{"id":76087,"date":"2026-05-26T02:41:32","date_gmt":"2026-05-26T02:41:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/?p=76087"},"modified":"2026-05-26T03:30:49","modified_gmt":"2026-05-26T03:30:49","slug":"understanding-the-bengal-verdict","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/understanding-the-bengal-verdict\/","title":{"rendered":"Understanding the Bengal\u00a0verdict"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The 9th<\/sup> of May is the birth anniversary of Bengal\u2019s foremost poet, Rabindranath Tagore. It is widely observed and celebrated, a day when the poet\u2019s philosophy of universalism and humanism is remembered and revelled in. It is also the day when the Soviet Union decisively defeated Nazi Germany in the Second World War. It is a cruel irony then, that this would be the day when the right wing Hindutva party, the BJP would form its very first government in the state of West Bengal, a state historically known as a bastion of opposition in India, a fortress of progressive politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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For the first time in its history, the BJP has won the state elections of West Bengal, a state where until 2016, it did not control a single assembly seat. Not only did the BJP win the elections, it swept the polls securing 208 seats in the assembly of 294 seats, with a vote share of over 45% of all votes polled. The unprecedented rise of the BJP appears to defy all logic and the unique history of the state, yet this reality is rooted in the political developments in India and West Bengal since 2014.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The BJP\u2019s victory in West Bengal was not an overnight or sudden phenomenon but years in the making, with certain key events propelling these changes forward. The consequences of this victory are yet to be fully seen, but we may get a hint of what\u2019s to come from statements made by BJP ministers, supporters and the actions of BJP cadres on the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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 In Jiaganj Murshidabad, a CPIM office was vandalized and a statue of Lenin was broken, the ABVP (the student\u2019s wing of the BJP) assaulted students of the leftist SUCI (Socialist Unity Centre of India) over their opposition to removing party posters. At various parts of the city of Calcutta and the rest of West Bengal, there have been cases of violent attacks on TMC party offices, fitting a familiar pattern of reprisal killings. In Central Kolkata\u2019s New Market area, several meat shops were arbitrarily demolished by a bulldozer, in other parts of the state shanti houses of workers and shop owners have been demolished in a similar way. In the same vein, the leadership of the ABVP in Jadavpur University has promised to \u2018wipe out\u2019 the so-called urban naxals from the campus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Scenes which were until now only seen in Uttar Pradesh and other BJP ruled states in India, have now come to West Bengal. Loud and offensive Hindutva music was played throughout the night, as if declaring the intent to bring Hindutva to the state. Videos emerged of BJP activists threatening meat shops to relocate from near temples. Though such incidents have happened, they are few in number so far. The bulk of attacks have been focussed on TMC party offices, many of these instances being reprisal attacks. In some cases locals joined in the attacks, or at least tolerated these attacks, because there has been an undeniable anger towards the TMC, notwithstanding their lip service to secular politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The character of the TMC <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Following the defeat of the TMC there was a spate of attacks against TMC party offices, cadres and leaders. These attacks were mainly led by the BJP and its cadres, but it is important to note that there was almost no outcry from the people. In many cases, the TMC leaders who were attacked were among the most criminal politicians of the party. Several MLAs and cabinet ministers have reportedly fled the state or gone into hiding. The dramatic collapse of the TMC\u2019s organization reflects not just the ferocity of the BJP, but just how much public anger and resentment had been present against the erstwhile ruling party. It is worth talking about how the TMC came to power and how they ruled the state to understand how their fall unfolded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The TMC came to power by hijacking the peasant protests in Singur and Nandigram against forcible acquisition of land for industry under the CPIM rule. The discontent among the peasantry and youth was channeled by Mamata Bannerji, who led the TMC to victory first in the 2009 lok sabha elections, and then in the 2011 state elections, ending 34 years of uninterrupted CPIM-led Left Front rule. The TMC first aligned itself with the BJP-led NDA alliance, then to the Congress-led UPA alliance, benefiting from the support and resources of both national coalitions when they were dominant. The Congress party in particular was decisive in isolating and destroying the left in West Bengal, for which they used the TMC strategically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Since coming to power, the TMC turned its focus to destroying the grassroots organization of the CPIM and its allies. The first five years of TMC rule saw the emergence of the lumpen leadership that would come to define it. Hundreds of CPIM cadres had been murdered in cold blood, their houses attacked, their families displaced. It did not take the TMC long to eventually turn its guns against the Maoists, clamping down on dissent in educational campuses, and on the Maoist insurgency in the Western tribal districts of West Bengal. The bloodstained first term ensured the political primacy of the TMC, but yielded little benefit for the Congress party who had given their fullest support to the TMC when they were fighting the CPIM.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The 2014 victory of the BJP in the national elections further aided the TMC\u2019s efforts to consolidate power, as they could now bank on the overarching threat of the BJP to scare Muslims into voting for them. The political consolidation of the TMC allowed it to be brazen, institutions such as the police and government bureaucracy were subjugated to the political whims of the TMC party. The TMC was brazen in looting public money with Ponzi schemes like the chit fund, and institutionalized corruption in government hiring, creating scams worth hundreds of crores of rupees. Their economic programme in turn aligned perfectly with their criminal enterprise. The TMC did not take any serious effort to revive failing state owned industries or expand it to generate steady employment. The TMC\u2019s primary economic focus remained real estate development which most benefits the criminal party and its backers among the land-owning bourgeoisie, invested in real estate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The COVID pandemic in 2020 had a devastating effect on the state\u2019s