{"id":73134,"date":"2023-06-13T19:29:10","date_gmt":"2023-06-13T19:29:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/?p=73134"},"modified":"2023-06-13T19:29:13","modified_gmt":"2023-06-13T19:29:13","slug":"the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/","title":{"rendered":"The Banking Crisis Tremors Continue"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Last month, in the US as well as Europe, there have been new episodes of the international banking crisis which began around two months ago with the bankruptcies of SVB (Silicon Valley Bank) and Signature Bank, and the collapse of Credit Swiss. Why is this crisis happening? How do we describe its dynamic and how does it relate to the broader dynamics of the international economy?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By Alejandro Iturbe<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the US, a third \u201cmid-size\u201d bank, First Republic Bank, has collapsed in less than two months, despite the 30 billion dollar rescue attempt by the country\u2019s major bank investors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recently, an FDIC statement announced that the San Francisco-based bank was closing, selling its operations to JP Morgan Chase for US$10.6 billion. According to the FDIC, after the bankruptcy of First Republic Bank, it \u201cwill cost the State \u2018around US$13 billion\u2019\u201d to guarantee its deposits [1].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was a great deal for the investment giant JP Morgan Chase, which got to keep the \u201cfailed bank\u2019s better quality assets\u201d backed by \u201ca series of \u2018golden\u2019 guarantees\u201d while deposits related to \u201clow quality\u201d assets were covered by money provided by the FDIC (i.e., the taxpayers) [2].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A diseased banking system<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Evidently, the FDIC\u2019s objective was to prevent a panicked bank run of clients at other troubled banks and a \u201cdomino effect\u201d of further failures, in the context of an already extremely malfunctioning banking system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Stanford University study shows that the situation of US banks \u201ccould be even worse than imagined\u201d and warned of \u201c200 banks in vulnerable situations.\u201d A new Hoover Institute investigation shows that \u201c2,315 financial institutions are sitting on assets worth less than their liabilities,\u201d with a negative difference estimated at \u201ctwo trillion dollars\u201d [3]. This is the result of the deprecation of the \u201cbalance sheet of long-term assets, such as mortgage securities and 10, 20, and 30-year bonds\u201d that have been hurt by the federally driven policy of interest rate hikes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This total includes banks of various sizes, many small local institutions as well as \u201cmid-sized\u201d regional banks (just behind the banking giants in the order of importance). The three banks under the greatest threat due to \u201crisk aversion\u201d are PacWest Bancorp, Western Alliance Bank, and KeyCorp, because they have experienced \u201cover 50% losses since the failure of SVB in March.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

So far, large investment banks and other giants seem safe from the shockwave of distrust in the system. The policy adopted by the FDIC in the case of First Republic Bank and JP Morgan Chase is designed to prevent such a \u201ccontagion,\u201d But concern emerges from \u201cthe impact this acquisition will have on JP Morgan\u2019s financial health\u201d \u2013 a concern gaining steam on Wall Street that questions the thesis that such banks are \u201ctoo big to fail\u201d in the US [4].<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

What do we do now?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

There have been very strong criticisms of the FDIC\u2019s policy. For example, hedge-fund manager Bill Ackman, founder of Pershing Square, gives the diagnosis that \u201cthe US regional banking system is at risk\u201d<\/em> [5].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In his analysis, he says that there already exists a deep \u201ccrisis of trust\u201d in depositors and investors who are withdrawing their deposits after any sign of alarm: \u201cno regional bank can survive bad news or bad data,\u201d leading to an \u201cinevitable fall in its share price.\u201d<\/strong> Deposits are withdrawn in \u201cthe search for strategic alternatives,\u201d creating a \u201cdomino effect\u201d that <\/em>will incur \u201ca large cost to the system and economy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Facing this dynamic, he criticizes the FDIC policy for acting on a \u201ccase by case\u201d basis and, as in the case of First Republic Bank, \u201ctoo late.\u201d He proposes the creation of \u201ca system-wide system of guarantees\u201d to prevent \u201ccrises of confidence\u201d and bank runs. According to him, \u201cwe are running out of time to solve this problem. How many unnecessary bank failures do we have to watch before the FDIC and our government wake up?\u201d<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Clearly, as a hedge-fund manager, Ackman is a stakeholder because his field is shrinking and he is affected by the \u201ccrisis of trust\u201d in the banking system. But he identifies a real, concrete problem: that FDIC policy has not stopped the shockwave and domino effect phenomena in the mid-size regional bank sector. This, as we have seen, in perspective, can also threaten large investment banks and other giants (\u201cthe cost to the system<\/em>\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In response to this, his proposal to create a \u201csystem-wide structure of guarantees\u201d means creating a \u201cshield\u201d for the mid-size banking sector and covering holes created by their bad business decisions and speculative bets \u2013 a shield made of US Treasury funds, that is, funds coming from all the country\u2019s taxpayers (or external purchasers of Treasury bonds).