{"id":76238,"date":"2026-07-08T00:49:11","date_gmt":"2026-07-08T00:49:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/?p=76238"},"modified":"2026-07-08T00:49:11","modified_gmt":"2026-07-08T00:49:11","slug":"after-the-arrest-how-5-july-2026-changed-the-political-balance-in-kashmir","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/after-the-arrest-how-5-july-2026-changed-the-political-balance-in-kashmir\/","title":{"rendered":"After the Arrest: How 5 July 2026 Changed the Political Balance in Kashmir"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
When the Pakistani authorities arrested Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) core member Shaukat Nawaz Mir, they expected to break the momentum of a movement that had already endured weeks of repression, arrests and political intimidation. The calculation was familiar: remove the leadership, criminalise the organisation, isolate the movement through an information blackout and gradually exhaust the population through fear and economic hardship. Similar methods have been employed against democratic movements across Pakistan for decades. Yet in Pakistan-administered Jammu Kashmir, the strategy produced an outcome very different from that intended by the state.<\/p>\n\n\n
\nSolidarity protest in London, Britain<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
Rather than retreating, the movement entered a new political phase.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Within days of Mir’s arrest, the Joint Awami Action Committee issued a call for mass marches, demonstrations and shutter-down strikes on 5 July 2026 throughout Pakistan-administered Jammu Kashmir. At the same time, it appealed to the Kashmiri diaspora to organise solidarity protests, public meetings and awareness campaigns wherever Kashmiri communities were living. What began as a regional movement now consciously sought to become an international democratic campaign. The significance of this appeal extended beyond symbolic solidarity. It recognised a political reality that has become increasingly important over recent decades: Kashmir is no longer politically confined within its geographical boundaries. Hundreds of thousands of Kashmiris live and work in Britain, Europe, North America and the Middle East. Their economic contribution through remittances, their political influence within diaspora communities and their growing engagement with trade unions, human rights organisations and democratic movements make them an indispensable part of Kashmir’s political future. JAAC’s appeal therefore represented a strategic attempt to break the movement’s isolation and expose developments inside Kashmir to an international audience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Inside Kashmir, however, the immediate challenge was survival.<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
By early July, many districts had experienced weeks of disruption. Sit-ins continued despite repeated forces operations. Internet restrictions had severely limited communication. Movement between districts became increasingly difficult. Reports from participants described shortages of food, medicines and fuel in several areas, while transport networks operated only intermittently. markets remained closed, businesses were under enormous pressure and ordinary families carried the burden of an indefinite confrontation with the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet these hardships produced a remarkable political response.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Instead of dispersing, communities organised themselves around the sit-ins. Villages collected food for demonstrators. Families shared available supplies. Volunteers established informal support networks for those travelling to protest sites. The movement increasingly relied not upon formal institutions but upon collective organisation developed from below. What emerged was not simply a series of demonstrations but the early characteristics of a society learning to organise itself under conditions of sustained political confrontation. The events of 5 July demonstrated that the movement had become far broader than many observers had anticipated.Across Rawalakot, Bagh , Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, Kotli, Bhimber, Neelam, Forward Kahuta, Sudhnoti and numerous smaller towns and villages, people responded to JAAC’s call despite extensive security deployments. In many places, protesters encountered roadblocks and police barricades erected to prevent marches from reaching district centres. Rather than abandoning the demonstrations, participants found alternative routes, removed obstacles or reorganised their marches. The ability of the movement to adapt under pressure reflected a growing confidence among ordinary people who increasingly viewed themselves not as spectators but as active participants in shaping the political future of their society. One of the most striking features of the July mobilisation was its social composition. The movement was no longer dominated by experienced political activists. Workers marched alongside traders, students alongside lawyers, pensioners alongside young first-time protesters. Entire families participated. In many towns, women formed a visible and determined presence at the front of demonstrations. Their participation challenged deeply rooted assumptions about political activism in a conservative society and transformed both the appearance and the character of the movement.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