fragile economy, especially because of the impact of cyclone Amphan which hit the state just as the Pandemic\u2019s worst impact hit. The state was also made to suffer worse as lockdowns were removed to assist political campaigning during the 2021 state elections. The TMC won that largely on the grounds of fears of the BJP winning and because its aggressive opposition to the BJP\u2019s Hindutva agenda, and the welfare measures such as the \u2018kanyashri\u2019 scheme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This victory was achieved despite increasing discontent against the TMC\u2019s rule. Throughout the 2021 state elections, many TMC leaders switched parties to the BJP, and eventually switched back to the TMC once the BJP lost, showing the loose and unprincipled character of the party, as well as the weakening hold of the party supremo Mamata Bannerji. Despite having won most seats from the state of West Bengal for the Lok Sabha elections in May, the TMC\u2019s ground remained shaky, and discontent against their misrule remained intact. Today, these contradictions have brought down the party to defeat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Urban discontent against their corrupt and oppressive rule that erupted in Calcutta spread throughout the state, reaching across rural Bengal. The attempts at coercion by the police and the TMC\u2019s lumpen goons have only added fuel to the fire, much like how mass protests in Singur and Nandigram had brought down the CPIM rule, the wave of protests that broke out around the Doctor\u2019s movements and the parallel agitations of tea workers and ASHA workers, played a part in bringing down the TMC government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Over their fifteen year rule over the state of West Bengal, they have transformed every public institution and governmental department into tools of exploitation. Government jobs could not be secured without party loyalty, without paying the intermediaries, bureaucrats twisted the law and government records to assist crony property developers, just so the money could find its way back into the pockets of the party leaders. Hospitals and universities became less centres of learning and more centres of control, with the TMC penetrating into every lever of administration to scam funds from students and patients.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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 The example of R.G Kar hospital is especially glaring, where the TMC linked administration was involved in selling bodies, organ trade and exploiting the most vulnerable class of patients who belong to the urban and rural poor. These activities first came to light because of the protests by Junior doctors at R.G Kar hospital, who protested the rape and murder of a young female doctor, sparking a much wider protest movement around junior doctors that spread throughout the city, eventually reaching the whole country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The TMC party functioned as an organized criminal gang for the purpose of looting the state and its people. To enforce this rule, they liberally use gangsters and lumpen goons, who are let loose on the people during every election cycle to ensure the party wins through coercion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Coercion alone cannot sustain the TMC in power in this state, to ensure some degree of support it has to keep the working class, peasantry and the lower sections of the petty bourgeois placated. For this, the TMC rolls out welfare measures such as direct cash transfers and free facilities such as bicycles for female students. Much of these schemes are financed by borrowing from the Central government, making the state completely dependent on the pressures from the BJP government. During the TMC\u2019s tenure in power, economic growth if any was skewed to benefit a wealthy urban clique of pro-TMC capitalists, and the wealthiest oligarchs who have had an established position in Calcutta\u2019s industries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The TMC sowed the illusion that they would try to develop the state and bring back industries for which West Bengal was once famous, but it did nothing of the sort. Instead, the state is now one of the most indebted in the country, with little to show for it. The economy of West Bengal continues to suffer from the historical forces that made it stagnate and fall behind its peers in the rest of the country, reasons which have their roots in the economic disruption caused by the Second World War, partition, the Bengal famine, policies by Congress led governments in India, and finally the Bangladesh liberation war. Now that the BJP has won, a myth has gained traction that the blame for industries \u2018fleeing\u2019 the state lay entirely at the feet of the CPIM and workers’ militancy in the decades of the 60s and 70s. This is a hint at where they would like to strike next.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The fall of the Stalinists in Bengal<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

At the peak of their dominance, the CPIM-led left front commanded 176 seats of the 294 seat West Bengal assembly. This was the political situation in 2006, before the mobilizations in Singur or Nandigram. No one back then could have imagined that the party that had uninterruptedly ruled West Bengal for nearly 30 years by that point, would collapse so thoroughly, that the entirely left front alliance would be reduced to a mere 42 seats in the election that followed in 2011. By the 2016 Assembly elections, that tally was further reduced to 26 seats, before being completely wiped out in the 2021 assembly elections. In the present state elections, the once dominant party that had ruled and reshaped West Bengal, managed to win only 4.5% of the total votes and 1 seat. The loss of West Bengal, reflected in the parliament, where the CPIM has been nearly wiped out, reduced from a historic high of 60 seats to just 4. The powerful opposition bloc that could swing the fate of the national government is but a distant memory now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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After independence, the CPIM rose in strength on the backs of mass revolts of the peasantry across the length and breadth of the country, but most particularly in the princely states of Southern and Western India. The Communists led the movement for abolishing the zamindari system, and for land reforms. These helped the CPIM grow to become the largest opposition party in the 1950s, and even secure power in the state of Kerala. This would be the first major victory of the CPIM, followed a decade later in the United Front government in West Bengal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite splits suffered in the aftermath of the Indo-China war and the Naxalbari uprising, the party continued to grow in strength, because it was able to position itself in the leadership of peasant and working class struggles. After having won the Kerala elections in 1957, the party\u2019s second big electoral victory came by making an alliance with the Bangla Congress (a splinter faction of the Congress party) in