<\/p>\n\n\n\n
After 49 days of one of the largest mobilizations in recent years, the Bolivian Workers\u2019 Confederation (COB) leadership participated in a roundtable discussion with Rodrigo Paz\u2019s government on June 18. They abandoned the demand for Paz\u2019s resignation, which had been approved at previous national plenary sessions. The COB presented itself as the representative of all the mobilized sectors and made the release of those detained a condition for continuing the negotiations. However, just one day later, on June 19, the COB leadership signed an agreement with the government that did not guarantee the release of those detained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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This decision lacked the mandate and approval of the rank-and-file members who have sustained the struggle. In fact, COB rank-and-file workers and miners had already significantly reduced their participation in the protests. Meanwhile, peasant and indigenous organizations have continued to carry out most of the roadblocks and maintain pressure on the government. Neither the Tupac Katari Federation nor the Single Trade Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CSUTCB) participated at the negotiating table. Both organizations denounced the lack of consultation and maintained their pressure tactics. The COB leadership made the decision to negotiate, disregarding the sacrifices of thousands of protesters and arrogating to itself a right to represent them that it no longer exercised in practice. This political shift undermined the struggle at a critical moment when the government was facing its greatest crisis. It fostered division within the movement and opened the door to a new repressive offensive against the popular movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Preliminary Agreements with the Miners<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The COB leadership and the state-owned mining sector leaders reached agreements with the government before the peasant and indigenous organizations could discuss the direction of the mobilization collectively. On June 17 and 18, the miners of Colquiri and Huanuni\u2014who constitute the most important sector of the working class and hold significant influence in the COB\u2019s decision-making bodies\u2014reached agreements with the executive branch before the labor federation signed the general agreement and officially called for the lifting of the blockades. In other words, the COB leadership clearly created conditions to ensure there would be no challenges from its main base.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n For weeks, workers, popular sectors, peasants, and indigenous people have maintained road blockades and held demonstrations. They have faced repression, shortages, and enormous economic sacrifices. The rank and file\u2019s strength had put the government on the ropes. However, while the peasant and indigenous sectors maintained most of the blockades and demanded a collective discussion of next steps, the COB leadership failed to expand the movement. They made no attempt to unite the factory, mining, and teaching sectors with the popular, indigenous, and peasant movements. Instead, they chose to channel the strength of the roadblocks toward negotiation and demobilization. They prioritized the agreements reached by their main working-class base and acted without a mandate from the mobilized sectors as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The COB\u2019s agreement with the government does not guarantee the release of prisoners or address any immediate demands. It merely grants the government a 90-day deadline<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The agreement\u2019s terms reveal the true nature of the negotiations. The extent of the COB leadership\u2019s capitulation was made clear in its handling of the detainees. Just two days before the signing, the union federation had affirmed that the release of the prisoners was a prerequisite for moving forward with the dialogue. The federation stated that without this \u201cfirst step\u201d by the government, any agreement would be viewed as a betrayal by the rank and file. However, the final document does not guarantee the release of any detainees, set deadlines, or provide for the withdrawal of charges or closure of legal proceedings. Instead, the agreement establishes a commission composed of the government, the COB, and the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office to \u201cfacilitate the release\u201d and review cases individually.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n None of the main demands of the mobilization received an immediate response. The government was granted 90 days to study the demands and draft proposals without committing to resolving the economic crisis or addressing demands regarding wages, food supplies, employment, and living conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Essentially, the COB leadership gave the government time to reorganize politically and regain the initiative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Peasant and Indigenous Grassroots Groups Reject the Agreement<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The agreement was rejected by numerous peasant and Indigenous groups, who criticized the COB leadership\u2019s decision as a betrayal of the movement and denounced not having been consulted. Grassroots organizations argue that abandoning pressure tactics disregards the sacrifices of thousands of protesters and breaks the unity agreement forged during nearly seven weeks of struggle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Peasant and Indigenous organizations were among the main driving forces behind the national mobilization. Their participation in roadblocks, marches, and clashes with repressive forces was crucial to sustaining the movement. Therefore, excluding these sectors from strategic decisions reflects a profound crisis of representation within the COB leadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The resistance of the rank and file shows that the struggle is not over. The issue is the leadership\u2019s decision to negotiate without a mandate from the people who kept the mobilization going in the streets and on the highways.