Women were not simply present; they became organisers, speakers and defenders of the demonstrations. In several localities they confronted police lines directly, refusing to abandon protest sites despite the threat of arrest or the use of force. Their presence gave the movement a broader social legitimacy while simultaneously encouraging many families who might otherwise have remained hesitant to participate openly. Equally significant was the emergence of a new generation of politically confident young people. Many had never previously participated in organised political activity. The movement itself became their political education. They organised transport, coordinated local demonstrations, communicated information despite internet restrictions and assumed responsibilities traditionally carried by older activists. Reports from numerous districts described young people rushing towards protest sites whenever news spread of forces operations or clashes. Their determination reflected more than youthful enthusiasm. It expressed a growing conviction that the outcome of the struggle would shape not only present conditions but also the future of their generation. This new political consciousness was increasingly reflected in the slogans heard throughout the demonstrations. One chant echoed repeatedly across towns and villages:”Khoon Rang Layega, Inqilab Aayega.””The blood of the martyrs will bear fruit; revolution will come.”Another slogan, equally common, captured the determination of the demonstrators:”Halla Bol! Halla Bol!””Advance the struggle! Press forward!” Whether interpreted literally or symbolically, these slogans revealed an important political shift. For many participants, the movement was no longer understood simply as a campaign around immediate demands. It increasingly represented a broader struggle over democratic rights, political power and the relationship between the people and the state.This evolution also created new challenges. As often occurs during rapidly expanding social movements, the energy of the rank and file occasionally moved faster than sections of the leadership. Younger participants frequently expressed impatience with prolonged negotiations that produced no visible results, while many argued that the movement should maintain continuous public mobilisation until concrete demands were implemented. These debates did not necessarily indicate weakness. On the contrary, they reflected the growing political maturity of a movement whose participants increasingly regarded themselves as active decision-makers rather than passive supporters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The state, however, interpreted the expanding movement very differently.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Having already declared JAAC a banned organisation, the authorities intensified their efforts to portray the movement as a threat to public order and national security. State officials and sections of the national media repeatedly characterised JAAC leaders as agents of foreign interests, separatists or individuals seeking to destabilise Pakistan. The movement’s democratic demands were frequently overshadowed by narratives emphasising security concerns and allegations of external influence. Such narratives are neither unique nor historically unusual. Governments confronted by large-scale democratic mobilisation have often sought to shift public discussion away from social grievances and towards questions of national security, patriotism and external conspiracy. By framing political dissent as disloyalty, the authorities attempt to isolate movements from wider public sympathy and justify extraordinary measures of repression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet the events of July suggested that these strategies were becoming less effective than in previous periods.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Despite weeks of official propaganda, arrests and restrictions, significant sections of the population continued participating in demonstrations. Even where uncertainty remained, particularly outside Kashmir, the state’s narrative no longer enjoyed unquestioned authority. The persistence of the protests indicated that lived experience had become more influential than official rhetoric. For thousands of ordinary Kashmiris, the movement’s legitimacy derived not from political speeches but from their own participation in collective action. The arrest of Shaukat Nawaz Mir therefore produced the opposite of its intended effect. Rather than creating paralysis, it accelerated the transformation of a protest movement into a broader popular mobilisation. July 5 did not resolve the political crisis, but it fundamentally altered its character. The state could still deploy force, make arrests and impose restrictions. What it could no longer assume was that repression alone would restore political normality. Instead, a new and more difficult question emerged for both the movement and the authorities: what happens when a society refuses to retreat? The significance of 5 July did not lie merely in the number of demonstrations or the geographical spread of the protests. Its real importance lay in exposing the limits of state repression. During the preceding month, the authorities had employed almost every instrument available to contain the movement. JAAC had been outlawed, its leaders arrested, hundreds of activists detained, internet access severely restricted, roads placed under heavy security and a sustained media campaign launched to discredit the movement. Yet none of these measures succeeded in restoring political normality. Instead, every new attempt to suppress the movement appeared to deepen public anger and widen participation. The demonstrations of 5 July therefore represented more than another day of protest. They demonstrated that the political initiative was no longer entirely in the hands of the state. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the movement was the emergence of women as one of its most dynamic social forces. While women had participated in earlier phases of the struggle, July witnessed an unprecedented level of involvement. They did not merely attend rallies; they organised demonstrations, addressed gatherings, maintained sit-in camps and, in several localities, stood in the front ranks when police attempted to disperse crowds. In whole Pakistan Administered Kashmir women marched alongside men in numbers that surprised even experienced political observers. In some confrontations, women reportedly resisted police attempts to block demonstrations, throwing stones in self-defence when security forces advanced. Such scenes reflected not simply courage but a profound social transformation. A movement capable of drawing women into the centre of political life acquires a legitimacy and resilience that repression alone cannot easily destroy. The participation of women also changed the atmosphere of the movement itself. Families increasingly attended demonstrations together. Sit-ins became community spaces rather than exclusively political gatherings. Mothers, daughters and elderly women shared platforms with students, workers and traders. The struggle increasingly appeared not as the project of one political organisation but as the collective expression of society itself. Equally decisive was the role of young people. Every mass movement eventually reaches a point where a new generation assumes responsibilities beyond its years. Kashmir appears to have reached precisely such a moment. Many of the young people leading chants, organising transport, coordinating communications and defending protest sites had little previous political experience. They learned organisation through struggle itself. Whenever reports emerged of police advancing towards a sit-in or attempting arrests, young people travelled rapidly towards those areas. They understood the defence of one protest site as the defence of the movement as a whole. Their confidence frequently exceeded that of older activists, many of whom carried memories of previous defeats and repression. The younger generation, by contrast, increasingly viewed retreat as impossible. For them, the movement had become inseparable from their own future. Regardless of the precise wording used from town to town, the political message remained consistent. The movement increasingly understood itself as a struggle for democratic dignity, public accountability and popular sovereignty rather than merely a campaign around individual grievances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The authorities responded by intensifying both repression and propaganda.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
State institutions continued portraying JAAC as a threat to national security. Sections of the media described the movement as externally sponsored, while prominent leaders were denounced as “Indian agents,” “separatists” or individuals attempting to undermine Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. Official statements repeatedly emphasised Pakistan’s historical sacrifices for Kashmir and suggested that criticism of state policy amounted to disloyalty. Such accusations have become familiar throughout South Asia. Democratic movements demanding accountability are frequently recast as security threats, allowing governments to justify exceptional measures while avoiding the substantive issues raised by protesters. Yet this strategy depends upon persuading society that dissent originates outside rather than within it. The events of July suggested that such arguments convinced fewer people than before. Despite an almost complete communications blackout, information continued to circulate. Young people climbed surrounding hills in search of mobile signals, crossed into areas where internet access remained available or relied upon relatives outside Kashmir to transmit videos, photographs and eyewitness accounts. International media organisations and members of the Kashmiri diaspora helped relay developments to audiences abroad, partially breaking the isolation imposed by the blackout. This informal communication network became one of the movement’s greatest strengths. Modern technology can be restricted, but collective determination often finds alternative routes. Every image reaching London, Birmingham, Manchester, Oslo, Milan, Toronto or New York weakened the effectiveness of the state’s information strategy.Meanwhile, new forms of local organisation emerged inside Kashmir itself. In several areas, residents established community checkpoints designed to monitor the movement of security forces and to alert neighbouring villages when forces operations appeared imminent. Volunteers organised food distribution, medical assistance and transport for demonstrators. In many districts, ordinary citizens\u2014not professional politicians\u2014became the practical organisers of resistance. The state reportedly attempted to encourage divisions within society by mobilising local political elites, pro-government networks and influential individuals against the movement. Yet these efforts achieved only limited success. The deeper the confrontation became, the more ordinary people appeared to rely upon their own collective experience rather than official assurances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Another important political development concerned the scheduled 27 July Legislative Assembly elections.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