West Bengal in 1967. The so-called United Front government fell after a few months, but it cemented the party\u2019s presence in the electoral sphere of West Bengal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The CPIM played a key role in mobilizing and sheltering refugees from Bangladesh during the 1971 liberation war. This further strengthened their political position in the state, even as they collaborated with the state to crush the Maoist movement. The CPIM further strengthened its position when they became the principal opposition to the Congress during the period of emergency. Once the emergency was lifted, and normal elections were held, the Communist Party won decisively. They would remain in power for 34 years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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During the first fifteen years, the party strengthened its position through land reforms, and standing resolutely against communalism. The dual strategy of land reforms, and guaranteeing worker\u2019s rights through militant trade unionism, ensured the party\u2019s success in the political sphere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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However, the CPIM was far removed from any revolutionary praxis. Not long after coming to power, the party committed the infamous Marichjhapi massacre, a massacre of Dalit Namasudra Bengali refugees seeking shelter in the Sundarbans. This would not be the last time that the CPIM would use its organizational force to commit state sanctioned murders. The same period that saw land reforms and literacy programmes under the banner of Communism, also witnessed a steady compromise with capitalism. The Calcutta Electric Supply Company (CESC) became the first private monopoly in India, for supplying a city electricity. The CPIM period saw the genesis of unbridled real estate led growth, which devoured the city of much greenery, and provided the basis of the corrupt model of the later TMC government. The CPIM used its organization to smash rivals, in the left and right alike, often using coercion and systematic violence. The party inculcated lumpen elements which would go on to fill the ranks of the TMC once the party lost its popularity and power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The CPIM led through a united front of other leftist parties, including the CPI, the Forward Bloc and others. The left front government\u2019s first fifteen years saw massive success in comprehensive land reforms and mass literacy drives that ended the agrarian crisis gripping the state, and improved the quality of life for millions of the state\u2019s rural inhabitants. This period was also marked by a visible decline in labour militancy, as de-industrialization picked pace. Lockouts increased massively, while worker\u2019s strikes declined in number. The CPIM led government faced a massive unemployment crisis upon coming to power, they opted for a short term solution to alleviate the situation, focusing on petty production, small scale industries and government employment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The CPIM era was not immune from corruption, but it was kept at bay by a disciplined party structure. The CPIM did not rely on corruption or lumpen gangsters, it relied chiefly on its peasant base and worker\u2019s unions to hold on to power. The ideological appeal of Communism buoyed it further, but it could only last as long as there was a principled commitment to class struggle. The Communist Party did not commit itself to revolution, rather it adapted to the pressures of Indian capitalism and the pressure of world imperialism. This put it on a slippery slope of corruption and inevitable decline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The contradictions of the party became intolerable in the aftermath of the Singur and Nandigram peasant mobilizations. The frustrations of the youth, the pressures from Indian and world capitalism, all combined to bring down what seemed like an indomitable political machinery of the CPIM. The failings of the CPIM paved the way for the emergence of the TMC, the coming to power of the TMC paved the way for the revival of the political fortunes of Hindutva, a movement that had been all but dead in Bengal since partition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The history of Hindutva in Bengal<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

We have analysed Hindutva as an ideological and political movement rooted in brahminism. At its core, it is a medium to ensure and enforce Brahmin and upper caste supremacy over Indian society. The hostility to Islam and Christianity must be seen in this context, rather than as a consequence of fascist politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Bengal presents a unique challenge for Hindutva, because of its syncretic culture and the history of Bengal. The caste system took root in Bengal quite late in its history, around the 11th<\/sup> to 12th<\/sup> century CE, during the rule of the Sena dynasty. Sena Dynasty rule barely lasted two centuries, when the Turkic invasions came to Bengal, with Bhaktiyar Khilji\u2019s invasion. This disruptive event hastened the decline and eventual disappearance of Buddhism from Bengal, whilst also overturning the nascent dominance of caste hierarchy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Nevertheless, the Kulin system of Casteism managed to survive the fall of the Senas and last into present day. Over much of medieval Bengali history, the region witnessed rule by Muslim sultans, or rule by Islamic Empires governing the region as a conquered territory from Delhi. Yet, Bengal\u2019s distance and frontier geographic position made it a hotbed of secessionist politics. This lent to Bengal, a distinct political and cultural identity, one that forged the unique syncretic culture blending Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic elements into a rich tapestry. This dialectical position both suppressed the development of a rigid caste system. Brahmins in particular, did not find the same level of social dominance in medieval Bengal as they might have elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This would change with the arrival of British colonialism. The massively destructive early rule of the East India Company saw the destruction of much of Bengal\u2019s traditional industries, and the total destruction of its erstwhile Persianate nobility. The first Bengal famine represented a decisive rupture, where the old elites were ruined and a new elite could emerge to fill the void. The Bengal renaissance emerged in the aftermath of this destruction, once Bengal\u2019s economy began to be rebuilt in capitalist terms, it was the more literate, educated upper caste Hindus who benefitted the most.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Despite its syncretic culture, Hindutva arose in the soil of Bengal, and found root here. The first inklings of a proto-Hindutva ideology could be seen in the works of Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, where the nation was deified, Hindu ascetics were valorised, and Muslims were cast as the enemy. All this, within the framework of an anti-British narrative. For the early nationalists of the late 19th<\/sup> century, the Hindu identity was conflated with nationalism and independence. This was a feature that lasted well into the 20th<\/sup> century when Bengal saw the first region wide agitation against the first partition of Bengal in 1905.