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The government exploited the division caused by the COB and declared a state of emergency<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The COB\u2019s decision to demobilize and divide the movement was immediately exploited by the government. As soon as the executive branch regained political maneuvering room, it declared a state of emergency, expanding the state\u2019s repressive powers and enabling greater restrictions on democratic freedoms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The government intends to use the state of emergency to reestablish state authority, contain new protests, and discipline sectors that remain mobilized. This offensive confirms that the COB\u2019s negotiations did not lead to a favorable outcome for workers and rural communities. On the contrary, the demobilization has weakened their capacity to resist and has facilitated the executive branch\u2019s repressive measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Even before the state of emergency is brought before the assembly for approval, news reports indicate that military forces are being deployed to various regions of the country, specifically to roadblocks. There is also a report of the persecution and attempted capture of movement leaders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n International solidarity is now more necessary than ever<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The government of Rodrigo Paz\u2019s declaration of a state of emergency marks a new escalation in the repressive offensive against the popular movement. Through this measure, the government seeks to grant itself greater power to dismantle mobilizations, criminalize protests, and ensure the intervention of repressive forces against peasants and indigenous peoples who continue to fight and maintain roadblocks. Meanwhile, the COB leadership\u2019s betrayal\u2014abandoning the demand for the government\u2019s resignation, sitting down to negotiate, and calling for an end to pressure tactics\u2014weakens the resistance and leaves mobilized sectors more vulnerable to state attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Under these conditions, international solidarity is essential. Workers\u2019, popular, peasant, Indigenous, student, and human rights organizations throughout Latin America and the world must speak out against the state of emergency, denounce any attempt at repression, and actively support the Bolivian people\u2019s struggle. In the face of the isolation that the government and conciliatory leadership seek to impose, we must strengthen a broad international campaign of solidarity with those confronting austerity policies and hunger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n We must build an alternative leadership<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n These 49 days of struggle have demonstrated an enormous fighting spirit among workers, peasants, and Indigenous peoples. They have also exposed the limitations of a leadership that, when the government was at its weakest, chose to prop it up through negotiations and concessions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n This experience teaches a fundamental lesson: no favorable outcome for the exploited and oppressed can depend on leadership that subordinates the struggle to agreements with governments in power. However, due to its historical and social composition, the Bolivian Workers\u2019 Confederation (COB) remains a potential space where the organized strength of the country\u2019s working class, peasants, and popular masses is expressed. Therefore, it can serve as a basis for an alternative power structure for the oppressed majorities. However, this potential can only be realized under conditions of workers\u2019 democracy and genuine grassroots control over its leadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As long as the COB leadership remains detached from collective decision-making and lacks effective oversight from those sustaining the mobilizations, it will continue to play a mediating and containment role, even during critical moments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, changing the leadership\u2019s names is not enough; a new leadership must be built that is truly democratic, revolutionary, socialist, and independent of the government and business sectors. This new leadership must answer exclusively to the sovereign decisions of the mobilized rank-and-file.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The immediate task is to reorganize the resistance, strengthen coordination among workers, peasants, and indigenous peoples, and establish new forums for deliberation from the grassroots up. The strength demonstrated by the national mobilization still exists. What is needed is consistent leadership willing to carry the struggle through to the end and forge a path forward for Bolivian workers and peoples.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" After 49 days of one of the largest mobilizations in recent years, the Bolivian Workers\u2019 Confederation (COB) leadership participated in a roundtable discussion with Rodrigo Paz\u2019s government on June 18. They abandoned the demand for Paz\u2019s resignation, which had been approved at previous national plenary sessions. The COB presented itself as the representative of all […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":18,"featured_media":76152,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"litci_post_political_author":"Lena Souza","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[477,2,3504],"tags":[478,4078,4770],"class_list":["post-76157","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-bolivia","category-featured","category-working-class","tag-bolivia-2","tag-latin-america","tag-working-class-struggles"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/litci.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Argolo-e-Rodrigo-Paz-1024x576-1.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&ssl=1","fimg_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/litci.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Argolo-e-Rodrigo-Paz-1024x576-1.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&ssl=1","categories_names":["Bolivia","Featured","Working Class Struggles"],"author_info":{"name":"Tara","pic":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/6d59cac2d1190db4eaaa7f914e21e04db15137afa77494a2d471fbea645a465c?s=96&d=mm&r=g"},"political_author":"Lena Souza","tagline":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76157","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/18"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76157"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76157\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":76158,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76157\/revisions\/76158"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/76152"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76157"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76157"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76157"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}