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The policy is similar to Obama\u2019s response to the 2008 banking crisis after the Lehman Brothers collapse. The only difference is that, at the time, the Fed acted directly as an \u201cinsurance company\u201d for the big banks and in this case, it would start with the \u201cmiddle rung\u201d of the banking system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The US public debt<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The US economy is in deficit: that is, it consumes more than it produces: <\/strong>\u201cIn recent years, the US economy has been built on the so-called \u2018twin deficits\u2019 of the balance between foreign trade and the government budget.\u201d <\/em>[\u2026]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe sum of both deficits meant that, in 2007, in order to function normally and not grind to a halt, the US economy needed an average of 3 billion dollars a day<\/strong> from abroad, through income from the sale of treasury bonds, other loans, direct investments, remittances of profits and royalties from subsidiaries of companies abroad, etc. Through various mechanisms, the US economy acts as a \u2018vacuum cleaner\u2019 for an entire part of the surplus value extracted in other regions of the world\u201d [6].<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Having a budget deficit means that the government is spending more than it receives in direct taxes. To pay its bills (suppliers, social security benefits, salaries of government and military workers, etc.) it needs to \u201cborrow\u201d and accumulate public debt. This is done through the issuance and sale of Treasury bonds for which it pays a certain interest rate set by the Fed. This interest, at the same time, increases the State\u2019s payment obligations, as well as the deficit itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In reality, this deficit has been growing steadily for decades. There have been periods of greater increase; for example, the one driven by indebtedness derived from Obama\u2019s policy of \u201cinjecting liquidity\u201d to save the bankrupt banking system; or the financing of the \u201ceconomic stimulus packages\u201d pushed through by the Biden administration. The following chart shows its evolution from its floor in the 1990s to the current figure of $31.4 trillion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The interest rate dilemma<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Treasury bond interest rate set by the Fed acts as the \u201cbenchmark rate\u201d for the entire US and, in effect, the global banking system. When the rate is low, it is said to drive a \u201ccheap money policy.\u201d On the contrary, a higher rate implies a policy of \u201cmaking the cost of money more expensive.\u201d The truth is that the Fed is coming from a year of gradual increases in its rate, which reached 5.25% this month (the highest it\u2019s been in the last fifteen years).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This high interest rate policy from the Fed had two objectives. The first was to secure a fluid sale of Treasury bonds to finance \u201cstimulus packages launched by the Biden government.\u201d The second was to use the policy of \u201cmaking the cost of money more expensive\u201d to lower the high inflation which characterized the weak post-pandemic economic recovery [7]. That is, to \u201cdry up the markets\u201d in order to reduce inflationary pressure represented by the \u201cexcess money\u201d generated by many years of monetary over-issuance (from 2008 to the present).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The bourgeoisie coexists with inflation and uses it as a weapon against the workers, through the erosion of the real value of wages (combining this with adjustment plans in sectors like health and public education, or privatization of services like transportation). But, in doing so, they open a flank of the class struggle which is sharpened by the response of the workers and the youth, as is shown by the great workers\u2019 struggles in Europe (especially in France and Great Britain). Throughout the past few years, glimpses of a similar potential have shown up in the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then, the bourgeoisie began to \u201cfight\u201d inflation with classic monetarist measures: raising interest rates (making the cost of money more expensive) to \u201cdry up\u201d the markets. In this way, it achieves partial success (in the US, inflation fell from over 8.5% in 2021 to an estimated 6% this year [8]).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, at the same time, this policy of \u201cdrying up the markets,\u201d on one hand, increases an already recessive tendency of the economy in general and, on the other, leaves the most compromised banking institutions in a very difficult situation, so several begin to collapse (which is what we are seeing now). In other words, with inflation, imperialist capitalism faces a situation the dilemma of the \u201cshort blanket.\u201d<\/a>[EL1]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Faced with this contradiction, the Fed gives contradictory signals. Just as it announced its final interest rate increase, it left open, with its language, the possibility that it might begin to lower the rate as of 2024. If this materializes, it would produce what bourgeois economists call an \u201cinverted yield curve.\u201d<\/em> That is, \u201cthe interest rates for these assets are higher in the short term (for three or two years) than in the long term (10 years)\u201d [9].<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This configuration leads Bank of America experts to predict that this US banking crisis will lead to a \u201cgeneral economic recession\u201d<\/em> and that this dynamic \u201ccould arise during the next quarter.\u201d<\/em> Its precedents are found in similar situations that occurred in 1990, 2001, and 2008 [10].