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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One of the results of British colonial rule was the entrenchment of a policy of divide and rule. Essentially, the British favoured a group depending on their perception of loyalty and usefulness to imperial rule. After the Sepoy rebellion, the British began to favour the new class of English educated Hindu elite, who more often than not happened to be upper caste Hindu Brahmins. The new position of privilege the upper caste elite found itself in allowed it to monopolize modern education, then secure economic power. The Bengal renaissance was at once a challenge to pre-capitalist social relations, and also a process of upper caste dominance. Capitalism in Bengal entrenched caste relations rather than diluted them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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By the end of the 19th<\/sup> century, nationalist movements were increasingly combining the language of Hindu supremacy and identity. At the same time, Bengali Muslim society was re-emerging from its ruination at the hands of British colonialism. A new educated class of Muslim gentry was growing, which would go on to challenge the hegemony of the Bengali Hindu elite. The 1872 census, the first in India, shed light on a demographic reality of Bengal which was known but never acknowledged by British rulers, that the Eastern half of the province had a Muslim majority. In the context of rising political consciousness and organization, this was a threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Tensions between the Hindu and Muslim elite came to a head over the partition of Bengal in 1905, when Bengal was proposed to be divided in two provinces along religious lines, the excuse being to administer the provinces better. While Orissa, Bihar and Assam were separated from Bengal, pitched activity which included economic boycott of British goods and terror tactics, forced the British administration to annul of the partition of Bengal. While this was a political victory, Hindu-Muslim relations were permanently damaged in its aftermath. The British, with the help of a section of Muslim elites, were successful in convincing large numbers of Bengali Muslims that the partition of the region was in their interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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On the other hand, the Hindu upper caste elite felt threatened by the newfound political assertiveness of Bengal\u2019s Muslims, most of whom formed the bulk of Bengal\u2019s marginalized peasantry. The core of Hindutva politics in Bengal would emerge from among them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At first, it was the Hindu Mahasabha which acted as the preferred political organization of the Hindu elite, as the BLPI explained the Mahasabha was the sharpest expression of the most reactionary Hindu landowning elites in India. Much of Bengal\u2019s agriculture, trade and industry was in the hands of the land owning gentry, most of whom were Hindu. This class sustained the power of the Hindu Mahasabha in Bengal. Though initially starting as a faction of the Congress party in 1915, they soon split apart and forged their own independent political path.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Hindutva in Bengal was rooted in the interests of the upper-caste, upper-class, landed gentry. Their patronage and support sustained them organizationally and politically. It is unsurprising, that they would see the assertion of Muslim Bengali peasantry under the Krishak Praja Party as the primary threat. Yet, they were on a losing historic trajectory. The emergence of the Communist movement, peasant agitation, and workers agitation, created conditions for the loss of power of the zamindary, who had rose to power by aligning with the East India Company. They were the main beneficiaries of the Permanent Settlement Act, which created the Zamindary system as we know it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Social tensions between Bengali Muslim peasant and Hindu land owning elite, came to a head in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Bengal famine of 1943 ruined many peasants, causing the deaths of up to 4 million. The famine was harsher in Muslim majority East Bengal than it was in the West. A key reason behind the famine, was rampant hoarding of rice by largely Hindu rice traders based in Dhaka and Calcutta. This became a major political rallying cry for the Muslim League, who until then was at best a secondary political force in Bengal, compared to the Congress Party and Krishak Praja Party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Calcutta with its port was one of the major centres of revolutionary mobilization towards the end of the Second World War, the upsurge of the youth in the aftermath of the Red Fort Trials, followed by the mutiny of the naval ratings, marked a high point of class struggle in the city. In months, the mood would swing from revolution to reaction, when the Calcutta and soon much of India would be bathed in the blood of communal violence between Hindu and Muslim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The open conflict between Hindus and Muslims marked what could be argued as the peak of Hindutva politics in Bengal. Reactionary Hindutva matched the fanaticism of reactionary Islamism unleashed by the Muslim League. At least 100,000 people were killed in the violence, and a million people would be displaced following partition. Over the course of drawing the post partition borders, the Hindu Mahasabha, and pro-Hindtuva leaders like Shyama Prasad Mukherjee would play a pivotal role ensuring the partition of Bengal. Movements like the Bengali Hindu Homeland movement, played a major part in the formation of the state of West Bengal in independent India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Shyama Prasad Mukherjee would go on to found the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, which would later merge with the Congress (O) to form the BJP. The BJP for its part has spared no effort in highlighting the role of Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, and showcasing Bengal as Shyama Prasad Mukherjee\u2019s Bengal, ignoring the vexed history of Hindutva politics in Bengal and its disastrous impact on the state. It would not be an exaggeration to say, that Shyama Prasad Mukherjee was one of the chief architects of partition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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His dismemberment of Bengal ensured its long term impoverishment. The partition itself would not have been possible without the reactionary mobilization of Hindutva forces within Bengal, in which Shyama Prasad Mukherjee played a leading role. After independence, he continued to play this role, being strictly opposed