In numerous towns, protesters publicly declared that they would reject election campaigns until the movement’s demands received a meaningful response. Some communities announced that candidates would not be welcomed into their areas while repression continued. Whether these declarations could ultimately be sustained remained uncertain, but they reflected a growing crisis of political legitimacy. Increasingly, sections of the population questioned not merely individual policies but the credibility of existing political institutions themselves. For decades, mainstream political parties have promised reform while operating within structures over which they exercise only limited influence. The July movement exposed the widening gap between these traditional parties and an increasingly mobilised society. As the protests expanded, many established political leaders struggled to keep pace with public expectations. Some called for dialogue without presenting concrete proposals. Others criticised repression while simultaneously urging demonstrators to return home. Such positions satisfied neither the authorities nor the protesters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This tension was also visible within the movement itself.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Large popular mobilisations inevitably generate strategic debates. Should demonstrations continue indefinitely? Under what conditions should negotiations begin? Can democratic gains be secured without broader political organisation? What relationship should exist between spontaneous mobilisation and structured leadership?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These questions became increasingly important as the confrontation continued. The determination of the youth inspired the movement, but it also raised practical challenges. Sustaining prolonged sit-ins required food, medicine, financial resources and organisational coordination. A movement capable of mobilising enormous energy must eventually confront the equally important question of how that energy can be sustained over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From the perspective of the authorities, the political dilemma became equally complex.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Two broad options remained available. The first was meaningful negotiation based upon substantive concessions capable of restoring public confidence. The second was a further escalation of repression in the hope of exhausting the movement through force. Both strategies carried significant risks. Concessions might encourage wider democratic demands throughout the region, while intensified repression risked producing greater instability and potentially transforming isolated confrontations into a deeper political crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It was precisely this contradiction that made the events of July historically significant. The state retained overwhelming institutional power, yet its political authority appeared increasingly contested. The movement possessed enormous moral energy and expanding public support, yet it still faced difficult questions concerning organisation, leadership and long-term strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One reality, however, had become unmistakably clear.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Kashmir movement was no longer a local dispute that could be quietly contained behind checkpoints, internet blackouts or official press statements. It had become part of a much broader struggle over democracy, social justice and political legitimacy\u2014one that was increasingly attracting attention far beyond the mountains of Kashmir. If 5 July transformed the political balance inside Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, it also marked the beginning of a new international phase of the struggle. Recognising that the state’s information blackout was intended not only to isolate the movement internally but also to conceal it from the outside world, the Joint Awami Action Committee appealed to Kashmiris living abroad to organise demonstrations, public meetings and solidarity campaigns wherever they resided. The response was immediate. Across Britain, Europe and North America, members of the Kashmiri diaspora organised marches, rallies and demonstrations. London became the centre of this international campaign. Thousands marched through the capital to the Pakistan High Commission, demanding an end to the repression, the restoration of democratic freedoms and meaningful dialogue with the movement. Similar demonstrations, though smaller in scale, took place in other British cities as well as in several European countries and North America. Women again played a particularly visible role, reflecting the changing social character of the movement itself. For decades, the Kashmiri diaspora has maintained emotional, cultural and economic ties with its homeland. During the July crisis these ties acquired a new political significance. Diaspora communities did more than protest; they became a vital channel through which information left Kashmir despite severe restrictions on communication. Videos, eyewitness accounts and photographs that could not circulate freely within the region reached the outside world through family networks, activists and independent journalists. International media coverage, although limited, increasingly challenged the effectiveness of the state’s attempt to monopolise the narrative. The economic dimension should not be underestimated either. Hundreds of thousands of Kashmiris living abroad send substantial