<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nWho is responsible for the climate crisis, and who will bear the cost of the transition?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fundamental issue is how energy and production will be organized and who will make these decisions. If profitability and competitiveness are once again to determine the direction of production, it is difficult to claim that the green transition will be truly fair for workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The issue is not merely what decisions will be made in Antalya. The real question is how energy, production, and social resources will be used, for what purpose, and in whose interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If we genuinely want to solve the climate crisis, we need a perspective of social transformation that does not make working people pay the price of the transition, that plans production according to society\u2019s needs, and that can carry this transformation out on a global scale.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
COP31 will be held in Antalya from November 9 to 20, 2026. Representatives of numerous states, corporations, civil society organizations, and scientists will attend the conference. The official COP31 website states that more than one hundred thousand participants are expected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n
- What exactly is COP?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Why do tens of thousands of people from all over the world come together every year?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- How much progress have all these meetings, declarations, and commitments actually made toward solving the climate crisis?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
To answer these questions, let us first look at how the climate crisis emerged and how it entered the agenda of international politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Global Warming and the Climate Crisis<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Especially with the Industrial Revolution, mechanization and the factory system accelerated production. The intensive use of fossil fuels, particularly coal, also increased. As a result, the amount of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO\u2082) released into the atmosphere rose rapidly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere causes the planet\u2019s average temperature to rise. We call this long-term increase in the Earth\u2019s average temperature global warming.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But the issue is not simply rising temperatures. Rainfall patterns are changing, droughts and extreme rainfall are becoming more destructive, glaciers and polar ice are melting, and sea levels are rising. Ecosystems are also finding it increasingly difficult to adapt to these changes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In short, rising atmospheric temperatures are affecting the planet\u2019s entire climate system. We call these broad-ranging changes, whose effects are becoming increasingly severe as a result of global warming, the climate crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Climate Crisis Enters the International Agenda<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
So when did states become aware of this problem? How did climate change enter the agenda of international politics?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Climate change did not suddenly become an issue on the international political agenda. From the 1970s onward, as scientific research on global warming expanded and political awareness developed, environmental problems also began to become subjects of international debate. The Stockholm Conference held in 1972 was an important turning point in bringing environmental problems onto the agenda of international politics. With the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization in 1988, the scientific dimension of climate change also gained greater importance in interstate politics. Thus, climate change ceased to be merely a subject for environmental sciences and began to be addressed as a common problem on an international scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, was another important step in this process. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted as a result of the conference. This laid the foundation for an international negotiation mechanism through which states would regularly come together to combat climate change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Following the entry into force of the Convention, the first Conference of the Parties (COP1) was held in Berlin in 1995. Two years later, the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in Kyoto in 1997, introduced legally binding targets, particularly for developed countries, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, the international climate negotiations we know today as the COPs began to take shape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unfortunately, the Kyoto Protocol failed to provide an adequate response to the problem of climate change. One of the most important reasons was that the Kyoto model imposed binding emission-reduction targets primarily on developed countries, while it did not impose similar obligations on developing countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At a time when global emissions were rapidly increasing, this meant that a significant share of the world\u2019s largest and fastest-growing economies remained outside binding reduction targets. The United States refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that developing countries also needed to undertake meaningful emission-reduction obligations. In 2001, the George W. Bush administration explicitly announced that the United States would not participate in the Protocol.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Thus, one of the world\u2019s largest historical emitters of greenhouse gases remained outside the Kyoto system. This raised serious questions about how effective and enforceable the Protocol could be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the fundamental problem with the Kyoto Protocol was not simply that the United States remained outside it. At a time when climate change was increasingly becoming a global problem, the Protocol failed to resolve the question of how responsibility should be shared between developed and developing countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The rapidly increasing emissions of major developing economies such as China, in particular, raised the question of whether the existing system could sufficiently limit global emissions. The need for a new international agreement that would take into account both the historical responsibility of developed countries and the growing emissions of developing countries therefore became increasingly evident in climate negotiations. This search led to the beginning of a new period with the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Paris Agreement<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Following the problems created by the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement was adopted at COP21 in Paris in 2015 in order to place the fight against climate change within a broader international framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fundamental aim of the Agreement was to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2\u00b0C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5\u00b0C. Unlike Kyoto, the Paris Agreement brought all countries into the same international framework and required states to prepare their own Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and renew them every five years with more ambitious targets. Providing developing countries with financial and technological support for climate mitigation and adaptation was also among the Agreement\u2019s important elements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