to the Hindu Code Bill, standing in opposition to the Nehru Liaqat pact, and advocating for a full population transfer of Hindus and Muslims of Bengal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Today, the Hindu community in Bangladesh faces discrimination and systematic violence, while the Muslims of West Bengal face systematic impoverishment. The only beneficiaries of the partition, were arguably a small section of upper caste Bengali Hindu elite who could secure their monopoly on political and economic power within a much reduced sphere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The most lasting legacy of the Hindutva movement in Bengal, and indeed of Shyama Prasad Mukherjee\u2019s political career, was the formation of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, an organization which would eventually become the Bharatiya Janata Party, the party that now rules India, and Shyama Prasad Mukherjee\u2019s home state of West Bengal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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How the BJP won<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In the run up to the 2021 elections, the BJP pooled all their resources from across the country to push in and take the state. They were so desperate to win the state that they temporarily relaxed lockdown rules, just so their party could campaign freely across the state. Cadres were brought in packed trains and trucks, massive rallies were hosted with thousands gathering. Suddenly, the party that initiated lockdowns to curb the spread of COVID had forgotten the pandemic was still raging. The virus spread, causing havoc across the state, and the country. This was a small price to pay for the BJP to win in West Bengal, yet that victory was denied to them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The Home Minister Amit Shah, and the Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself came down to campaign in person in the state. Yet, these failed to translate into the victory they hoped for. Over the course of the campaigning, the BJP had managed to buy several defectors from the TMC over to their party, drawn by the lure of money, and the chance of being forgiven for criminal activities for which the Enforcement Directorate had been investigating them. Once it seemed like a BJP victory was uncertain, the same people defected back to the TMC, in what became a comical circus of political disloyalty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The defeat of the BJP in 2021 was an important turning point for the party\u2019s political fortunes, it was at least in part a verdict on the BJP\u2019s handling of the COVID pandemic. Despite resentment towards the misrule of the TMC, the BJP did not seem like a convincing alternative. On the contrary, the Muslims of West Bengal had every reason to oppose the party. The anti-Ctizenship Amendment Act mobilizations had broken out in 2019, there was a fear of detention camps, a nationwide National Register of Citizens being implemented, and the possibility of being deported en masse to Bangladesh had gripped the minds of most Bengali Muslims. The fear of deportation was not limited to Muslims either, extending to the many Hindus who had fled Bangladesh following the Pakistani genocide of Bengalis during the 1971 war, as well as the descendants of those Hindus who had fled or immigrated to India in the aftermath of partition and the decades following the establishment of Bangladesh.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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A combination of factors worked to ensure the BJP would not get a wide mandate among the people of West Bengal in 2021. Most in fact, supported the TMC as a lesser, more manageable and recognizable evil, just to keep the BJP out. The same period saw the farmer\u2019s protests in Delhi, and the withdrawal of the Farm laws. This in turn, ensured that North India\u2019s farmers would remain opposed to the BJP going into the 2024 National elections. The reduction of the BJP\u2019s absolute majority forced it to rely on coalitions to ensure a stable government. Since then however, the BJP has regained lost support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Perhaps the most significant impact of the 2021 West Bengal assembly elections, was the wiping out of the CPIM and the Congress from the Bengal assembly. The TMC had monopolized power over the opposition through coercion, deploying a vicious and efficient party machinery that relied primarily on gangsters, lumpens and defectors from the CPIM and Congress party. The destruction of grassroots organization, the haemorrhaging of cadres and leaders, ensured that the CPIM would have to rebuild from the ground up, while the BJP entered the field with a fully prepared organization structure, backed with the full weight of national institutions firmly under the influence of the RSS and political control by the BJP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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For the people of the state, reeling from the long term systematic impoverishment of the state after independence, and further from the criminal rule of the TMC, the BJP seemed like the only viable alternative. The BJP positioned itself as the only force capable of fighting the TMC, not only on the streets, but institutionally through the help of law enforcement institutions like the Enforcement Directorate and Central Bureau of Investigation. The only real base of support for the TMC remained the Muslim minority, for whom the BJP presented itself as an existential threat, one that openly threatened their cultural rights and very existence as a community.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The turning point however, was the doctor\u2019s protest. Youth frustrations, and wider public frustration with the TMC\u2019s criminal administration erupted at a single point of anger. The rape and murder of the young doctor Abhaya, galvanized public anger cutting across class lines and the rural-urban divide. The BJP\u2019s lame duck efforts to secure the leadership of this movement fell flat on its face with the junior doctors rejecting them from the picket. If any political party played a major role in the protests, it was the CPIM through its mass organizations, the Students Front of India and the Democratic Youth Federation of India. They were instrumental in stopping the theft of Abhaya\u2019s body from R.G Kar hospital, and spearheading protests across the city in solidarity with the junior doctors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The CPIM\u2019s role in the doctor\u2019s protests did not translate into elections, this owes as much to the specific dynamic of elections themselves, as much as to the CPIM\u2019s own cautious approach where they failed to politicize the doctor\u2019s movement and potentially gain leadership of the fight. The doctor\u2019s movement was only the most visible expression of anger against the TMC and its leadership, at the same time that the junior doctors revolted against the system in Calcutta and Southern Bengal, a massive strike of tea plantation workers shook Northern Bengal. The latter struggle did not