remittances to their families. During the crisis, many openly discussed reducing or delaying transfers as a form of protest, while others redirected financial support towards families affected by the movement. Whether these initiatives were symbolic or economically significant, they demonstrated that developments inside Kashmir were capable of generating pressure beyond its geographical boundaries. This internationalisation also altered the political calculations of the Pakistani state. The authorities were no longer dealing solely with demonstrations inside Kashmir but with a movement capable of attracting attention from trade unions, human rights organisations, progressive political parties and sections of the international media. A crisis that had initially appeared local was beginning to acquire an international audience.Yet the significance of the July movement extends beyond Kashmir itself. It unfolded at a moment when multiple social and democratic struggles were already developing across Pakistan. In Balochistan, the movement led by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee continued to challenge enforced disappearances, political repression and restrictions on democratic rights. The imprisonment of prominent activists, including leaders associated with the movement, became a focal point for wider protests. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, PTM (pushtoon Tahfiz Movement ) continued to raise concerns about militarisation, insecurity, displacement and the protection of civil liberties. Across the country, journalists, lawyers, students, trade unionists and human rights defenders faced increasing legal and political pressure. Government employees mobilised against deteriorating working conditions, while workers opposed privatisation, downsizing and attacks on labour rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These developments should not be viewed as isolated events. They reflect different expressions of a broader political and social crisis.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Over recent decades, successive governments\u2014civilian and military alike\u2014have pursued economic policies centred on privatisation, fiscal austerity and market liberalisation. Public services have been weakened, labour protections reduced and strategic sectors opened to private and corporate interests. At the same time, democratic space has narrowed. Restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association have increasingly accompanied neoliberal restructuring. This combination of economic inequality and political centralisation has produced growing discontent across multiple regions and social classes. From a Marxist perspective, the Kashmir movement cannot therefore be understood simply as a regional dispute. It is one expression of a wider contradiction between a political and economic order that struggles to secure popular legitimacy and a society increasingly unwilling to accept the costs imposed upon it. This does not automatically mean that whole region specially Pakistan has entered a revolutionary situation. Such conclusions require careful analysis rather than political enthusiasm. Classical Marxist theory distinguishes between periods of social discontent, pre-revolutionary crises and fully revolutionary situations. A revolutionary situation generally involves a profound crisis of state authority, the inability of the existing ruling class to govern in its traditional manner and the emergence of working class consciousness of exercising an alternative form of popular power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Pakistan has not yet reached that stage.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
However, developments during 2026 suggest that elements commonly associated with a pre-revolutionary situation are becoming increasingly visible. Confidence in established political institutions has weakened. Social struggles are expanding across different regions and sectors. Traditional parties face growing difficulties in containing public anger. Economic hardship continues to deepen. Repressive measures increasingly replace political consensus as the principal means of governance. These are significant developments, but they remain tendencies rather than completed historical outcomes. The future trajectory will depend not only upon the actions of the state but also upon the political capacity of democratic movements themselves. The events of July revealed both the enormous strengths and the real limitations of the Kashmir movement. Its greatest strength lies in its remarkable popular legitimacy. It has general workers, students, traders, women, professionals and rural communities around a broadly democratic programme. It has demonstrated extraordinary courage under conditions of sustained repression. It has shown an impressive capacity for self-organisation and mutual support. Yet every mass movement eventually confronts questions that cannot be answered by courage alone. How should spontaneous mobilisation be transformed into durable democratic organisation? How can unity be preserved while encouraging open political debate? Under what conditions should negotiations occur, and what guarantees are necessary to ensure that agreements are implemented? How can local struggles connect with broader democratic and labour movements without losing their own political independence? These are strategic questions rather than tactical ones, and they will shape the future of the movement long after the immediate confrontation has passed. One important development during the July mobilisation deserves particular attention. Increasingly, activists