the permanence of the protests led imperialism to seek another one inside and outside the regime to do the job.
Russia, China, Brazil, India and South Africa, all members of the security council are still calling for reforms led by Bashar. Last August 9th Brazil, India and South Africa went beyond that point claiming Bashar’s willingness to carry out reforms while condenming the violence from ‘both sides’.
Yet Turkey, the main trade partner of Syria (US$ 2,5 billion annual trade) with whom she shares strong historical links, stopped in between. Last August 9th, the Turkish chanceller Davutoglu announced that Turkey would wait two weeks for the end of all state violence and for meaningful reforms before any other actions were taken.
Emboldened by these decisions and by the strong support from Iran, Bashar is resorting to wide repression in order to prevent the growth of the movement and the establishment of free cities that could become strongholds for the revolution, as happened in Libya with Benghazi. However, despite strong repression, the revolution does not seem to be withering away even if the mobilization got smaller in August due to wild repression.
Bashar’s plan B is to push ahead the reforms sponsored by Western powers for «democratic» elections and a national unity government. It is not clear whether this option is viable due to the actual stage of the mobilizations. His last option is the establishment of a militarized Alawite statelet in the northwest, around Aleppo and Lattakia.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the revolution is alive and bound to radicalizing.
The marches and rallies have jumped from a few thousand five months ago to hundreds of thousands recently, in July. Daraa, on the poor southern border with Jordan, was the first center of the revolution. Now the mobilizations are held national wide, led by Hama and Deir-el-Zour with an output of hundreds of thousands on each city every Friday. Even in Damascus, there are marches in some neighborhoods where the majority are Sunnis, Kurds and certain sections of the middle class. The only main city without any larger mobilization is Aleppo, a center of the Alawite community and a stronghold of Assad’s regime.
The non-sectarian character of the revolution is critical to attracting increasing numbers of various Christian sects, Shiites and Druzes. One of the most popular chants is «One, one, one, Syrian people are one». There also exists the possibility of splits among the Syrian bourgeoisie, themselves deeply affected by the economic paralysis.
The strong repression led the demands to change from reforms to the fall of the regime. In August Bashar managed to halt the hundred thousands marches in Hama and Deir-el Zour but as soon as the troops leave the cities, smaller marches restart. But new contradictions emerge from this repressive actions.
Troop defections are on the rise. Bashar has to rely upon the fourth division of the armed forces, primarily formed by the Alawite community and directly led by his brother Maher Al Assad to carry out the slaughtering in Hama, Deir-el-Zour, Lattakia and other places. There are reports of soldiers being killed by their commanders for refusing to carry out the repression against the protesters. The generalization of troop defections have not happened yet due to the lack of an alternative center where the soldiers can gather to fight back.
Nevertheless there is a limit for Bashar to base himself on one section of the army to face a national-wide wave of protests. Furthermore the other sections of the army which are not employed to attack the people are too sensitive to people’s demands and are bound to split. On the other hand, protesters are bound to defend themselves by setting up barricades in the cities and arming themselves.
The actual leadership of the protests is the local coordination committees that have emerged across the country, primarily composed of modest numbers of young activists. They coordinate themselves through alternative means of communication. Previously their stand was to oppose any dialogue with the regime while repression is applied. Now they demand the end of the regime. The tendency of the struggle is to develop all these coordination committees into open and larger democratic organization on the ground, pushing aside the fake opposition that met in Damascus last June 27th under the auspices of the regime along with the other opposition group abroad that held a 300-person conference in Antalya, Turkey from June 2nd to 4th, primarily of liberal and nationalist groups and personalities.
The main absentee: a strong revolutionary workers party
The main absentee from the Arab Revolution in Syria and elsewhere is a strong revolutionary socialist organization to consciously develop the mobilization and self-organization of the working masses to topple Assad’s regime, and carry out all their demands and needs. A clear set of demands and the working class in motion are critical to make the first strike to topple the repressive regimes and move on to deliver the changes the working masses are demanding and in need.
a) Down with Assad regime!
b) Free speech and the right to form unions and political parties!
c) Freedom for all political prisoners and fair trials for all members of the regime!
d) Free elections for a national constituent assembly that can provide:
·Severance of all ties with Israel and the West, be them economic, political, diplomatic or military! Non-payment of the foreign debt!
·The right for self-determination for the Kurdish people and support for their struggle across all of Kurdistan;
e) Full support for the Palestinians in struggle for a secular and democratic Palestine covering the entirety of its historical territory;
f) Military support for Hezbollah to carry out the resistance against Israel and all support for the Iraqi resistance;
g) Jobs, wages, affordable housing, free public education and healthcare, and social security;
Above all, the entire economy must be nationalized and placed under workers control building for a workers and peasants government in Syria that can advance the creation of the Socialist Federation of Arab Republics.