see a major role by the CPIM nor did the left more generally, capitalize on this to build solidarity across the state behind the workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were multiple pressures on the TMC, the doctors managed to squeeze out some concessions from the state without inflicting a clear decisive victory. The tea plantation workers had also won some concessions on pending pay and work conditions, but without a decisive break with the exploitative system that keeps them in poverty. The writing was on the wall, and the party had lost much credibility. Fissures were beginning to show within the party, the cohesion of the party which was held together by the personality cult of Mamata Bannerji was buckling. The BJP took advantage of all of this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unlike 2021, there was no major outcry against the party, the sentiment which had worked to defeat the party across multiple state constituencies in the national elections of 2024 was absent in West Bengal in 2026. The momentum of the farmer\u2019s strike was not matched by the general strikes in 2025, nor were there any massive agitations in the run up to the 2026 agitations. On the contrary, signs suggested that the BJP was regaining lost momentum, winning decisively in Bihar by utilizing voter list revisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If Bihar was the test case, West Bengal would be its chief field of application. The Special Intensive Revision was followed on the same principles which led to massive voter purges in Bihar. The commission had listed out 11 documents that everyone must present for authentication:<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

i) Passport, <\/p>\n\n\n\n

ii) National Register of Citizens document (NRC document), <\/p>\n\n\n\n

iii) tenth grade certificate, <\/p>\n\n\n\n

iv) Caste certificate, <\/p>\n\n\n\n

v) Land certificate, <\/p>\n\n\n\n

vi) Forest rights certificate, <\/p>\n\n\n\n

vii) Family register, <\/p>\n\n\n\n

viii) Any other bank or post office document. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Curiously the Aadhar Card and PAN card are missing from this list, but what is more ironic is that the Aadhar card is needed for obtaining any of these 11 documents. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The emphasis on documentation meant that many young voters, especially among the poor, would be disenfranchised. In West Bengal, this brought together a communal angle, the BJP raised the pitch of its propaganda against supposed illegal Bangladeshi \u2018infiltrators\u2019 settling in West Bengal with a vaguely explained plan to change the demographic and present a \u2018security challenge\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The only people who seriously believe this nonsense are hardcore Hindutva followers for whom even the normal migration of Muslims comes associated with some nefarious plan. In fact, the bulk of migrants from Bangladesh are Hindus escaping discrimination, and historically they were escaping persecution at the hands of the Pakistani state. Muslims who do come to India largely follow material instincts, seeking a better livelihood than what is on offer in the backward border districts of Bangladesh. It is near impossible to tell them apart from Bangladeshi Hindus and Bengali Muslims, but this cultural reality is not understood or even acknowledged by the Hindutva BJP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) was rolled out despite protests, with the aim of deleting as many voters as possible, especially among those who were perceived to be anti-BJP. The first phase of the SIR aimed at deleting deceased voters, with the presumption that those whose names were not in the electoral roll of 2002 (the last time a voter revision was carried out) would not be brought into the electoral list for 2026. The first saw deletions of up to 5.8 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the second phase, the deletions included those whose documentation and residency proof was dubious. After the second phase, the total of over 9 million names were deleted, these were people who had supposedly dubious data, or missed key identification documents. A complex process of appeals was set up, for which hundreds of judicial officers, judges and bureaucrats from the state were marshaled. Those deleted could appeal the decision before an SIR tribunal, and millions did. However, there were only a few hundred judges to take care of all of these cases. The most ludicrous cases of deletions after appeal were those of \u2018logical discrepancy\u2019 where a mere spelling mistake could result in a name being deleted from the voter list and thus denied the right to vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Actually disposing these cases could take several years, which left many voters in the limbo. Their voting rights remained questioned, the matter was eventually brought before the Supreme Court, which was hearing a challenge to the SIR brought before it by the CPIM. The Supreme Court once again showed where its political leanings lay, when it denied those voters under adjudication the right to vote in the West Bengal elections. Thus, in one fell swoop, over 9 million voters were disenfranchised, some for reasons as flimsy as a spelling error in their voter IDs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The brazenly unconstitutional removal of names barely elicited a whimper of protest from the mass of voters. Principled organizations came out to protest on the streets, there were protests by opposition parties, but by and large most people were aloof to the deletions. The state machinery held by the TMC cooperated with the efforts of the Central government and the election commission.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many analysts, and casual observers have cited the SIR as the decisive reason for the TMC\u2019s loss. However, this was just one factor in a host of factors behind the TMC\u2019s defeat. The BJP brought the full weight of central government power, giving the election commission sweeping powers to conduct the elections. In an unprecedented move, up to 480 companies of Central government paramilitaries were deployed to provide security for voters, numbering nearly half a million troops. The last time West Bengal saw this level of militarization was in preparation for the Bangladesh war in 1971.