from different nationalities, regions and political traditions recognised that isolated struggles are easier to suppress than coordinated ones. This understanding has encouraged discussion around initiatives such as the People’s Solidarity Caravan\u2014a platform intended to strengthen solidarity between movements resisting repression, economic exploitation and democratic restrictions across the region. The significance of such initiatives lies not in organisational labels but in political principle. When workers in Punjab support democratic rights in Kashmir, when students in Sindh defend political prisoners in Balochistan, when lawyers in Islamabad speak against attacks on journalists, and when Kashmiris stand with movements elsewhere, the state can no longer isolate each struggle within its own geographical boundaries. Solidarity becomes not simply a moral gesture but a practical form of political resistance. Ultimately, the central lesson of 5 July is not that repression has ended or that victory is inevitable. Neither conclusion would be justified. The state retains formidable institutional resources and may continue to rely upon coercion. The movement itself faces difficult organisational and political challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But one fact can no longer be ignored.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The attempt to silence Kashmir through arrests, bans, blackouts and intimidation has not restored political stability. Instead, it has produced a generation more politically conscious, more organised and more determined than before. A movement once portrayed as local has become part of a wider debate about democracy, social justice and popular sovereignty throughout the region. Whether the authorities choose negotiation or further repression will shape the next phase of this conflict. Whether the movement can transform its remarkable courage into lasting democratic organisation will shape its historical legacy. What happened on 5 July 2026 was therefore more than a day of protest. It marked the moment when thousands of ordinary people demonstrated that political legitimacy does not arise from decrees, prohibitions or coercion, but from the active participation of society itself. The events of that day did not resolve Kashmir’s political crisis, but they ensured that it could no longer be dismissed as a temporary disturbance. They revealed a society determined to defend its democratic rights and a movement whose significance now extends far beyond the mountains where it began. History rarely moves in straight lines. Victories are followed by setbacks, advances by retreats. Yet there are moments that permanently alter the political imagination of a people. For many Kashmiris, 5 July 2026 appears destined to become one of those moments.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
When the Pakistani authorities arrested Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) core member Shaukat Nawaz Mir, they expected to break the momentum of a movement that had already endured weeks of repression, arrests and political intimidation. The calculation was familiar: remove the leadership, criminalise the organisation, isolate the movement through an information blackout and gradually exhaust the population through fear and economic hardship. Similar methods have been employed against democratic movements across Pakistan for decades. Yet in Pakistan-administered Jammu Kashmir, the strategy produced an outcome very different from that intended by the state.<\/p>\n
Rather than retreating, the movement entered a new political phase.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":23,"featured_media":76239,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"litci_post_political_author":"Mehnatkash Tareek","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4138,497,4141],"tags":[6836,6293,6788,4139,6785,4140,4329,6844,6843,6845,6841,6842],"class_list":["post-76238","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-kashmir","category-pakistan","category-pakistan-asia","tag-azad","tag-jaac","tag-jammu","tag-kashmir","tag-pak","tag-pakistan","tag-pok","tag-shaukot","tag-shawkat","tag-shawkot","tag-shoukat","tag-shoukot"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/litci.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/PHOTO-2026-07-07-20-21-44.jpg?fit=720%2C540&ssl=1","fimg_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/litci.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/PHOTO-2026-07-07-20-21-44.jpg?fit=720%2C540&ssl=1","categories_names":["Kashmir","Pakistan","Pakistan"],"author_info":{"name":"Carlos S.","pic":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/fdf3a2076204dbf848fa7838fc9e2787f3317262207b35e333f31316e39fce9c?s=96&d=mm&r=g"},"political_author":"Mehnatkash Tareek","tagline":"Mass Resistance, State Repression and the Internationalisation of a Democratic Movement in Pakistan-Administered Jammu and Kashmir","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76238","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/23"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76238"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76238\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":76242,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76238\/revisions\/76242"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/76239"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76238"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76238"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76238"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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