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The data used by Bank of America experts is extremely technical and it is not even clear what the Fed will set the interest rate by 2024. But this pessimistic forecast expresses the fear of bourgeois analysts and economists that the combination of various factors is brewing the \u201cperfect storm.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The mess of the debt ceiling<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition to all the factors already analyzed, there is a conjunctural but very acute problem: on June 1, the US will have reached the point of using the \u201cpublic debt ceiling\u201d authorized by Congress. The Biden government needs Congress to approve a new extension of this \u201cceiling\u201d to issue and sell new Treasury Bonds and thus cover its needs. Otherwise, it will default<\/em> on its current spending and interest payments to Treasury bondholders. This would have a catastrophic impact not only on the US but on the whole world capitalist economy [11].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The last midterm elections (2019) determined a parliamentary impasse: the Democrats hold a very slight majority in the Senate while the Republicans are the majority in the House of Representatives, where bills must be initiated. In other words, the Joe Biden government cannot approve an increase in the debt ceiling without negotiating it with the Republican representatives (or at least, with a sector of them).<\/a>[EL2]<\/a>\u00a0[12]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Negotiations have already begun on a \u201cfeverish\u201d basis, with a looming \u201cdeadline.\u201d In a year marked by presidential campaigns and upcoming elections, \u201cRepublicans are pushing Biden to cut spending<\/strong>, including on some of their flagship programs<\/em>,\u201d such as the public Medicare healthcare system, in order to erode Joe Biden\u2019s re-election prospects. On their part, Democrats refuse to grant these cuts and \u201cdenounce \u2018irresponsible Republican extorsion\u2019 which will hurt Americans\u201d [12].<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most likely, the Democrats will end up accepting some minor cuts and, finally, the debt ceiling will be raised. In other words, the situation of defaulting<\/em> will not occur. What we want to point out is that this political situation is taking place in the context of a very precarious situation for the US banking system and a possible recessionary dynamic in its economy, and contributes to the aggravation of both problems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Crisis spreads to Europe<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cdomino effect\u201d is occurring not only in the US but also has begun to spread to Europe, through the channels of communication and investment across financial institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An example of this is the situation of Alecta, the biggest pension fund in Sweden<\/strong>, which holds assets worth $100 billion for 2.6 million clients [13].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the last few months, Alecta, having sold its majority stake in Swedish banks (such as Handelsbanken) to invest in US banks which were already experiencing problems and falling share prices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, Alecta has become the fourth-largest shareholder of Silicon Valley Bank, the fifth-largest of First Republic Bank and the sixth-largest of Signature Bank. This is a kind of risky financial transaction known as \u201cbuying short.\u201d The expectation was that the FDIC would bail out these banks, which would raise the stock prices and allow Alecta to make fast substantial profits. But the gamble turned out poorly and those banks eventually failed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alecta directly lost $2 billion in this transaction and Magnus Billing, the CEO who decided to pursue it, was forced to resign. Another consequence has been the \u201cflight of clients\u201d: these past few months, the Swedish fund registered 7,000 withdrawal requests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The deterioration of Alecta\u2019s equity, for now, is small compared to what US banks are going through. The \u201closs of trust\u201d from its clients is also relatively minor. But it demonstrates the contagious effect which crosses borders and how a part of the equity of financial institutions is based on \u201cbets\u201d in Europe too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A factor we have not referred to in this article is the class struggle: that is, the response of the workers and masses to the attacks of the bourgeoisies and governments, as demonstrated by the current European reality with its epicenter in France. This ongoing banking crisis and the forecasted recessive dynamic of the world economy mean that the bourgeoisies and governments will intensify these attacks. With that, they stoke the objective conditions which generate this response. If, as we are seeing in France, the class struggle will strengthen, this will be another central factor in shaping the \u201cperfect storm\u201d for imperialist capitalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> Quebr\u00f3 el First Republic y ser\u00e1 rescatado por el JP Morgan (diariopopular.com.ar)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> N\u00e3o acaba no First Republic: mais de 2 mil bancos dos EUA est\u00e3o com problemas de solv\u00eancia (um deles tem mais de US$ 1 tri em ativos) \u2013 Money Times<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> \u2018Quantos bancos precisam quebrar antes do governo americano acordar?