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The aim of course, was to disable the party machinery of the TMC which relied primarily on voter intimidation, the mass use of lumpen cadre to rig elections. Defending this setup was the party\u2019s control over the police and bureaucracy, both of whom were sidelined by the Election Commission and Central agencies deployed to the state. The task of law enforcement was taken over by Central government paramilitaries, while election observation, and counting, were centralized under the Election commission agents. From the date of announcement of polls to the day of voting, the state of West Bengal had all but come under the authority of the Central government. The TMC barely pushed back against any of this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As much as this was a heavy intrusion of Central government power into the state\u2019s affair, the public were accepting of this because they saw the TMC\u2019s openly criminal operation as worse. Secular politics had been discredited enough by the TMC that the BJP\u2019s communal agenda did not offend enough people to vote for the lesser evil this time. The opposite happened, where the BJP\u2019s communal agenda was tolerated and accepted, just to rid them of the TMC and its tyranny. The BJP positioned itself as a solution to the TMC\u2019s criminal rule, and succeeded in convincing most Hindu voters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Simmering discontent among the tribal populations of the Western districts and among the Gorkha communities of North Bengal, as well as the urban youth, all factored into giving the BJP a sweeping mandate. While at the same time, the SIR ensured many voters who could have voted with an anti-TMC and anti-BJP mandate, were cut off from the list. The turnout for both phases of the vote exceeded 90% showing the enthusiasm and freedom with which people voted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The BJP left no stone unturned in their effort to take West Bengal. Yet, the actual vote share of the party was at 45% , which means a majority of the state\u2019s electorate accounting for 55% of the vote, did not support the BJP and its agenda. 40% of the vote went to the TMC, no doubt with many choosing them as the lesser evil, or purely out of spite for deleting friends and family from the voter list in the SIR exercise. This is important as the state braces itself for the next 5 years of BJP rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The changed national and local situation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The demolition drives undertaken by the BJP, the restrictions on the sale of beef, the statements by the party\u2019s secretary and leadership in public, all reveal the BJP\u2019s ultimate agenda. West Bengal was not merely another state added to the list of BJP-ruled states, it is a final victory of Central power over federal opposition in India. The fall of West Bengal, the collapse of the TMC, and the erasure of Stalinist parties from the electoral mainstream, have created political conditions where Central power can rule with impunity. That Central power today is in the hands of the BJP and RSS, in other words, it is with the Hindutva movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All standard bourgeois democratic avenues of curbing the rise of Hindutva have been exhausted, the victory of the BJP in this state will now pave the way for the ultimate national agenda of transforming India into a Hindu Rashtra. The particular tempo of this change might vary, but we might be witnessing a tipping point where the shrinking of democratic spaces will become irreversible. The regional opposition of the Southern Dravidan states lack the numbers or cohesion to mount what could be achievable with a national opposition anchored in a bastion in West Bengal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The precise role of West Bengal in national politics, particularly from the late 60s onwards has been as a foil for potential Bonapartism. The Stalinist opposition was a powerful bulwark against complete centralization of power by the Congress, it was a valuable check on the rise of Hindutva parties in the decades of the 80s and 90s, and it served as a powerful check to the BJP and Modi\u2019s power for much of the last 12 years. With the end of West Bengal as an oppositional bastion, we can expect greater brazenness on part of the BJP at the national level. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the BJP have only just won in the state, they lack the grassroots organizational strength to consolidate power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the next five years, the BJP will be consolidating its presence in the state politically. The first obvious step is the total destruction of the TMC, the next step is less obvious, and that is containing the CPIM while it destroys its principal bourgeois opposition in the TMC. At the same time, we will likely be witnessing a rapid expansion of the RSS in the state, something that had already been catching pace under the TMC rule, will now acquire lightning fast pace, aided by much of Calcutta\u2019s traditionalist business community. West Bengal will be primed to become a major destination for investments, both domestic and foreign, while Calcutta and Siliguri will be transformed into industrial corridors that consolidates India\u2019s hold over the contested North East region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Together with these changes will come a stricter enforcement of sedition laws, a clamp down on working class militancy, and intensified attacks on West Bengal\u2019s informal and agricultural economy. The initial days of the BJP\u2019s rule has seen a spate of politically motivated FIRs against those who spoke against the party and its agenda, two prominent actors from the Bengali movie industry, Parambrata Chatterjee and Swastika Mukherjee, have become targeted for comments made on social media 5 years ago celebrating attacks on BJP cadres in the aftermath of the 2021 West Bengal assembly elections. In the same vein, the leader of the Bangla Pokkho (Bengali faction), a right wing ethno-nationalist organization, has been brought under arrest on dubious charges. These are only the first hints at what BJP rule might be for any opponent, a reinvigorated ABVP has made it their open agenda to \u2018weed out\u2019 so-called urban naxals from Jadavpur University, a leftist bastion. It is not just likely, but inevitable that the BJP in West Bengal will come down hard on leftist unions, organizations and any outspoken individuals in the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the BJP is triumphant In West Bengal, the picture elsewhere is not as rosy for them. Working class militancy is rising in the industrial belt of the North around Delhi and Gurgaon, discontent among the peasantry and petty bourgeois is growing, and the youth are inching toward an open rebellion. All the while, the Indian economy is facing its most dire crisis in decades. The political victory of the BJP hides structural vulnerabilities that plagues India, the victory here has been a good distraction for the BJP from its failures in managing India\u2019s economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Iran war is presently quiet, active fighting has been halted for a shaky ceasefire. Yet, the Straits of Hormuz continues to be blockaded. This adds to the strain weighing down India\u2019s growth, the rupee continues its decline while supplies of oil and gas continues to be interrupted. India has very limited strategic oil reserves, it imports most of what it needs and most of these supplies of oil and gas comes through the Straits of Hormuz. The economic hardships fuel anger among the masses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To add to India\u2019s woes, this year might see a super El Nino, which will cause havoc on Indian agriculture. The BJP has yet to regain the trust of India\u2019s farmers, if the El