With the Paris Agreement, the world\u2019s states appeared to have united around a common goal against the climate crisis. But what happened to the climate crisis in the years following the adoption of the Agreement?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
How Successful Have the COPs Been?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, renewable energy investments and capacity expanded significantly around the world. In some countries, this transition was supported by various funds, and many countries announced net-zero or emission-reduction targets. A common global climate framework emerged with the Paris Agreement, and climate change became increasingly important in states\u2019 economic and energy policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet despite all these developments, there remains a significant gap between the targets announced today and actual emissions. Despite the rapid growth of renewable energy, the transition away from coal, oil, and natural gas is not happening quickly enough. There is also a serious gap between the targets countries announce and the policies they actually implement. For developing countries in particular, one of the fundamental questions remains who will pay for the cost of the transition. The issue here is not only the amount of financing to be provided, but whether it will take the form of grants, loans, or new debt, and who will have access to the necessary technologies and under what conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
All of this reveals one of the fundamental disputes in climate negotiations: Who is responsible for the climate crisis, and who will bear the cost of the transition?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
How fair is it for developed countries that completed their industrialization much earlier and countries that are still undergoing industrialization and development today to carry the same obligations? On the other hand, the increasing share of large and rapidly growing economies such as China in global emissions raises the question of where the responsibility of developing countries begins.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, developing countries are not integrated into the world economy on equal terms. The unequal distribution of capital, technology, and financial resources on a global scale also limits developing countries\u2019 access to the resources necessary for the transition. Therefore, when discussing the cost of the climate crisis, we must look not only at countries\u2019 current emissions but also at their unequal positions within the world economy.
<\/p>\n\n\n\nWho Will Bear the Cost of Solving the Climate Crisis?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Limiting the effects of the climate crisis requires not only reducing emissions but also a comprehensive transformation of energy and production systems. Gradually phasing out fossil fuels, closing coal mines and thermal power plants, expanding renewable energy sources, increasing the use of electricity in industry and transportation, improving energy efficiency, and moving toward cleaner production technologies are among the fundamental elements of this transformation. This requires restructuring a significant part of the economy and making large-scale investments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
States are attempting to steer this transformation through various policies. Carbon taxes and emissions trading systems, restrictions on fossil fuel use, renewable energy incentives, emissions standards, and infrastructure investments are among them. But the fundamental question here is not which instruments will be used. The real question is: Who will bear the cost of this transformation?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
States can use public resources to finance climate policies. But a significant portion of these resources ultimately comes from taxes collected from society. For companies, new investments, technological changes, or the transformation of production processes mean additional costs. Some of these costs can be passed on to prices, wages, or working conditions. In other words, who pays for the expenditures and investments carried out in the name of the \u201cgreen transition\u201d becomes directly a class question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Steps such as closing coal mines and thermal power plants directly affect workers and local communities dependent on these sectors. Closing a mine may be necessary from an environmental perspective. But questions remain as to how the people working there will make a living, how new jobs will be created, and who will make the decisions concerning this transformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From the standpoint of capital, the fundamental concern is to keep the cost of the transition as low as possible and preserve the competitiveness of companies. From the standpoint of workers, the question is much simpler: What will happen after this transition, and who will make the decisions?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is precisely why the concept of a \u201cjust transition,\u201d which has been widely used in recent years, has become an important subject of debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
How Just Is the \u201cJust Transition,\u201d Really?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A just transition aims to reduce the costs that climate policies and the energy transition impose on workers, compensate for job losses, and create new employment opportunities. This approach seeks, in particular, to prevent workers in coal mining and fossil fuel industries from being disadvantaged during the transition process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At first glance, this approach appears quite reasonable. But here too there is a fundamental question: Who will ensure that this transition is truly \u201cjust\u201d?