\u2019, questiona investidor bilion\u00e1rio | Finan\u00e7as | Valor Econ\u00f4mico (globo.com)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> On this topic, we recommend reading \u201cCap\u00edtulo 8: EEUU, epicentro de la crisis actual\u201d del libro de Alejandro Iturbe O sistema financeiro e crise da econom\u00eda mundial<\/em>, Editora Sundermann, Brasil, 2009. (Chapter 8: The US, epicenter of the current crisis\u201d in Alejandro Iturbe\u2019s book On the financial system and crisis of the world economy<\/em>)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> Econom\u00eda mundial: recuperaci\u00f3n an\u00e9mica y con muchos problemas \u2013 Liga Internacional de los Trabajadores (litci.org)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> EEUU: la inflaci\u00f3n baj\u00f3 por octavo mes seguido y se ubic\u00f3 en el 6% anual, en l\u00ednea con lo esperado (ambito.com)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a> La crisis econ\u00f3mica podr\u00eda ser inminente, alertan desde Bank of America (eleconomista.es)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a> Estados Unidos podr\u00eda caer en default el 1 de junio: \u00bfC\u00f3mo avanzan las negociaciones en el Congreso para evitar una crisis financiera global? (clarin.com)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/a> Translators note: as of the first week of June, Biden passed a bill extending the deadline to Jan 1. 2025. This was done through negotiation with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, which stirred up anger among the GOP\u2019s dissenting conservative ranks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2023\/06\/06\/1180492284\/house-freedom-caucus-republicans-mccarthy-vote-debt-ceiling-gas-stoves<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13] Estados Unidos podr\u00eda caer en default el 1 de junio: \u00bfC\u00f3mo avanzan las negociaciones en el Congreso para evitar una crisis financiera global? (clarin.com)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14]<\/a> El fondo de pensiones de Suecia, la mayor v\u00edctima de la crisis bancaria desatada por la quiebra de SVB (eleconomista.es)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nhttps:\/\/www.npr.org\/2023\/06\/06\/1180492284\/house-freedom-caucus-republicans-mccarthy-vote-debt-ceiling-gas-stoves\n<\/div><\/figure>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Last month, in the US as well as Europe, there have been new episodes of the international banking crisis which began around two months ago with the bankruptcies of SVB (Silicon Valley Bank) and Signature Bank, and the collapse of Credit Swiss. Why is this crisis happening? How do we describe its dynamic and how […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":18,"featured_media":73136,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"litci_post_political_author":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3639,3498],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-73134","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-economy","category-usa"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Banking Crisis Tremors Continue - International Worker's League<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Banking Crisis Tremors Continue - International Worker's League\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Last month, in the US as well as Europe, there have been new episodes of the international banking crisis which began around two months ago with the bankruptcies of SVB (Silicon Valley Bank) and Signature Bank, and the collapse of Credit Swiss. Why is this crisis happening? How do we describe its dynamic and how […]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"International Worker's League\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2023-06-13T19:29:10+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-06-13T19:29:13+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/litci.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/9c17322_c630a7a2ce434ed59f63c0ce333f32bb-0-14f0724d352746769ad31e45038d6457.webp?fit=1440%2C720&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1440\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"720\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/webp\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Tara\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Tara\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"13 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Tara\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/1facc9e620e074f6509e2320eac22a14\"},\"headline\":\"The Banking Crisis Tremors Continue\",\"datePublished\":\"2023-06-13T19:29:10+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2023-06-13T19:29:13+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/\"},\"wordCount\":2632,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/litci.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/9c17322_c630a7a2ce434ed59f63c0ce333f32bb-0-14f0724d352746769ad31e45038d6457.webp?fit=1440%2C720&ssl=1\",\"articleSection\":[\"Economy\",\"U.S.\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/\",\"name\":\"The Banking Crisis Tremors Continue - International Worker's League\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/litci.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/9c17322_c630a7a2ce434ed59f63c0ce333f32bb-0-14f0724d352746769ad31e45038d6457.webp?fit=1440%2C720&ssl=1\",\"datePublished\":\"2023-06-13T19:29:10+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2023-06-13T19:29:13+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/litci.org\/en\/the-banking-crisis-tremors-continue\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/litci.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/9c17322_c630a7a2ce434ed59f63c0ce333f32bb-0-14f0724d352746769ad31e45038d6457.webp?fit=1440%2C720&ssl=1\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/litci.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/9c17322_c630a7a2ce434ed59f63c0ce333f32bb-0-14f0724d352746769ad31e45038d6457.webp?fit=1440%2C720&ssl=1\",\"width\":1440,\"height\":720,\"caption\":\"A television screen displaying financial news, including the stock price of First Republic Bank, is seen inside one of the bank's branches in New York's Financial District, on March 16, 2023. 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