Nino hits the country at a time when it is staring at a fertilizer supply, Indian agriculture may very well collapse. The BJP has no tolerance for democratic dissent, and its natural response to any challenge is to attempt to crush it. The likelihood of the BJP acting more aggressively against protests has increased, especially now that it has been buoyed by the electoral victory in West Bengal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The tempo of class struggle in India is not even across regions. Eastern and North Eastern India at present, is in a reactionary situation of peace, with some exceptions. Northern India, especially among farmers, and workers in the industrial belt of Delhi, is witnessing more intense struggles. Southern India, which will face a double hammer of industrial stagnation and agricultural crisis, is witnessing some of the most active fights by the working class and youth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The BJP is fast losing the unconditional support it had from India\u2019s leading capitalists, the further India slips into crisis, the more vulnerable the BJP may become politically. For the BJP and indeed Modi, it is necessary to give the capitalists a victory, for this it must transform the political victory in West Bengal into an economic reward for India\u2019s capitalists. All the rhetoric of reindustrializing West Bengal must be seen in this context. The BJP\u2019s push towards industrializing West Bengal will be achieved at the cost of the working class, peasantry and petty bourgeois. The first shots fired are in the form of mass evictions of hawkers in Calcutta, in the name of removing squatters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the foreseeable future, the BJP will keep its efforts at consolidating power in the state, while pursuing its ultimate agenda of implementing Hindutva ideology in the state. This will provoke a fight back from the more conscious layers of society, especially among radicalized students and youth. Once the BJP has politically consolidated itself, the attacks on Bengali culture, especially Bengali Muslim culture, will pick up pace. This however, will be a distraction from the economic agenda, of aggressively proletarianizing Bengal\u2019s peasantry and petty bourgeois. So far, the BJP has political momentum to sustain such attacks, but they will not last. Should the BJP succumb to external economic pressures and be weighed down by an impending economic crisis, its position in West Bengal will become all the more tenuous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The strategic importance of West Bengal<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For any revolutionary strategy, Eastern India becomes invaluable. Throughout history Bengal has been a gateway region. It has been the bridge between the gangetic plain and the wider world through the Bay of Bengal, and it has been India\u2019s doorway to Eastern Asia, through overland and maritime routes that pass through its Himalayan passes. The indian bourgeoisie understands this now, as seen from its urgent attention to the Siliguri corridor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

West Bengal is India\u2019s 4th<\/sup> largest state by population, the 6th<\/sup> largest in economy, it is the gateway to three countries \u2013 Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. It is the state that connects North Eastern India and its \u2018seven sisters\u2019, with the Indian heartland through Bihar. The two most mineral-rich states of Odisha and Jharkhand are located in Eastern India, both bordering West Bengal. The intellectual, industrial and financial heartland of this wider region is based in Calcutta, which remains important despite its decline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bengal was where the dream of a united independent India was first envisioned, it was also the place where India\u2019s partition was envisioned and first executed. Bengal can be the place where partition is undone, together with Punjab. This would require defeating the twin reactionary pillars of Hindutva and Islamism, both propped up by capitalism. A victory of Hindutva in West Bengal is devastating, but it is not permanent, like all victories of capitalism and reaction, this victory will wither in the face of class struggle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The tasks before revolutionary Trotskyists is tremendous, we are not yet a mass force, and suffer from scattered isolation. Being marginal will not save us from the reactionary wave, on the contrary it only makes us more vulnerable. The crisis plaguing Indian capitalism presents opportunities to grow, but also challenges to organize. Understanding both is key to surviving and growing in the present adverse situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First published here<\/a> by New Wave Bolshevik-Leninist<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

For the first time in its history, the BJP has won the state elections of West Bengal, a state where until 2016, it did not control a single assembly seat. Not only did the BJP win the elections, it swept the polls securing 208 seats in the assembly of 294 seats, with a vote share of over 45% of all votes polled. The unprecedented rise of the BJP appears to defy all logic and the unique history of the state, yet this reality is rooted in the political developments in India and West Bengal since 2014.<\/p>\n

The BJP\u2019s victory in West Bengal was not an overnight or sudden phenomenon but years in the making, with certain key events propelling these changes forward. The consequences of this victory are yet to be fully seen, but we may get a hint of what\u2019s to come from statements made by BJP ministers, supporters and the actions of BJP cadres on the ground.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":23,"featured_media":76088,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"litci_post_political_author":"Mazdoor Inquilab","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[495,856],"tags":[6743,6745,3718,3561,6742],"class_list":["post-76087","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-india","category-asia","tag-bjp-2","tag-cpim","tag-election","tag-history","tag-result"],"yoast_head":"\nUnderstanding the Bengal\u00a0verdict - International Worker's League<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The BJP\u2019s victory in West Bengal was not an overnight or sudden phenomenon but years in the making, with certain key events propelling these changes forward. The consequences of this victory are yet to be fully seen, but we may get a hint of what\u2019s to come from statements made by BJP ministers, supporters and the actions of BJP cadres on the ground.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/understanding-the-bengal-verdict\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Understanding the Bengal\u00a0verdict - International Worker's League\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The BJP\u2019s victory in West Bengal was not an overnight or sudden phenomenon but years in the making, with certain key events propelling these changes forward. 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