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Capitalist states can employ various instruments to promote a just transition. Providing income support to workers who lose their jobs, organizing training programs for new occupations, encouraging renewable energy investments, and implementing regional development programs are some of them. However, none of these policies changes the fundamental purpose of production. Profitability and competition remain the basic criteria of economic activity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While the state seeks to reduce emissions, it is also obliged to protect the competitiveness of companies and economic growth. For this reason, there is a constant tension between climate policies and the interests of capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet a just transition is not limited to ensuring that a miner who loses their job finds another job. The fundamental issue is how energy and production will be organized and who will make these decisions. If profitability and competitiveness are once again to determine the direction of production, it is difficult to claim that the green transition will be truly fair for workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When decisions concerning the transformation of production and energy are made solely by states and companies, workers are turned into objects of this process. Yet workers who are directly affected by this transformation must have a say in how and for what purpose production is organized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For this reason, although the concept of a \u201cjust transition\u201d points to an important problem, its limits are quite clear as long as capitalist relations of production remain unchanged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Is Solving the Climate Crisis Possible Under Capitalism?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The picture that has emerged so far does not mean that capitalist states are doing nothing against the climate crisis. On the contrary, serious steps are being taken through renewable energy investments, emission-reduction targets, climate funds, and various regulations. However, all these measures are shaped within capitalist relations of production and competition between states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Capitalism can, of course, develop new technologies, redirect investments toward different areas, and accelerate the transformation of production through state policies. But all of this takes place within relations of profitability and competition. Therefore, the issue is not that capitalism is incapable of doing anything; rather, the capacity of what it does to solve the climate crisis is constrained by the relations of production within which it operates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When a state raises its climate targets, concerns arise that the costs of its own companies may increase, their competitiveness may weaken, or investments may move to other countries. For this reason, climate policies are determined not only by environmental necessities but also by concerns such as economic growth, employment, energy security, and international competition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This also explains why COPs have faced the same fundamental problems for years. Although states face a common problem on a global scale, they primarily consider their own economic and political interests when seeking solutions. The conflicts of interest behind debates over climate finance, the phase-out of fossil fuels, and the transformation of production lie precisely here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The climate crisis, however, recognizes no borders. The atmosphere is not divided between countries; production chains, energy resources, capital flows, and environmental consequences do not remain within national borders either. Therefore, we cannot conceive of its solution solely through the interests of individual states. Production and energy resources must be reorganized on a global scale according to society\u2019s needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The way forward lies in replacing competition among capitalist states with the common interests of peoples, and above all, the international working class. A genuine solution to the climate crisis requires the means of production and energy resources to be planned according to social needs rather than private profit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For this reason, internationalism here is not merely a political choice but a necessity imposed by the climate crisis itself. While capitalism is organized on a global scale, it is impossible to conceive of solutions to the crises it creates within the borders of individual countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
COP31 in Antalya: The Same Problems, New Commitments<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The COP31 Presidency describes the conference to be held in Antalya as an \u201cImplementation COP.\u201d Its aim is to turn commitments made at previous COPs into concrete results and accelerate the implementation of climate policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At COP31, issues such as the energy transition, green industrialization, climate finance, resilient cities, and food systems will come to the fore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet here again we face the same fundamental questions. Implementing countries\u2019 climate targets requires major investments, new technologies, and substantial amounts of financing. Particularly for developing countries, how this transition will be financed, how necessary technologies will be accessed, and who will bear the resulting costs remain contested issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Therefore, it is not enough to limit the discussions in Antalya to the question of what more countries can do on climate. The fundamental issue is which economic and political interests will shape this transformation and who will bear its costs. The years since the Paris Agreement have shown that setting targets alone is not enough. Unless COP31\u2019s claim of \u201cimplementation\u201d moves beyond these fundamental contradictions, it will not offer a genuine solution to the climate crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion: What Kind of Future?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The reality of the climate crisis is no longer a matter of debate. In the face of this crisis, whose effects we increasingly feel across the world, states have been setting new targets, signing agreements, and meeting at COPs every year for decades. Yet the gap between the promises made and the results achieved remains vast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The problem is not that nothing is being done against the climate crisis. The problem is the economic and social relations within which these measures are being implemented. Phasing out fossil fuels, transitioning to renewable energy, and transforming production may be necessary. But shifting the cost of this transformation onto workers and working people, while maintaining the profitability of capital and competition between states as the fundamental criteria, will not lead us to a genuine solution to the climate crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Therefore, the issue is not merely what decisions will be made in Antalya. The real question is how energy, production, and social resources will be used, for what purpose, and in whose interests. If we genuinely want to solve the climate crisis, we need a perspective of social transformation that does not make working people pay the price of the transition, that plans production according to society\u2019s needs, and that can carry this transformation out on a global scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n